Stephens v. Kemp
Decision Date | 08 June 1984 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. CV183-280. |
Citation | 592 F. Supp. 228 |
Parties | William Kenny STEPHENS, Petitioner, v. Ralph KEMP, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Alison Pease, John Rogers Carroll, Charles A. Glackin, Philadelphia, Pa., James K. Jenkins, Savannah, Ga., for petitioner.
Paula K. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Marion O. Gordon, William B. Hill, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.
Petitioner is under sentence of death. Before the Court is his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On February 15, 1980, a jury in the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, found William Kenny Stephens guilty of one count of murder and three counts of aggravated assault. The next day, Stephens was sentenced to death for the murder and to consecutive twenty year sentences on each aggravated assault count. In its opinion affirming the conviction and sentences, the Supreme Court of Georgia set forth the facts of the case:
Stevens sic v. State, 247 Ga. 698, 699, 278 S.E.2d 398, 401 (1981), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 3551, 77 L.Ed.2d 1398 (1983).
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on August 25, 1983 in the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia. The same day, the court held a hearing and denied habeas relief. On August 26, 1983, the Supreme Court of Georgia denied petitioner's application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal.
Also on August 26, 1983, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a stay of execution. Petitioner traveled rapidly through the judicial system because he was scheduled to be executed on August 29, 1983. The Court granted the petitioner's motion for a stay of execution.
Afterward, petitioner's counsel, who had represented petitioner at trial and throughout the various appeals and petitions for habeas relief, withdrew, and new counsel entered the case. New counsel amended the petition to include numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The claims of ineffective assistance of counsel had never been presented to the state courts. Therefore, this Court dismissed the petition under authority of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). Stephens v. Kemp, 578 F.Supp. 103 (S.D.Ga.1983).
Petitioner again journeyed quickly through the court system because on November 29, 1983, he was rescheduled to be executed on December 12, 1983. On December 7, 1983, petitioner returned to the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia, with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After a hearing, the court denied relief and ordered the petition dismissed, reasoning that the petition was successive and that petitioner had waived his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by not raising it in his original state habeas petition. The Supreme Court of Georgia on December 8, 1983, denied petitioner's application for a certificate of probable cause.
The following day, petitioner filed in this Court another petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court granted a stay of execution.
The Court originally scheduled a hearing on this case for January 24, 1984. Due to the unexpected illness of one of petitioner's lawyers, the Court postponed the hearing and later scheduled it for April 3, 1984.
At the hearing held April 3, 1984, petitioner's counsel identified several claims that would not be pursued: (1) the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for his failure to reveal a conflict of interest between his representation of petitioner and his alleged representation of the sole eyewitness of the shooting of Investigator Stevens; (2) the claim that trial counsel was ineffective because of his failure to challenge adequately the admissibility of petitioner's pretrial statements to police; (3) the claim that trial counsel was ineffective due to his failure to challenge the grand and petit jury arrays in Richmond County, Georgia; (4) the claim that trial counsel was ineffective because of his failure to prepare and present sufficient evidence for a change of venue; (5) the claim that trial counsel was ineffective because of his failure to challenge the adequacy and methodology of the review of death penalty cases by the Supreme Court of Georgia; (6) the claim that the trial court erred because of its failure to sever the trial on the murder charge from the charges of aggravated assault; (7) the claim that the trial court erred because of its failure to grant petitioner's motion in limine; (8) the claim that the trial court erred because of its failure to conduct a sequestered voir dire; (9) the claim that the trial court erred because of its failure to grant a change of venue; and finally, (10) the claim that the trial court erred because of its failure to exclude petitioner's pretrial statements from the evidence. In that the petitioner announced that these stated claims would not be urged at the hearing, the Court will treat such issues as abandoned and will not address their merits.
Also at the hearing, counsel for the petitioner and the respondent identified the issues which they believed to require an evidentiary hearing in federal district court. No state court had heard evidence on the ineffective assistance issue. The Court, unwilling to follow respondent's argument to extend the doctrine of procedural default to the state habeas procedure, Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190, 1192 n. 3 (11th Cir.1983), conducted an evidentiary hearing on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, for reasons stated in open court, I found and concluded that counsel had not been ineffective. Petitioner received "representation that fell within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and conformed to professional standards of reasonable investigation of the facts and understanding of the law." Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 597 (11th Cir.1984); see also, Tucker v. Zant, 724 F.2d 882, 894, reh'g en banc granted, No. 83-8137 (11th Cir. Mar. 15, 1984).
Petitioner requested the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on additional issues, including the issue of whether or not trial counsel should have more vigorously sought expert witnesses to testify at trial and the issue of whether or not the trial court should have permitted funds to pay expert witnesses to assist petitioner and his counsel. Petitioner sought to present to this Court what the experts could have testified to if only they had been obtained for and testified at the trial. Petitioner's habeas counsel was most anxious to establish that Investigator Stevens fired first and that petitioner Stephens acted in self-defense. I allowed petitioner to make an offer of proof but for reasons stated in court did not permit an evidentiary hearing on the issues concerning expert witnesses.1 Furthermore, again for reasons stated in court, I concluded that the trial court did not err in its denial of funds for experts to assist petitioner at trial.
Petitioner seems to have lost sight of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Stephens v. Kemp
...court issued a lengthy opinion and order finding appellant's claims to be without merit and dismissing the petition in its entirety. 592 F.Supp. 228. Appellant raises the following claims of error on this (1) The district court erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing at which appel......