Stephens v. Smartt

Decision Date09 August 1909
Docket Number1,043,1,046.
Citation172 F. 466
PartiesSTEPHENS et al. v. SMARTT et al. FINLEY v. WILLIAMS et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

Wheeler & Trimble, for complainants.

Brown &amp Spurlock and Pritchard & Sizer, for defendants.

SANFORD District Judge.

These consolidated causes were heard on the pleas in abatement which had been set down for argument by the complainants under the thirty-third equity rule, and on the complainants' motions for preliminary injunctions.

Finley v. Williams et al.

The bill in this case was filed by Finley, a citizen of Georgia against Williams and 14 other individuals, all citizens of Tennessee, and the First Cumberland Presbyterian Church of Chattanooga, Tenn., a corporation under the laws of Tennessee. It avers:

That complainant is a member of said church, and a regular attendant on its religious services; that said church is the owner of a house of worship and parsonage in the city of Chattanooga, which, with the lot upon which they stand, are worth as much as $25,000; that the defendant Smartt and six others of the individual defendants are the ruling elders of said church, charged with maintaining the spiritual government of the congregation; and that the defendant Smartt and four others of the individual defendants, including two others of said elders, are the trustees and directors of said church, and as such are its representatives as respects its relation as a body to the civil law and charged with the preservation and assertion of its legal rights.

That prior to 1904 said church was a congregation of the religious denomination known as the 'Cumberland Presbyterian Church,' which had been organized and formed in the early part of the last century by reason of a schism in and secession from the general church known as the 'Presbyterian Church in the United States of America'; that, the said Presbyterian Church in the United States of America having some years hence adopted certain modifications or interpretations of its 'standards'-- that is, of its constitution and laws-- which removed all the differences concerning interpretation of 'standards' which had kept said church and the said Cumberland Presbyterian Church apart for nearly a century, said two churches were thereafter, through the action of their respective constituted authorities, reunited in one organization exactly as they had existed before the breach, such reunited church bearing its ancient name, and its highest judicature being called the 'General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.'

That a majority of the members of the defendant church, and all its officers except the defendant F. A. Seagle, who was an elder, acquiesced in said reunion, and have continued to attend upon said church; that the defendant Smartt and said other seven defendants are now, as they were before, its lawful elders and directors; that all persons who have been admitted to its membership and have not withdrawn or been dismissed therefrom, including the complainant, who was admitted to membership after the reunion, are the true and only First Cumberland Presbyterian Church of Chattanooga, and the equitable and beneficial owners of its real estate, entitled to have it preserved and protected for their use as heretofore, and as a residence for their minister.

That after the adjournment of the last General Assembly of the separate Cumberland Presbyterian Church a minority of its former delegates or commissioners met and organized themselves into a body which they called the 'General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church'; and that after the formation of this new Cumberland Presbyterian General Assembly the defendant Seagle and four other individual defendants, with other persons, seceded from said First Cumberland Presbyterian Church at Chattanooga and formed a congregation which has since conducted religious services in another building, and which claims to be the First Cumberland Presbyterian Church at Chattanooga, and to be connected with said new Cumberland Presbyterian General Assembly, and refuses to recognize the authority of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.

That while neither the defendant Seagle nor his associates are officers or members of the defendant church, or recognized as such by its ecclesiastical authorities, and have no right to interfere with or control its properties, the defendant Seagle and the four defendants associated with him are refusing to recognize the defendants, who are the sole ruling elders of said church, and pretending without right to be officers of the defendant church, and threatening to take unlawful possession of its house of worship, parsonage, and grounds, and prevent its rightful pastor from ministering therein, and, when they have obtained such possession, will oust the pastor and elders of said church, and those who have a right to attend upon their ministrations, and will divert its property from the use of its congregation and members, and turn it over to the use of a different congregation and pastor.

That while it is the duty of the defendant Smartt and the other defendants who are officers of the defendant church, as its elders, trustees, and directors, to protect its property and the rights of complainant and the other members of the church from the unlawful acts threatened and about to be done by the defendant Seagle and others, by such proceedings in the courts as will prevent the same, and while complainant has demanded and repeatedly urged that they take such legal action as may be necessary to that end, they have refused to take such action, answering complainant that, because of a decision in the Tennessee courts in another case not concerning this property or these parties, such steps are useless and the case hopeless, and that a compromise or adjustment is desirable; that it has been announced in alleged newspaper interviews with some or all of said officers of the church that they intend to submit to the intended wrongful acts of the defendant Seagle and others, without any effort to protect either their rights or those of their cestui que trust, the complainant, and all others in like situation with him; that the defendants Smartt and other officers further caused a meeting of said church congregation to be held, at which they recommended that no legal steps be taken to protect their rights, but that, on the contrary, efforts of compromise be made, and that the members of the congregation passed a resolution in accordance with such recommendation, all present either voting for such resolution or remaining silent, except the complainant, who publicly notified said officers and members that he insisted upon action being taken, and intended to take such legal steps as were in his power to protect the rights of the members and the property of the church; and that, notwithstanding the demand and notice of complainant, and the evident fact that the defendants Seagle and others will not agree to any compromise, the defendant Smartt and other officers have taken no action, and indicate that they do not intend to make any defense, should suit be brought against them.

The complainant prays: That it be decreed that the defendants Smartt and other trustees and directors of said church, and the defendant corporation, hold title to the church property for the exclusive use and benefit of the congregation of said church which adheres to said United Church, and that its session, consisting of its pastor and the defendants Smartt and other ruling elders, has the exclusive right to control the possession and use of its property, and its pastor the sole right to occupy its pulpit and conduct its services; that the defendants Seagle and associates, all persons acting under their authority, and all members of the other congregation whom they represent, be enjoined and restrained from taking any steps, by forcible entry, legal proceedings, or otherwise, to take possession or control of the church property, from resisting or obstructing complainant and others in like situation with him from free access to and use of said church property for the purpose of religious worship and all its former uses and purposes, from attempting to interfere with its pastor in the conduct of its religious exercises or other pastoral functions, or with the defendants Smartt and other elders, trustees, and directors, in the control and management of said property for the use and benefit of complainant and others in like situation, from disturbing or interfering with complainant and the pastor, congregation, officers, or members of the defendant church in the possession, use, or enjoyment of the church property, and from bringing any other suit in relation to the title or possession of said property; and that the defendants Smartt and other officers of said church be enjoined and restrained from surrendering possession or control of said property to the defendants Seagle and others, or any of their associates.

The plea in abatement of the defendant Seagle and the four other defendants associated with him alleges that there is no such diversity of citizenship of the parties as is necessary to give this court jurisdiction of this cause, and avers:

That at the time of the attempted merger of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church in the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, whose validity was denied by many members of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, they were members of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church and of the congregation of the defendant church at Chattanooga, and refused to assent to said merger, and denied its validity, while the defendant Smartt and six of the other defendants described...

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3 cases
  • Chickasaw Wood Products Co. v. Lane
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • November 19, 1938
    ...of the transaction, the party must be a material defendant, and a judgment must be sought against him in good faith. Stephens v. Smartt, C. C., 172 F. 466; Cerri v. Akron-People's Telephone Co., D.C., 219 F. "It was never contemplated by the framers of the act of 1820 (Code, sec. 2821 [Code......
  • Chickasaw Wood Products Co. v. Lane
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • November 19, 1938
    ...of the transaction, the party must be a material defendant, and a judgment must be sought against him in good faith. Stephens v. Smartt, C. C., 172 F. 466; Cerri Akron-People's Telephone Co., D.C., 219 F. 285. "It was never contemplated by the framers of the act of 1820 (Code, sec. 2821 [Co......
  • Sharp v. Bonham
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • August 9, 1913
    ...general rule in reference to the duty of the court as to the re-alignment of the parties as stated in my opinion in Stephens v. Smartt (C.C.E.D. Tenn.) 172 F. 466, 471, and the cases therein cited. In view of the fact that two defendants as members of the Grace Church are, in a sense, as it......

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