Stephens v. Sabol
| Decision Date | 24 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 07cv40083-NG. |
| Citation | 539 F.Supp.2d 489 |
| Parties | Vincent STEPHENS, Petitioner, v. Carolyn SABOL, Warden, Federal Medical Center, Devens, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Michael P. Sady, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING IN PART PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
This case concerns the sequencing of sentences, how they begin, and whether they can be interrupted.
The facts are undisputed.
Petitioner Vincent Stephens ("Stephens" or "petitioner") committed two crimes approximately two weeks apart in the summer of 1994. On July 29, 1994, he committed a carjacking near a sandwich shop in Miami, Florida. On August 11, 1994, he robbed the same sandwich shop at gunpoint. Decl. of James Hazelton ("Hazelton Decl.") ¶ 4, Ex. 1 to Resp. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss ( ) (document # 7).1
Three days later, on August 14, 1994, Stephens was arrested by Miami police on state charges of robbery with a deadly weapon, armed burglary, and aggravated assault with a firearm. Each charge stemmed from the August 11 robbery. Id. Stephens was detained pending trial.
On December 6, 1994, Stephens was indicted in federal court for the July 29 carjacking. Id. He was brought into federal custody under a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum on July 31, 1995. See Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Prosequendum, United States v. Stephens, No. 94-cr-647 (S.D. Fla. filed July 24, 1995, document # 5). Stephens was convicted after a jury trial. On February 14, 1996, he was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. See Judgment in a Criminal Case ("Federal Judgment") at 1-2, United States v. Stephens, Ex. A to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7). As of that date, he had not yet been tried or sentenced in state court. The federal judgment did not mention the pending state charges, or the relationship of the federal sentence to any state sentence that might be imposed. See id.
Stephens was returned to state custody on October 22, 1996. Individual Custody and Detention Report ("Custody Report"), Ex. B to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7). On February 10, 1997, Stephens was sentenced on multiple state counts; under a Florida law increasing punishment for a "habitual violent felony offender," he was committed for a 15-year term, with other, shorter sentences to run concurrently. See Sentence at 3 (filed Jan. 23, 2003), Ex. C to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7).2 Notably, the state court judge "further ordered that the composite term of all sentences imposed ... shall run ... concurrent with the ... [sentence in] Federal Case # 94-647-001." Id. at 3. At his, sentencing, Stephens was given credit for 912 days served, id., reflecting the entirety of his time in custody from August 14, 1994, to February 10, 1997.
Stephens moved to vacate his state sentence in January 2001. While the motion was granted and his case set for resentencing on March 9, 2001, see Order (Jan. 10, 2001), Ex. F to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7), it is unclear whether the petitioner was, in fact, resentenced at that time.
Apparently unaware that Stephens was to be resentenced, officials at the Dade County Jail informed the United States Marshals that he had finished serving his state sentence and that the Marshals should execute the federal detainer lodged pursuant to his federal judgment and commitment order. See Custody Report at 1, Ex. B to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7) ("Dade Co Jail apparently made a mistake by informing us that his [sic] finished w/his state se [sic]."). Consequently, Stephens was picked up by U.S. Marshals do September 20, 2001,3 and placed in the Federal Corrections Institute at Jesup, Georgia ("FCI-Jesup"), on March 15, 2002. See Custody Report at 2, Ex. B to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7); accord Federal Judgment at 2, Ex. A to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7). About two months later, federal officials at FCI-Jesup realized that Stephens had not completed his state sentence. They returned him to the Florida Department of Corrections on May 23, 2002. Custody Report at 3, Ex. B to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7); Overall Inmate Record at 3 (June 10, 2003), Ex. E to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7).
On November 26, 2002, Stephens filed another motion to modify his state sentence. See Order Regarding Motion for Relief at 1, Ex. C to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7). The motion was granted, and Stephens was resentenced on January 22, 2003, nuns pro tune February 14, 2002.4 At that time, he was given a sentence of 9.4 years. Id. at 2. Unlike the previous sentence, the Florida court stated this time that the sentence "shall not run concurrently with [the] federal [sentence]." Id. at 3. Furthermore, Stephens was given credit for 1,222 days served.5
Stephens completed his state sentence on February 28, 2003, see Inmate Record, Ex. E to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7), some eight years and six months after being arrested in August 1994.6 He was immediately transferred to federal custody. See Sentence Monitoring Computation Data at 2, Ex. J to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7). His full-term release, eight years from that date, is February 27, 2011; with anticipated good-conduct time, Stephens will be released on February 16, 2010. Id.
Stephens filed this habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking to have the Court review the Bureau of Prisons's ("BOP's") calculation of his sentence. He has exhausted his administrative remedies. See Petition at 2 (document # 1); Response to Request for Administrative Remedy # 386315-F1, Ex. I to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7). The Bureau of Prisons has moved to dismiss, and Stephens opposes.
Stephens contends that he is entitled to credit on his federal sentence for at least some of the time he spent in state custody. The case thus requires the Court to consider when and how his sentences commenced.
Stephens's first argument is that he became a federal prisoner when he was brought into federal court on December 6, 1994, and therefore that his federal sentence should be counted from that date.
The sovereign that first arrests a defendant takes primary jurisdiction over him. See, e.g., United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir.2005). It retains that jurisdiction until it takes a specific ad to relinquish it, such as release on bail, parole, or the dismissal of pending charges. See id. In addition, the sovereign may, in an act of executive discretion, waive the right to primary jurisdiction and turn the defendant over to another sovereign. See, e.g., Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1097-98 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607 (1922)). As of December 5, 1994, the day before he was brought into federal court for his trial, the State of Florida clearly had jurisdiction over Stephens, because it had arrested him and had done nothing to relinquish its jurisdiction.
On December 6, when Stephens appeared in federal court, he did so by way of a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The use of that writ did not signal that Florida authorities relinquished their primary jurisdiction over Stephens. To the contrary, the federal writ only "borrows" the defendant from state custody. See, e.g., United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23, 67 (1st Cir.2005); Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d 1059, 1061 n. 1 (7th Cir.1999). When the writ is used, the defendant officially remains in the jurisdiction of the sovereign from which he was borrowed, even though his custodians change. The rule allows one sovereign to produce the defendant for trial without impinging on the rights of the other. Therefore, when Stephens was brought into federal court on December 6, 1994, he remained under the sole jurisdiction of the state of Florida. His federal sentence did not begin to run and he was returned to state custody after the trial was completed.7
Next, Stephens contends that he is entitled to federal credit for the time served between February 10, 1997 — the date of his original state sentence — and at least January 10, 2001 — the date that sentence was vacated. The state court had, after all, ordered that the sentences run concurrently.
The problem was that the federal court had not so ordered. Its judgment was silent as to any possible relation with Stephens' sentence on the then-pending state court charges. See generally Federal Judgment, Ex. A to Hazelton Decl. (document # 7). The federal court could have ordered a concurrent sentence, even though no state sentence had yet been imposed: under Eleventh Circuit law, "a district court does have the authority to make a federal sentence concurrent to a state sentence not yet imposed for pending state charges." United States v. McDaniel, 338 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir.2003) (). Without any statement by the federal trial court, however, the Bureau of Prisons was left to presume that the sentences were to run consecutively. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (). And the power to determine whether federal prisoners receive credit for time spent in state custody prior to the commencement of their federal sentence is a matter left solely to the discretion of the Attorney General. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331-32, 334, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
It was a grave error by Stephens's counsel. Because Stephens had never been in federal jurisdiction, his federal sentence had not yet commenced. During the period of time it took to litigate the federal charges, Stephens was in the temporary...
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