Stephens v. Overstolz
| Decision Date | 26 September 1890 |
| Citation | 43 F. 465 |
| Parties | STEPHENS v. OVERSTOLZ. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Geo. D Reynolds, U.S. Atty., and Lubke & Muench, for plaintiff.
Chester H. Krum, for defendant.
The main question in this case, which it would seem to be necessary to determine at this time, is the question whether the right of action stated in the petition in favor of the receiver is one that has abated by the death of the director who committed the wrongful acts charged, ore is a right of action that survives against the executrix of the deceased. The argument is that the statute under which the suit is brought is a penal statute, and imposes a punishment; that the demand sued for is a penalty; and that it is of that character that the right to recover is ceased with the death of the wrong-doer. We cannot, as important as the case is when on the circuit, where so much is to be done in a short time, give as full investigation to the authorities on the subject as we would like to do, but we have given it such consideration as we are able to, and all three of us are of the opinion that the act of congress on this subject treats the directors of a national bank as persons charged with a duty and a trust for the benefit of other parties; that, when they violate such trust, the statute in effect declares that they shall compensate the parties who have been injured for that violation of the trust. In effect that was a principle which existed before the statute was enacted. The statute declares the mode of proceeding, the liability of the wrong-doer, and the limit of his responsibility. It is not so essentially a penal statute intended to punish a wrong-doer for a wrongful act as to bring it within that class of penalties, the liability for which expires with the death of the party. The statute imposes a legal liability upon the officers of the bank for certain things which they may do which shall result in an injury to the bank, its stockholders or creditors.
The statute says, in effect, that they shall be liable for whatever damages result to any one from their violation of duty. Penal statutes, strictly speaking, are generally those which impose a punishment measured only by the offense or guilt of the party. They generally say that, for every such offense, the party shall be fined in a given sum, or imprisoned for a limited time. Generally they say exactly what the punishment shall be; that a party who does thus and so shall be liable to a fine of $500 or some other sum, or shall be liable to imprisonment for so long a time. Penalties of that nature are of a criminal character, but in this case and in some others that might be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Webb v. Cash
... ... holding that there was privity between depositors and ... directors; no such privity exists; Bank v. Peters, supra; ... Stephens v. Overstolz, 43 F. 771; Dawkins v ... Mitchell, (La.) 90 So. 396. The bank must be made a ... party; Zinn v. Baxter, 65 O. S. 341; Ellis v ... ...
-
Hughes v. Reed
...which are identical with Oklahoma, the Kansas court held that the action was "upon a liability created by statute." In Stephens v. Overstolz (C. C. Mo.) 43 F. 465, Mr. Justice Miller, sitting on circuit with two associate judges, held that the liability imposed by section 5239 was remedial ......
-
Cockrill v. Cooper
...exist. This, however, is not a correct view of the scope and purpose of the statute, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Miller in Stephens v. Overstolz, 43 F. 465, and as declared, in substance, by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in the case of Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 146, 11 Sup.Ct. 924......
-
Hart v. Evanson
... ... because of the fraud or negligence or other actionable wrong, ... are based on statutes, as, for instance, Stephens v ... Overstolz (C. C.) 43 F. 465 ... The ... real principle upon which the cases are probably grounded, ... which hold that ... ...