Stephens v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 05-709.

• Decision Date: 31 January 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-709.,05-709.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Parties: Brenda Kay STEPHENS, Petitioner, v. FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, Hon. John W. Larson, Respondent.

128 P.3d 1026

2006 MT 21

331 Mont. 40

Brenda Kay STEPHENS, Petitioner, v. FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, Hon. John W. Larson, Respondent.

No. 05-709.

Supreme Court of Montana.

January 31, 2006.

OPINION AND ORDER

¶ 1 Petitioner Brenda Kay Stephens (Brenda) seeks a Writ of Prohibition to the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, prohibiting it from hearing, enforcing, or deciding any parenting matters concerning her minor children, or in the alternative, that this Court direct the District Court to suspend temporarily its proceeding pending a final resolution of this matter. In an Order dated December 20, 2005, we directed the District Court and Jesse Delbert Stevens (Jesse), the father of the minor children, to respond to Brenda's Petition. Both filed responses.

¶ 2 Brenda and Jesse were married in Montana on November 5, 1999. The parties have two minor children. Jesse, Brenda and their children lived in Montana until sometime in 2002 when they moved to Arkansas. The family returned to Montana in the spring of 2005. The parties took steps at that time that would imply that they intended the move to Montana to be permanent. For example, Jesse and Brenda enrolled their children in schools in Missoula during May 2005. Brenda applied for and received a Montana conservation license. She also opened a bank account in Montana.

¶ 3 Brenda left Montana with the two minor children in August 2005 and returned to Arkansas. Jesse filed a Petition for Dissolution on August 10, 2005. Jesse's Petition for Dissolution also included a proposed parenting plan. Brenda filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Dissolution based upon the District Court's lack of jurisdiction over the minor children. The District Court denied Brenda's motion in an Order, dated November 28, 2005, on the grounds that it had jurisdiction to resolve the parenting issue based upon § 40-4-211(1)(a)(ii), MCA. This provision states that a district court has jurisdiction to decide parenting matters if Montana "had been the child's home state within 6 months before commencement of the proceedings" and the child is absent from Montana because of the child's removal by a parent and the other parent continues to live in Montana. The District Court further ordered Brenda to return the children to Montana on or before December 24, 2005.

¶ 4 Brenda argues in her petition that the District Court mistakenly interpreted § 40-4-211(1)(a)(ii), MCA, as conferring jurisdiction on the District Court whenever a child's home state has been Montana within six months before the commencement of the proceedings. Brenda points out the District Court's order makes no reference to "home state" as defined according to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Section 40-7-103(7), MCA. The UCCJEA defines "home state" as being "the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." Section 40-7-103(7), MCA. Brenda argues that the UCCJEA sets six consecutive months as a minimum length of residence for the children before Montana can be considered the children's home state. The District Court found that Jesse and Brenda returned to Montana in May 2005 and that Jesse filed his Petition for Dissolution on August 10, 2005.

¶ 5 The District Court and Jesse concede that § 40-4-211(1)(a)(ii), MCA, cannot bestow jurisdiction in this matter. They argue instead that the District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA, in that accepting jurisdiction would be in the best interests of the children based on the fact that the minor children and Jesse and Brenda have a significant connection with Montana. In making this argument, the District Court and Jesse contend that the children have no "home state" for purposes of the UCCJEA, §§ 40-7-101 to -317. They argue that Arkansas lost its status as the minor children's home state when the entire family moved to Montana in May of 2005. Montana and Arkansas, they argue, condition the application of the six-month grace period upon a parent, or person acting as a parent, remaining in the former state. Section 40-7-201(1)(a), MCA; Ark.Code Ann. § 9-19-201(a)(1). Both parents moved to Montana and lived with the minor children in May 2005, and no parent continued to reside in Arkansas. In the absence of any "home state" under the UCCJEA, the District Court and Jesse argue that the provisions of § 40-4-211(1)(b), MCA, apply. We disagree.

¶ 6 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the UCCJEA in 1997. Montana enacted the UCCJEA in 1999. See §§ 40-7-101 to -317, MCA; Stoneman v. Drollinger, 2003 MT 25, ¶ 14, 314 Mont. 139, ¶ 14, 64 P.3d 997, ¶ 14. The UCCJEA sought to increase uniformity in state laws regarding jurisdiction and custody matters and further sought to avoid disputes between competing jurisdictions. See Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, 9 U.L.A. 649-52 (1997). The UCCJEA drafters dealt specifically with the conflict created by differing jurisdictions taking contrary views of the bases of jurisdiction by choosing to "prioritize[] home state jurisdiction." 9 U.L.A. 651. The drafters, thus, made it clear that the UCCJEA would give priority to a finding of home state jurisdiction over any other jurisdictional provisions.

¶ 7 The UCCJEA also completely eliminates a determination of "best interests" of a child from the original jurisdictional inquiry. 9 U.L.A. 649-52; In re Marriage of Fontenot, 2003 MT 242, ¶ 15, 317 Mont. 298, ¶ 15, 77 P.3d 206, ¶ 15. These changes advance a more efficient and "bright line" jurisdictional rule consistent with the purpose of the UCCJEA. Section 201 cmt. 2, 9 U.L.A. 672. The UCCJEA specifically seeks to avoid a judicial analysis of substantive issues in the determination of jurisdiction. Section 201 cmt. 2, 9 U.L.A. 672. The statutory text of § 40-7-201(1), MCA, allows consideration of these other substantive factors only if no state qualifies as a "home state."

¶ 8 Considerable confusion has arisen in this matter regarding how to analyze the children's "home state" for purposes of determining jurisdiction. Such confusion seems understandable in light of the apparent contradictory language set forth in the Montana statutes. Section 40-7-201(1)(a), MCA, provides that Montana has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination if it is the child's home state "within six months before" the commencement of the child custody proceeding. By contrast, "home state" as defined under § 40-7-103(7), MCA, requires a child to have lived in Montana for "at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding."

¶ 9 Thus, if a child's home state three months before a parent commenced a custody proceeding differs from the state to which a child has moved permanently, § 40-7-103(7), MCA, would indicate that no "home state" exists. The court would then determine initial jurisdiction based upon a significant connection to Montana and other substantive factors set forth under § 40-7-201(1)(b), MCA. On the other hand, under these same facts, § 40-7-201(1)(a), MCA, would declare the prior state the home state because it was a child's home state within six months of the filing of the action. Initial jurisdiction then would rest in the prior state regardless of any significant connections to the state in which the parent filed the action.

¶ 10 The facts and circumstances of this matter directly present the apparent statutory conflict between § 40-7-201(1)(a), MCA, and § 40-7-103(7), MCA. The children lived in Arkansas for more than six consecutive months ending in May 2005. The children then resided in Montana for the next three months, immediately before Jesse filed the petition in August 2005. Thus, under Brenda's interpretation of the statute, Arkansas is the children's home state as a matter of law under § 40-7-201(1)(a), MCA. Arkansas, under this view, was the children's home state (from 2002 to May 2005) within six months of the filing of the petition in August 2005 and therefore possesses initial jurisdiction.

¶ 11 Under the interpretation of the statute supported by the District Court and Jesse, neither Arkansas nor Montana qualifies as the children's home state as neither state meets the requirements of § 40-7-103(7), MCA, that the children live in the state "for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." Under that scenario, the District Court would be required to hold a hearing to determine whether a significant connection with Montana existed and the other substantive factors set forth in § 40-7-201(1)(b), MCA, to determine whether Montana should have initial jurisdiction.

¶ 12 The drafters intended that the UCCJEA should be construed to promote one of its primary purposes of avoiding the jurisdictional competition and conflict that flows from hearings in competing states when each state substantively reviews subjective factors, such as "best interest," for purposes of determining initial jurisdiction. We thus resolve any statutory conflict in the application of home state jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the UCCJEA's intent of strengthening the certainty of home state jurisdiction.

¶ 13 As a result, we hold that "home state" for...