Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 52474

Decision Date17 July 1981
Docket NumberNo. 52474,52474
PartiesLinda Rae STEPHENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SNYDER CLINIC ASSOCIATION and James N. Winblad, M. D., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. The state legislature has the power to shorten an existing statute of limitations, provided a reasonable time is given for a person having an existing cause of action to commence an action before the bar takes effect.

2. The two-year grace period for filing an action against a health care provider for negligence, provided by K.S.A. 60-513(d ), is a reasonable time.

3. Article 2, Section 17, of the Kansas Constitution, which provides that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state, requires that all laws of a general nature which affect the people of this state generally must operate with geographical uniformity. It is not applicable to constitutional challenges based upon a denial of equal protection of the laws not involving a claim of lack of geographical uniformity.

4. Where a constitutional equal protection argument is asserted, the Kansas Constitution's counterpart to the Fourteenth Amendment is Sections 1 and 2 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.

5. Section 2 of the Kansas Bill of Rights applies solely to political privileges and not to those relating to property rights.

6. Section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights is applicable where a claim of denial of equal protection is raised involving personal or property rights.

7. It is within the power and competency of the legislature to provide for different periods of limitations for different causes of actions where the classification is not unreasonable or discriminatory.

8. The yardstick for measuring equal protection arguments is the "reasonable basis" test.

9. There is a reasonable relation existing between the legislative objective of assuring continued quality health care in Kansas and the 1976 amendment of K.S.A. 60-513 to shorten the statute of limitations to four years from the date the wrongful act occurred in tort actions brought against health care providers.

Robert D. Ochs of Fisher, Ochs & Heck, P. A., Topeka, argued the cause, and Ronald D. Heck, Topeka, of the same firm, and Gary M. Peterson, Topeka, were with him on the briefs for plaintiff-appellant.

Alvin D. Herrington of McDonald, Tinker, Skaer, Quinn & Herrington, Wichita, argued the cause, and Ronald P. Williams, Wichita, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for defendants-appellees.

Charles E. Hill, Topeka, Atty., Kansas Ins. Dept., and Derek J. Shafer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., were on the brief amicus curiae for Fletcher Bell, Com'r of Ins Wayne T. Stratton and Charles R. Hay of Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds, Palmer & Wright, Topeka, were on the brief amici curiae for the Kansas Medical Society and Kansas Hospital Ass'n.

PRAGER, Justice:

This is an action to recover damages for alleged medical malpractice resulting from the insertion of an intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD). The district court held that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (K.S.A. 60-513).

On this appeal, we will assume that the following facts are true: The plaintiff-appellant, Linda Rae Stephens, is a resident of Topeka, Kansas. The defendant-appellee, Dr. James N. Winblad, M.D., is a medical doctor licensed to practice in Kansas. The defendant-appellee, Snyder Clinic Association, is a professional association of medical doctors located in Winfield, Kansas. Defendant Winblad was formerly associated with the Snyder Clinic, and it will be assumed that at all times he was acting as an agent and employee of Snyder Clinic.

On December 19, 1969, Dr. Winblad inserted in the plaintiff's uterus, for the purpose of contraception, a Lippes Loop intrauterine device (IUD). Shortly, thereafter, plaintiff, following the manufacturer's instructions, noticed that she could not find the tail string that was attached to the IUD for the purpose of checking to insure the device was properly situated in her uterus. She immediately contacted Dr. Winblad. He assured her that the device was designed to be expelled from the uterus if a problem arose with the fitting of the IUD. Approximately three months after the IUD was inserted, the plaintiff became pregnant with her second child. While she was under the care of Dr. Winblad, she again inquired as to whether the IUD could possibly still be in her uterus. Dr. Winblad again assured her that the device had been expelled. The plaintiff, after giving birth to her second child on January 18, 1971, suffered continuous problems with blood discharge from the uterus. During this period of time, she consulted with and was treated by various physicians for this problem with no success. Finally, upon the recommendation of Dr. William Roy of Topeka, Kansas, plaintiff underwent a hysterectomy which was performed at Topeka, Kansas, on November 5, 1979. The pathologist's report from the hospital laboratory indicated that the plaintiff's uterus was healthy with the exception that an IUD was found embedded into the wall of the healthy uterus.

Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Winblad and the Snyder Clinic is based upon the alleged negligence of Dr. Winblad in the insertion of the IUD on December 19, 1969, and in his failure to discover the improper placement of the device as late as January, 1971. Her primary complaint is that, after the plaintiff notified Dr. Winblad that the IUD was not in place, Winblad had a duty to examine the plaintiff, either by physical examination or x-ray, to insure that the device was not still in the uterus of the plaintiff. The last dates on which the act or omission which forms the basis of plaintiff's claim could have occurred were January 6, 1971, as to Dr. Winblad and August 6, 1971, as to the Snyder Clinic.

On December 18, 1979, plaintiff filed the present action in Cowley County District Court to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged wrongful acts of the defendants. On January 15, 1980, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The basis for the motion for summary judgment was that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (K.S.A. 60-513). The district court sustained the motion for summary judgment on that basis, and the plaintiff has appealed.

Before turning to the specific points raised on the appeal, it should be noted that the statute of limitations problem in this case arose because of an amendment to K.S.A. 60-513 passed by the Kansas legislature in 1976. To understand the issues, we must carefully examine the statutory provisions. The pertinent statute of limitations, which was in effect in 1974 prior to the 1976 amendment, was K.S.A. 1974 Supp 60-513. K.S.A. 1974 Supp. 60-513 provided in part as follows:

"60-513. Actions limited to two years. The following actions shall be brought within two (2) years:

....

"(4) An action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.

....

"The cause of action in this section shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall the period be extended more than ten (10) years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action."

It is important to note that, under the 1974 statute, an action in tort for personal injuries resulting from negligence had to be brought within two years from the time the act giving rise to the cause of action first caused substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury was not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation did not commence until the fact of injury became reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. Under that statute, the period could not be extended more than ten years beyond the date of the "act giving rise to the cause of action." If the 1974 statute had been in existence at the time plaintiff's action was filed in 1979, plaintiff's action would have been timely filed, since the alleged negligent act giving rise to the cause of action occurred in 1971 and plaintiff's suit was filed on December 18, 1979, which was clearly within the ten-year period.

Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the Kansas legislature, in 1976, amended K.S.A. 60-513. The amendments were made as a result of a review and study by a Special Interim Committee on Medical Malpractice on the effect of medical malpractice actions on the distribution and provision of medical and hospital care for Kansas residents. As a result of this study a package of twelve separate bills was recommended to the legislature by the special committee. The medical "malpractice package" contained a number of elements, among which were: (1) The requirement that each health care provider maintain a policy of professional liability insurance with limits of $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 per year (K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 40-3402); (2) establishment of a joint underwriting association to supplement the existing market for professional liability coverage (K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 40-3413); (3) establishment of the Health Care Stabilization Fund, which is, in effect, an "excess" insurance carrier, providing coverage in excess of the basic required limits and administered by the Commissioner of Insurance (K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 40-3403); (4) modification of the Collateral Source rule in health provider cases (K.S.A. 60-471); and (5) reduction of the "discovery period" of the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions and a redefining of the point of time when such actions accrue (K.S.A. 60-513(c)).

K.S.A. 60-513, as amended in 1976,...

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