Stephens v. Nat'l City Corp.
| Decision Date | 28 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:19CV00784 |
| Parties | LENORA STEPHENS, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL CITY CORP., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
[Resolving Docs. 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 33]
Pro se Plaintiff Lenora Stephens sues twenty-two defendants. In her complaint and amended complaint, Stephens alleges that the defendants engaged in a RICO conspiracy and violated numerous federal laws and her Constitutional right to due process in connection with a foreclosure on certain real property located in Cumberland County, North Carolina.
This case is dismissed for the reasons here described.
Plaintiff's complaint, amended complaint, and attachments,1 consist of hundreds of pages. Briefly, this action arises from a foreclosure order given in 2007 by a North Carolina state court. The North Carolina foreclosure judgment related to property owned by Plaintiff in Fayetteville, North Carolina - 606 Country Club Dr. (the "Property") - and deal with legal proceedings leading up to the foreclosure. Plaintiff claims that the defendants, including the North Carolina state court, title companies, banks, bank officers and employees, law firms, lawyers, and the individual who purchased the Property after the foreclosure, were involved in the alleged illegal foreclosure.
As background, in September 1998, Plaintiff owed a large debt to the IRS and reached a settlement with the IRS that required Plaintiff Stephens pay $20,000.
To finance the $20,000 settlement payment, Stephens applied for a residential mortgage loan with Chase Mortgage.2 Stephens received the $20,000 loan on October 28, 1998.3 Plaintiff failed to pay on the loan and the bank started foreclosure proceedings. In 1999 and while represented by an attorney, Plaintiff, filed a North Carolina state court action for injunctive relief to stop the impending Property foreclosure and also sought relief in North Carolina federal bankruptcy court.4
But Plaintiff's efforts to prevent the Property foreclosure failed and in 2007 the Property was sold in foreclosure. After Plaintiff's "eight-year battle with illegal activity in the banking industry criminal enterprise as well as the lawyer's continuing illegal enterprise."5
Plaintiff sues in federal court in the Northern District of Ohio, allegedly because she "has not and cannot get fair representation in the State of [North Carolina]."6 Plaintiff sues defendants National City Corporation, Peter Raskind, Rebecca Brown, Laura Cauper, PNC Financial Services Group, William Demchak, Jim Rohr, Provident Financial Group, Christopher Carey, Hutchens Law Firm, John Britton, Britton Law, Substitute Trustee Services, Terry Hutchens, Phillip Heller, North Carolina Cumberland County Court, Garris Neil Yarborough, Yarborough Law Firm, Law Firm of Brooks Pierce McLendon Humphrey and Leonard, Robert King III, H. Mitchell Colvin, Jr., and McGriff Insurance Services. She says all were involved in the arguably illegal foreclosure.
Plaintiff claims nine causes of action regarding the events surrounding the foreclosure on the Property. Stephens alleges violations of various federal laws including RICO, TILA, and RESPA, and the United States Constitution.7 For relief, which Plaintiff characterizes as a tenth cause of action, she asks this Court to "award Plaintiff quiet title" in the Property and/or monetary damages.
Multiple Defendants filed motions to dismiss on various grounds - lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).8
Plaintiff has also filed multiple motions. On June 5,9 June 6,10 July 3,11 and July 24,12 Plaintiff sought leave for extensions of time to respond to defendants' motions13 and to further amend her Complaint. Plaintiff also moves for default judgment against various Defendants,14 for leave to file electronically,15 and for leave to submit proof of service.16
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Court's diversity jurisdiction.17 As the party filing this action in federal court, it is Plaintiff's burden to establish the Court's authority to hear this case.18 Federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00.19 To establish diversity, Plaintiff must show that she is a citizen of one state and defendants are all citizens of other states.
With respect to the individual defendants, "[c]itizen and its variant citizenship have acquired a particular meaning in our law as being equivalent to domicile."20 "In elemental terms, domicile consists of (1) residence and (2) an intent to remain there."21 One's domicile is the 22 "An individual ... may have several residences, but only one domicile."23 A corporation is a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and is a citizen of the State where it has its principal place of business.24
Even with the benefit of liberal construction, Plaintiff has failed to allege enough facts to establish subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. By way of example, Plaintiff alleges that John Britton, Neil Yarborough, and Robert King are "registered lawyers" in North Carolina "headquartered" at a North Carolina address.25Even if true, these allegations do not establish the citizenship of Britton, Yarborough, or King, and the Court is not required to construct claims or to conjure factual allegations on Plaintiff's behalf.26 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege facts which establish the Court's jurisdiction on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
While Plaintiff does not invoke federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for jurisdiction, the complaint alleges violations of various federal laws and the United States Constitution. The Court's federal question jurisdiction is plain on the face of the complaint. Therefore, in the spirit of liberal construction, the Court finds that it has federal question jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers,27 pro se plaintiffs are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.28 With respect to defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the Court's personal jurisdiction.29
Rule 12(b)(1) motions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be facial or factual attacks. A facial attack challenges the sufficiency of the pleading itself.30 When reviewinga facial attack,31 the Court must take the allegations in the complaint as true, similar to the standard of review applied to Rule 12(b)(6) motions.32 As the party bringing this action to federal court, it is Plaintiff's burden to establish the court's federal subject matter jurisdiction to survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion.33
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint is subject to dismissal if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must present enough facts "to state a claim to relief that it is plausible on its face" when all of its factual allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the non-moving party's favor.34
Multiple defendants have moved to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6),35 arguing variously that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims under federal criminal statutes, she cannot assert constitutional claims against private actors, her claims are barred by the doctrines of Rooker-Feldman and res judicata, and she fails to state a plausible claim for relief.
Plaintiff's claims in her first four causes of action consist of allegations that defendants committed fraud and deceptive trade practices and violated RICO, RESPA, TILA, HOEPA, and Regulation Z concerning the events surrounding the Property loan, state court proceedings, and foreclosure of the Property. Plaintiff alleges that decisions, rulings, and judgments by the state courts in North Carolina which resulted in the foreclosure are the source of the injuries she claims in this action. For relief, she seeks statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages, and asks the Court to award her quiet title to the Property or award her treble damages based on today's market value.36
If successful, Plaintiff's claims for relief would require this Court to overrule final North Carolina state court decisions concerning the Property loan and foreclosure of the Property. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, precludes these claims.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that lower federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts.37 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine stops "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."38 "If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction."39
At bottom, Plaintiff's injuries arguably result from a series of decisions by the North Carolina state courts rejecting Plaintiff's arguments that the Property loan and foreclosure were illegal. Indeed, Plaintiff repeatedly states in her complaint that the Property...
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