Stephens v. Kemp
Decision Date | 06 December 1984 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 84-484-1-MAC. |
Citation | 602 F. Supp. 960 |
Parties | Alpha Otis O'Daniel STEPHENS, Petitioner, v. Ralph KEMP, Superintendent, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Sumner & Hewes, William Sumner, Quintus W. Sibley, Atlanta, Ga., Thomas M. Lahiff, Jr., Kathryn Keneally, New York City, Kilpatrick & Cody, Virginia Taylor, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.
William B. Hill, Jr., Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Westmoreland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.
Petitioner Alpha Otis O'Daniel Stephens is before this court on his third application for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.A. ž 2254 (West 1977).1 In his petition, petitioner asserts only one claim in support of his prayer for relief: the inadequacy of the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the meaning and role of mitigating circumstances.
The respondent has answered by denying that any of petitioner's constitutional rights have been violated as a result of the sentencing phase charge. The respondent further pleads that this action constitutes an abuse of the habeas corpus process, and has therefore moved to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 9(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. ž 2254 (West 1977).2 Respondent asserts that petitioner should have raised this claim in his second application for habeas corpus relief filed before this court on November 15, 1983. An evidentiary hearing, as required by Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727, 747 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877, 102 S.Ct. 357, 70 L.Ed.2d 187 (1981), was held on December 5, 1984.
The court perceives that two issues have been raised by petitioner's application. First, both parties agree that the constitutional sufficiency of the trial court's charge on mitigating circumstances was specifically considered and ruled upon against petitioner in his first application for federal habeas corpus relief. Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397, 404-05 (5th Cir.1980), modified on reh'g, 648 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.1981), rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) ( ). Petitioner maintains, however, that there has been an intervening change in the law which renders his sentencing phase charge constitutionally insufficient. Therefore, the court must determine if such a change has in fact occurred. Second, respondent, while not conceding that there has been an intervening change in the law, argues that if such a change occurred, it took place prior to the November, 1983, filing of petitioner's second application for federal habeas corpus relief, and that petitioner, having failed to raise this claim in his second petition, should now be precluded from asserting this issue. Therefore, assuming a change in the law occurred, this court must determine if this change took place prior to November, 1983, and, if so, whether petitioner can be excused for failing to present this claim in his previous appearance before this court.
The sentencing phase of petitioner's trial took place on January 21, 1975. The trial court gave the following further charge regarding the definition and role of mitigating circumstances:
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court held that a jury considering the imposition of the death penalty must be allowed to consider, as a mitigating factor, "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2965.
In October of 1978, the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Lockett as requiring a specific charge defining and explaining mitigating circumstances:
This constitutional requirement to allow consideration of mitigating circumstances would have no importance, of course, if the sentencing jury is unaware of what it may consider in reaching its decision. We read Lockett and Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 98 S.Ct. 2977, 57 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1978), then, to mandate that the judge clearly instruct the jury about mitigating circumstances and the option to recommend against death.
Chenault v. Stynchcombe, 581 F.2d 444, 448 (5th Cir.1978).
Petitioner's first petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus was filed in this court on February 8, 1979. In this petition, petitioner asserted that the trial court's charge on mitigating circumstances was inadequate. On appeal to the former Fifth Circuit, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund filed a brief as amicus curiae (see Appendix A to this opinion), wherein this issue was specifically raised in light of Chenault. See Brief for Amicus Curiae at 35-47, Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.1980) (reproduced herein as Appendix A). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this claim, stating:
To continue reading
Request your trial