Stephens v. Faus

Decision Date14 February 1906
Citation106 N.W. 56,20 S.D. 367
PartiesSTEPHENS v. FAUS.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hughes County.

Action by Louis L. Stephens against Oliver H. P. Faus. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

W. E Keeley and John Sutherland, for appellant. Horner & Stewart and Louis L. Stephens, for respondent.

HANEY J.

This is an action to compel the specific performance of a contract relating to real property. It is alleged in the complaint that the defendant was the owner of a certain described tract of land in Hughes county; that the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract whereby the defendant agreed to convey the land by warranty deed, free of all incumbrances to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff agreed to pay therefor the sum of $500; that the defendant, though requested, has failed and refused to convey; and that the plaintiff is still ready and willing to pay for the property. The answer admits that the defendant owns the land, and that he has not delivered or offered to deliver a deed, and denies all the other allegations of the complaint. The decision of the learned circuit court was in favor of the plaintiff defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and this appeal taken.

Appellant's assignments of error are substantially as follows: "(1) The court erred in overruling defendant's objections to the introduction of Exhibit B. (2) In overruling defendant's objections to the introduction in evidence of the following exhibits: Exhibit C, Exhibits D and E, Exhibit F, Exhibit G, Exhibit H, Exhibit I, Exhibit J, Exhibit K, Exhibit L, and Exhibit M. (3) In overruling defendant's objection to the following question, to wit: 'State whether or not you found from the records that the defendant owns any land in Hughes county.' (4) In overruling the objection of defendant to the following question, to wit: 'State whether or not that is the same tract of land that you described in this deed that you sent Mr. Faus, defendant.' (5) In rendering his decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. (6) In refusing to sign the findings of fact presented by the defendant, instead of those presented by the plaintiff and signed by the court. (7) In refusing to sign the conclusions of law presented to him for signature by the defendant. (8) In deciding that the evidence warranted decision in favor of plaintiff, and in deciding that the minds of the parties met so as to form a contract. (9) That the decisions of the court is not sustained by the evidence, first, because there is not sufficient evidence to show that the minds of the parties met so as to form a contract; second, if there was a contract, the same was abrogated by the plaintiff requiring the signature of defendant's wife to the deed. (10) The court erred in signing the findings of fact and conclusions of law presented by and in favor of the plaintiff. (11) The court erred in overruling plaintiff's [[defendant's] motion for a new trial."

The first four assignments might be deemed abandoned because not discussed in appellant's brief. However, they present so reversible error. The plaintiff resided in this state; the defendant in Florida. The evidence of the alleged contract consisted of letters and telegrams which passed between the parties. The exhibits mentioned were either letters, copies of letters, or copies of telegrams relating to such contract. Proper foundation was laid for the introduction of copies, and each of the exhibits was relevant. The statement that the plaintiff found from the records that the defendant owns land in Hughes county was harmless, if not admissible, because the defendant admitted in his answer that he owned the land described in the complaint. The deed referred to in the fourth assignment was in the defendant's possession. There was notice to produce and oral evidence of its contents was entirely proper.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh assignments specify no particular errors occurring at the trial, and present nothing for review. The eighth assignment is unavailing because it attempts to question the sufficiency of the evidence without specifying wherein it is insufficient.

The ninth assignment, though imperfectly stated, may be regarded as specifying the particulars in which the evidence is alleged to be insufficient to justify the decision, a question which can be considered only on an appeal which presents for review an order denying a motion for a new trial, and such an order made after judgment, as in this case, can be reviewed only on an appeal from such order. Pierce v. Manning, 2 S. D. 517, 51 N.W. 332; Hawkins v. Hubbard, 2 S. D. 631, 51 N.W. 774; Norwegian Plow Co. v. Bellon, 4 S. D. 384, 57 N.W 17; Evenson v. Webster, 3 S. D. 382, 53 N.W. 747, 44 Am. St. Rep. 802; Gade v. Collins, 8 S. D. 322, 66 N.W. 466; Sinkling v. Railway Co., 10 S.D. 560, 74 N.W. 1029; Machine Co. v. Skau, 10 S.D. 636, 75 N.W. 199; Bourne v. Johnson, 10 S.D. 36, 71 N.W. 140; Parrish v. Mahany, 10 S.D. 276, 73 N.W. 97, 66 Am. St. Rep. 715; Mettel v. Gales, 12 S.D. 632, 82 N.W. 181; Hughes v. Stearns, 13 S.D. 628, 84 N.W. 196. Under the law as it was prior to 1901 no appeal would lie from a judgment or order until after it had been "entered" as a permanent record of the court below. State v. Lamm, 9 S. D. 418, 69 N.W. 592; Coburn v. Board, 10 S.D. 552, 74 N.W. 1026; Martin...

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