Stephens v. Herring

• Decision Date: 02 July 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2:92cv143.
• Citation: Stephens v. Herring, 827 F.Supp. 359 (E.D. Va. 1993)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Frizzel STEPHENS, Plaintiff, v. Robert HERRING, Assistant Attorney General, Raymond M. Muncy, Patricia A. Johnson, Lou Ann White, Virginia Department of Corrections, M.J. Wilkerson, Virginia Department of Corrections, James A. Smith, Virginia Department of Corrections, Russell Wilson, and Fidelity Deposit of Maryland, Defendants.

827 F. Supp. 359

Frizzel STEPHENS, Plaintiff, v.Robert HERRING, AssistantAttorney General, Raymond M. Muncy, Patricia A. Johnson, Lou Ann White, Virginia Department of Corrections, M.J. Wilkerson, Virginia Department of Corrections, James A. Smith, Virginia Department of Corrections, Russell Wilson, and Fidelity Deposit of Maryland, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 2:92cv143.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

July 2, 1993.

Frizzel Stephens, pro se.

Karen Lynn Lebo, Office of the Atty. Gen., Richmond, VA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PAYNE, District Judge.

Frizzel Stephens, a former Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights and seeking monetary relief.The conspiracy claim grows out of this court's decision in a previous action filed by plaintiff in which he claimed that Virginia's parole eligibility statute, Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-151, was unconstitutional as applied to him.By opinion and order issued by the Honorable Robert G. Doumar on December 10, 1990, this court rejected plaintiff's claim and granted summary judgment for the defendants in that action.SeeStephens v. Muncy,751 F.Supp. 1214(E.D.Va.1990).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed that decision by unpublished opinion.SeeStephens v. Muncy,929 F.2d 694(4th Cir.1991).Judge Doumar also denied plaintiff's subsequent motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) for relief from judgment.The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision by unpublished opinion as well.SeeStephens v. Muncy,972 F.2d 342(4th Cir.1992).It is undisputed that, in ruling on those matters, Judge Doumar acted in his capacity as a judge of this court and within the scope of his jurisdiction.

In the present case, which was assigned initially to Judge Doumar, plaintiff alleges that defendants somehow conspired to violate his constitutional rights in the previous action.On March 8, 1993, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint in this action to add Judge Doumar as an additional defendant and to seek unspecified declaratory and injunctive relief against him.In the motion to amend, Stephens essentially claimed that, by denying his earlier challenge to Virginia's parole eligibility statute and by holding that statute applicable to him, Judge Doumar was in league with the defendants in conspiring to violate Stephens' asserted rights.Stephens further contended that, because he sought only declaratory and injunctive relief against Judge Doumar, the claim was not barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.SeeFowler v. Alexander,478 F.2d 694, 696(4th Cir.1973).Finally, Stephens requested Judge Doumar to recuse himself, see28 U.S.C. § 455, and also to reconsider an earlier decision in this action denying a request for appointment of counsel.

By order dated May 21, 1993, Judge Doumar denied the motion for reconsideration, but, because no responsive pleadings had yet been served, granted Stephens' motion to amend the complaint to add him as a defendant.SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 15(a).Because of the pending recusal motion, Judge Doumar further "ordered that this matter be referred to another United States District Judge for the initial purpose of determining whether plaintiff has an action against the undersigned."Stephens was directed to submit affidavits or legal memoranda supporting the claim he intended to pursue against Judge Doumar.In response, Stephens submitted a document entitled "Objections and Response to Order" which does not address the conspiracy claim, but merely objects to certain alleged misstatements in the court's May 21 order and again requests that Judge Doumar recuse himself.

It is against this background that the court addresses whether Stephens can maintain an action for injunctive and declaratory relief against Judge Doumar based on the Judge's allegedly conspiratorial conduct in ruling on legal issues presented in the prior action in this court.Put differently, the fundamental issue presented in this case is whether the doctrine of judicial immunity bars an action against a federal judge seeking injunctive or declaratory relief for allegedly improper conduct undertaken by the judge while performing a judicial act within the judge's jurisdiction.

For the reasons set forth below, the court dismisses plaintiff's complaint under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

DISCUSSION

It has long been established that judges, whether federal or state, enjoy absolute immunity from civil actions for damages challenging their judicial acts, "`even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.'"Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104, 55 L.Ed.2d 331(1978)(quotingBradley v. Fisher,13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646(1872));see alsoClay v. Yates,809 F.Supp. 417, 422-23(E.D.Va.1992).In particular, the Supreme Court of the United States has expressly recognized that judicial immunity precludes actions for civil damages against state judges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.Pierson v. Ray,386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288(1967).

However, in Pulliam v. Allen,466 U.S. 522, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565(1984), the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that judicial immunity did not extend to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking prospective injunctive relief against state judges on account of their judicial acts.Unlike Pulliam, the present action involves a claim asserted against a federal judge acting under color of federal law, and is therefore properly brought, if at all, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619(1971), not § 1983.Neither the Supreme Court nor our Court of Appeals has considered whether injunctive or declaratory relief is available in a Bivens action against a federal judge for alleged constitutional torts committed during the exercise of his or her judicial functions.Although the Supreme Court has observed generally that, for purposes of immunity, there is no difference between actions brought under § 1983andBivens, those observations were made not in the context of judicial immunity, but in cases involving, for example, immunity for court reporters, Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.,___ U.S. ___, ___ n. 5, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 2170 n. 5, 124 L.Ed.2d 391(1993), or federal executive officers, Butz v. Economou,438 U.S. 478, 503-04, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909-10, 57 L.Ed.2d 895(1978), and are not controlling here.

Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court has frequently relied on its § 1983 jurisprudence to set the parameters of Bivens claims, seeEconomou,438 U.S. at 496-97, 98 S.Ct. at 2905-06, this court must determine whether the Supreme Court's reasoning in Pulliam applies with equal force to permit claims for equitable relief against federal judges under Bivens.In this regard, at least three federal courts have held that it does not, finding instead that federal judges enjoy the same immunity from equitable remedies as they do from damages.SeeMullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern Dist. of Nev.,828 F.2d 1385(9th Cir.1987), cert. denied,486 U.S. 1040, 108 S.Ct. 2031, 100 L.Ed.2d 616(1981);Wightman v. Jones,809 F.Supp. 474(N.D.Tex.1992);Page v. Grady,788 F.Supp. 1207(N.D.Ga.1992).But seeScruggs v. Moellering,870 F.2d 376, 378(7th Cir.)(dictum criticizing Mullis), cert. denied,493 U.S. 956, 110 S.Ct. 371, 107 L.Ed.2d 357(1989);Affeldt v. Carr,628 F.Supp. 1097(N.D.Ohio1985);but cf.Dorman v. Higgins,821 F.2d 133, 139(2d Cir.1987)(assuming, without analysis, that claims for injunctive relief could be asserted against a federal probation officer, but finding that no injunctive relief was warranted).As discussed below, in the context of our federal system, while Pulliam's rationale may permit a federal court to enjoin the unconstitutional conduct of a state court judge, it does not, for reasons of policy and jurisdictional power, permit a federal court to enjoin the conduct of a member of a co-equal or superior federal tribunal.

In Pulliam, the majority based its decision not to extend to state court judges judicial immunity from prospective injunctive relief under § 1983 on two factors.First, the Court determined that the common law, from which we derive our concept of judicial immunity, permitted injunctive-type writs against inferior or rival courts and hence did not preclude equitable relief against state judges who were, as a matter of federal law, subject to the authority of the federal courts on issues governed by federal constitutional or statutory law.466 U.S. at 529-40, 104 S.Ct. at 1974-80.Second, the Court determined that, in enacting § 1983, Congress intended to allow injunctive relief against state judges in order to effectuate the fundamental purpose for which § 1983 was enacted.Id. at 540-41, 104 S.Ct. at 1980-81.Because these factors are significant in assessing whether the decision in Pulliam controls the issue presented here, they are considered in detail below.

With regard to the effect of the common law, the Supreme Court first observed that "there was no such thing at common law as an injunction against a judge."Id. at 529, 104 S.Ct. at 1974.The Court nevertheless drew an analogy between equitable relief against state judges in § 1983 actions and "the collateral prospective relief available against judges through the use of the King's prerogative writs," particularly "the writs of prohibition and mandamus."Id. at 529, 532, 104 S.Ct. at 1974, 1976.As the Court explained, the judges of the King's Bench, who exercised the authority of the crown, issued the writs against inferior and rival courts(particularly the rival ecclesiastical courts), not only to control their jurisdiction, but also to enjoin a variety of...