Stephens v. Laughlin

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
• Writing for the Court: BRIAN K. EPPS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
• Decision Date: 21 December 2016
• Docket Number: CV 115-151
• Citation: Stephens v. Laughlin, CV 115-151 (S.D. Ga. Dec 21, 2016)
• Parties: JOHN D. STEPHENS, Petitioner, v. VANCE LAUGHLIN, Warden, and HOMER BRYSON, Commissioner, Respondents.

JOHN D. STEPHENS, Petitioner, v. VANCE LAUGHLIN, Warden, and HOMER BRYSON, Commissioner, Respondents.

CV 115-151

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION

December 21, 2016

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, an inmate at Wheeler Correctional Facility in Alamo, Georgia, brings the above-captioned petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Having considered all the relevant pleadings, for the reasons set forth below, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS Petitioner's § 2254 petition be DENIED without an evidentiary hearing, this civil action be CLOSED, and a final judgment be ENTERED in favor of Respondents.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 20, 2012, the Burke County grand jury indicted Petitioner for rape pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1. (Doc. no. 9-5, pp. 26-27.) Conviction for rape may result in punishment "by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, by imprisonment for life, or by a spilt sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation for life." O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(b). On December 11, 2012, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), Petitioner entered a plea to the lesser included offense of aggravated assault with intent to rape, for which the range of punishment is "imprisonment for not less one nor more than 20 years." O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c); doc. no. 9-5, pp. 31-38, 59-71.

Attorney Joshua Smith negotiated the plea agreement on behalf of Petitioner, and represented Petitioner at the plea and sentencing hearing. (Doc. no. 9-5, pp. 12, 31, 59.) The Honorable Sheryl B. Jolly sentenced petitioner to a "split" sentence of ten years in prison and ten years of probation. (Id. at 38.) On May 17, 2013, the Clerk of Court filed Petitioner's pro se Motion to Modify Sentence, in which he argued the sentence for his aggravated assault conviction was too severe and requested his twenty-year sentence be modified to require he serve only three years in prison. (Id. at 48-50.) Judge Jolly denied the motion in an order filed June 26, 2013. (Id. at 54.)

Petitioner filed a state habeas corpus petition pro se on September 20, 2013, in Wheeler County, and subsequently amended that state petition on December 31, 2013. (Doc. nos. 9-1, 9-2.) Petitioner raised the following claims in his state habeas petition:

(1) Petitioner's plea was not knowing and voluntary because:

(a) his rights under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), were not explained to him; and

(b) neither an explanation of the charges nor a factual basis for the plea was put on the record.

(2) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel because Mr. Smith coerced him into the Alford plea by:

(a) not explaining the case to Petitioner;

(b) falsely telling Petitioner he would receive life in prison if he went to trial;

(c) failing to investigate the case; and

(d) letting Petitioner "plead to a void guilty plea";(3) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel because Mr. Smith did not file a general or special demurrer to the indictment.

(4) Petitioner's due process rights were violated because he was tried on a defective indictment.

(Doc. nos. 9-1, 9-2.) The state habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 16, 2014, and Mr. Smith testified at the hearing. (Doc. no. 9-5, pp. 9-23.) The state habeas court denied relief in a final order dated March 27, 2015, and filed April 7, 2015. (Doc. no. 9-3.) The Georgia Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for a certificate of probable cause to appeal (CPC) on July 6, 2015. (Doc. no. 9-4.)

Petitioner then timely filed the above-captioned § 2254 petition pro se. (Doc. no. 1.) Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief:¹

(1) Mr. Smith provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because he:

(a) did not explain the case to Petitioner;

(b) coerced Petitioner into pleading guilty by telling him he would be sentenced to life in prison if he went to trial;

(c) failed to investigate Petitioner's case;

(d) let petitioner plead guilty to a "void guilty plea"; and

(e) failed to file a general demurrer against the indictment because it was not signed by the grand jury foreperson.

(2) Petitioner's plea was not knowing and voluntary because Mr. Smith did not accurately explain the differences between the rape charge and the lesser included offense of aggravated assault with intent to rape to which Petitioner entered his plea, causing Petitioner to think he was pleading to a misdemeanor rather than a felony offense.

(3) Petitioner's due process rights were violated because he was tried on a defective indictment that was not signed by the grand jury foreperson.

(4) Mr. Smith provided ineffective assistance of counsel because he:

(a) did not file a general demurrer against the indictment because it was not signed by the grand jury foreperson;

(b) coerced Petitioner into pleading guilty by erroneously telling him he was pleading guilty to a misdemeanor sexual battery charge rather than a felony aggravated assault charge; and

(c) should have "had Petitioner's mental health problems checked."

(See generally doc. nos. 1, 4.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"):

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

The United States Supreme Court has characterized § 2254(d) as "part of the basic structure of federal habeas jurisdiction, designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accordingly, § 2254(d) creates a "difficult to meet and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (citations omitted).

In Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), the Supreme Court explained the difference between the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses in § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

A state-court decision is contrary to this Court's clearly established precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court but reaches a different result. A state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court's clearly established precedents if the state court applies this Court's precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, under § 2254(d)(1), it is not enough to demonstrate that a state court's decision is wrong; "even clear error will not suffice." White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. -, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). Rather, the habeas petition must show the state court decision was "objectively unreasonable." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003); see also Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. -, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (a petitioner must show the state court's ruling "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement."). A showing that the state court's determination was unreasonable is a substantially higher threshold than whether it was correct. Reed v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 767 F.3d 1252, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2014); Evans v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013). In addition, "review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181.

Moreover, under AEDPA's highly deferential standard of review for state court factual determinations, a federal habeas court may only grant relief if a state court'sadjudication of a claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Additionally, § 2254(e)(1) requires the Court "to presume the correctness of state courts' factual findings" unless the habeas petitioner rebuts that presumption "with clear and convincing evidence." Nejad v. Att'y Gen., State of Ga., 830 F.3d 1280, 1289 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007)); see also Reese v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2012) ("In a habeas proceeding, our review of findings of fact by the state court is even more deferential than under a clearly erroneous standard of review."). "The Supreme Court has not yet defined § 2254(d)(2)'s precise relationship to § 2254(e)(1). . . . Whatever that precise relationship may be, a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner Is Not Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing.

Petitioner requests the Court hold an evidentiary hearing on his federal petition. (Doc. no. 4, p. 8; doc. no. 10, p. 3.) The request should be DENIED.

According to Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, "[i]f the petition is not dismissed, the judge must review the answer, any transcripts and records of state-court proceedings, and any materials...