Stephens v. Hopper

• Decision Date: 20 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 33487,33487
• Citation: 247 S.E.2d 92,241 Ga. 596
• Parties: STEPHENS v. HOPPER.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 92

247 S.E.2d 92

241 Ga. 596

STEPHENS v. HOPPER.

No. 33487.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Argued May 8, 1978.

Decided July 6, 1978.

Rehearing Denied July 20, 1978.

James C. Bonner, Jr., Athens, Hugh Lawson, Hawkinsville, for appellant.

Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harrison Kohler, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Alpha Otis O'Daniel Stephens, was convicted of murder in the Superior Court of Bleckley County in January of 1975 and sentenced to death. The conviction and sentence were affirmed in Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 227 S.E.2d 261 (1976). In April of 1977, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Tattnall Superior Court attacking his death sentence on various constitutional and statutory grounds. The Tattnall Superior Court denied his petition for habeas relief. We granted his application to appeal.

A brief review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the appellant's conviction of murder and sentence to death is necessary to an understanding of the arguments made in his habeas corpus petition.

In August of 1974, the appellant was serving concurrent three-year sentences under multiple convictions for burglaries committed by the appellant in April of 1973. He was being held in the Houston County jail, from which he escaped on August 19th. Before being apprehended on August 22nd, the appellant, in addition to committing a prior armed robbery and burglary, broke into the home of Charles Asbell in Twiggs County and proceeded to burglarize it. As the burglary was under way, Roy Asbell, Charles Asbell's father, drove up. The appellant approached Asbell with a pistol and forced him out of the car. He hit Asbell in the face several times and took several hundred dollars from him. The appellant then hit Asbell with the pistol and forced him back into the car. He drove Asbell approximately three miles, across the county line into Bleckley County, and killed him there by shooting him twice in the head.

In October of 1974, the appellant pleaded guilty in the Superior Court of Twiggs County to an indictment accusing him of committing an armed robbery and a murder in May of 1973. He also pleaded guilty to indictments accusing him of the following offenses arising from the criminal episode at the Asbell residence: one count of burglary, one count of motor vehicle theft, one count of armed robbery, and one count of kidnapping with bodily injury. The count of the indictment charging him with kidnapping with bodily injury alleged that the appellant, "did unlawfully and with force and arms abduct and steal away Roy Asbell, a person, without lawful authority, and held Roy Asbell against his will and did physically abuse and did inflict and cause bodily injury to the body of Roy Asbell by beating, hitting and kicking Roy Asbell And did threaten to kill Roy Asbell and then did kill Roy Asbell by shooting Roy Asbell . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

The appellant pleaded guilty to the kidnapping-with-bodily-injury indictment in Twiggs County, and he was given a sentence of life imprisonment. He was then placed on trial for the murder of Roy Asbell in Bleckley County. The jury imposed the death penalty, finding as statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) that the offense of murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction of a capital felony, Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b)(1); (2) that the murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions, Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b)(1), supra; and, (3) that the offense of murder was committed by a person who had escaped from the lawful custody of a peace officer or a place of lawful confinement, Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b)(9). Although noting that in Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534(7), 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976) that portion of Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b)(1) which authorizes the death penalty where a murder is committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive convictions had been struck down as unconstitutionally vague, this court affirmed the appellant's death sentence in Stephens v. State, supra, as the evidence supported the jury's finding of other statutory aggravating circumstances.

1. In the first enumeration of error, the appellant argues that in view of the allegations of homicide in the Twiggs County kidnapping-with-bodily-injury indictment, it became necessary for the state to prove that the kidnap victim was killed; therefore, so this argument proceeds, the appellant's subsequent trial, conviction, and sentence for murder in Bleckley County were barred by state and federal constitutional guarantees ensuring due process and prohibiting double jeopardy.

Both the substantive and procedural aspects of this double jeopardy argument are controlled adversely to the appellant by our recent decision in Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67 (11), 243 S.E.2d 510 (1978).

The starting point for an analysis for any double jeopardy question in this state must begin with Code Ann. §§ 26-505 through 26-507 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1267) and the seminal decision interpreting these statutory provisions, State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 206 S.E.2d 475 (1974). Estevez recognizes that these provisions of the 1968 Georgia Criminal Code provide new, expanded statutory tests for determining double jeopardy questions, thereby rendering inapplicable previous Georgia decisions applying only minimum constitutional standards of double jeopardy. These statutory provisions distinguish between two aspects of double jeopardy first, limitations upon multiple prosecutions for crimes arising from the same conduct (referred to as the Procedural bar of double jeopardy); and, second, limitations upon multiple convictions or punishments that may be imposed for such crimes (referred to as the Substantive bar of double jeopardy).

As to the Procedural bar of double jeopardy, Code Ann. § 26-506 requires all crimes arising from the same conduct to be prosecuted in a single prosecution provided they are in the same jurisdiction and are known to the prosecutor unless the court in the interest of justice orders separate trials. Code Ann. § 26-507 sets out in detail when a second prosecution is barred. A prosecution is not barred within the meaning of Code Ann. § 26-507, "if the former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the accused or the crime." Id., subsection (d)(1).

In the present case, it is undisputed that the appellant kidnapped Roy Asbell in Twiggs County, inflicted bodily injury upon him in that county, and then abducted him to Bleckley County and killed him there. As a result, these two offenses were not within a single court's jurisdiction and could not have been tried together. Therefore, there was no procedural bar to the appellant's subsequent prosecution for the murder of Roy Asbell in Bleckley County. Potts v. State, supra, 241 Ga. at pp. 77-78, 243 S.E.2d 510.

As to the Substantive bar of double jeopardy, Code Ann. § 26-506(a)(1) provides that when the conduct of an accused may establish the commission of more than one crime, the accused may be Prosecuted for each crime, but he may not be Convicted of more than one crime, if one crime is included in the other. Code Ann. § 26-505(a) and (b) provide alternative rules for determining when one crime is included in another. A crime is so included if "(i)t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts or a less culpable mental state than is required to establish the commission of the crime charged" (Code Ann. § 26-505(a)), Or "(i)t differs from the crime charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission" (Code Ann. § 26-505(b)). Code Ann. § 26-505(a) sets out the rules for determining included crimes as a matter of fact, and Code Ann. § 26-505(b) sets out the rules for determining included crimes as a matter of law. State v. Estevez, supra, 232 Ga. 316, 206 S.E.2d 475.

In Potts, supra, we held that murder and kidnapping with bodily injury are not included crimes as a matter of law, citing Pryor v. State, 238 Ga. 698, 701, 234 S.E.2d 918 (1977). However, Potts argued that his murder conviction was included in his kidnapping-with-bodily-injury conviction as a matter of fact, since the kidnapping-with-bodily-injury indictment alleged as the bodily injury the killing of the victim. This is the precise argument the appellant makes in this case. In Potts we rejected the argument that the murder charge was, therefore, established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts required to establish the commission of kidnapping-with-bodily-injury charge. We rejected this argument because the state, in order to establish the kidnapping-with-bodily-injury charge, had to prove an unlawful abduction of the victim against his will, which did not have to be proved in order to establish the murder charge; and, in order to establish the murder charge, the state had to prove malice aforethought, which did not have to be proved in order to establish the kidnapping-with-bodily-injury charge. In other words, we held that murder and kidnapping with bodily injury were not included as a matter of fact under the first prong of Code Ann. § 26-505(a), since these crimes have distinct elements. The first enumeration of error is without merit.

2. In the second enumeration of error, the appellant argues that the failure of the court reporter to transcribe the closing arguments of counsel renders the subsequently imposed death penalty unconstitutional.

It is true that improper statements made by the prosecutor in his closing argument to the jury can cause the death penalty to be set aside. See Prevatte v. State, 233 Ga. 929, 214 S.E.2d 365(6) (1975). Therefore, even though not required by statute (Code Ann. § 27-2401), closing arguments of counsel should be taken down in a case in...