Stephens v. Stephens, s. 820683

• Decision Date: 14 June 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. 820683,820740,s. 820683
• Parties: Cecelia C. STEPHENS v. Lawrence B. STEPHENS. Lawrence B. STEPHENS v. Cecelia C. STEPHENS. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 484

331 S.E.2d 484

229 Va. 610

Cecelia C. STEPHENS v. Lawrence B. STEPHENS.

Lawrence B. STEPHENS v. Cecelia C. STEPHENS.

Record Nos. 820683, 820740.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

June 14, 1985.

Morris H. Fine, Virginia Beach, (Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, Virginia Beach, on brief), for appellant Cecelia C. Stephens.

Thomas H. Cave, Virginia Beach, (Mahler & Cave, P.C., Virginia Beach, on brief), for appellee Lawrence B. Stephens.

Present: All the Justices.

THOMAS, Justice.

These appeals concern a question of personal jurisdiction in Virginia over an individual who resides in Tennessee. Resolution of the jurisdictional issue requires us to construe the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA or the Act), Code §§ 20-88.12 through 20-88.31.

The same facts are pertinent to both appeals. Lawrence B. Stephens and Cecelia C. Stephens were divorced in Florida. Two children were born of the marriage. The final decree was entered on June 4, 1965. It provided for $125 per child per month in child support and $100 per month in spousal support. Shortly after the divorce, the parties moved to Virginia, Lawrence as part of his military duties and Cecelia returning to her home state.

In late 1966, Cecelia sued Lawrence in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the City of Virginia Beach to enforce arrearages in child and spousal support pursuant to the Florida decree. In early 1967, Lawrence was personally served. By order dated January 26, 1967, the J & DR court ordered Lawrence, in a unitary award, to pay $350.25 per month, through the court. In February 1968, the unitary award was increased to $375.25 per month. Thereafter, in September and December 1968, Lawrence filed petitions in the same court to cut off support. ¹ Lawrence moved from Virginia to Tennessee in December 1968.

From Cecelia's first suit, in December 1966, through the 1970's, Cecelia instituted several proceedings against Lawrence, in Virginia, concerning matters of support. The parties' youngest child reached his majority on April 10, 1972, but litigation concerning both child support arrearages and spousal support continued unabated. Finally, on June 27, 1980, the J & DR court entered an order in which it held that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Lawrence regarding spousal support.

In that order, the court wrote as follows: "The Order of this Court of January 26, 1967, and all Orders subsequent thereto as they relate to child support are valid. Anything relating to alimony is void for want of jurisdiction." The June 1980 order confirmed a ruling the J & DR court had first announced in a letter opinion dated September 6, 1979. The June 1980 ruling was never appealed by Cecelia. Its effect was to annul all previous awards of spousal support.

In February 1980, after the September 1979 letter opinion but before the June 1980 order, Cecelia registered the Florida divorce decree in Virginia, pursuant to the provisions of Code § 20-88.30:5. The events that followed the registration are most important to these appeals.

In August 1980, Cecelia again sued Lawrence in the Virginia Beach court for spousal support arrearages, this time in the amount of $4,800. Notice of the suit was sent to Lawrence in Tennessee. By order dated September 8, 1980, the J & DR court ruled that Lawrence "was properly served with notice of hearing" and ordered him to pay the $4,800 in spousal support arrearages together with interest at 8% and attorney's fees of $300.

Lawrence made a special appearance by counsel and petitioned the J & DR court to rehear the matter on the ground that Lawrence "was never served personally." Lawrence also entered a plea to the jurisdiction of the court. By order dated November 21, 1980, the court ruled that Lawrence had been properly served in Tennessee by the delivery of Cecelia's petition to his office even though he was absent at the time. The court noted that Lawrence admitted receiving a copy of the petition. The court affirmed its September 8, 1980 award and then ruled that Lawrence was also liable for an additional $7,580 in arrearages based on the June 4, 1965 Florida decree. According to the J & DR court, the $7,580 figure was comprised of "unpaid alimony and child support for periods prior to August 1976 and unpaid spousal support for September and October, 1980." Lawrence did not appeal either the September 1980 order or the November 1980 order.

In June 1981, Cecelia filed another petition in the J & DR court. This time she sought to increase spousal support. Lawrence moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Lawrence's motion was granted. In an order dated June 24, 1981, the court ruled that there had "not been proof of proper service of said petition upon" Lawrence. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition.

In August 1981, Cecelia filed yet another petition to increase spousal support. Again, Lawrence moved to dismiss on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction. Again the court granted Lawrence's motion. In its order, the J & DR court stated the following:

Mere registration under URESA, of a foreign decree in Virginia, combined with personal service on the defendant in another State is insufficient to create personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

It is further held that this Court does not have in personam jurisdiction over Mr. Stephens, notwithstanding the fact that the Florida divorce decree has been properly registered here.

On appeal, the circuit court reached the same result. In an order dated January 20, 1982, the circuit court stated that the mere registration of a foreign decree in Virginia, coupled with personal service on a defendant in another state, is not sufficient to create personal jurisdiction over that defendant in a Virginia court.

Cecelia appeals from the circuit court's January 1982 order. She contends that once she registered the Florida decree in Virginia, all she then had to do was to notify Lawrence of any suit brought by her in Virginia and the Virginia court would have personal jurisdiction over him. Cecelia bases her argument upon her reading of Code § 20-88.30:6 and of Sheffield v. Sheffield, 207 Va. 288, 148 S.E.2d 771 (1966). According to Cecelia, the court erred in preventing her from proceeding against Lawrence. We think the J & DR court lacked personal jurisdiction over Lawrence; therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court in Cecelia's appeal.

The ruling that the J & DR court did not have personal jurisdiction over Lawrence was a complete reversal of the position that court had taken a year earlier when it entered judgments against Lawrence totaling approximately $13,000. Following the entry of the J & DR court's favorable September 8, 1981 order, Lawrence petitioned for a rehearing concerning the orders of September 8, 1980, and November 21, 1980, in which awards adverse to him had been made. Lawrence contended that those earlier orders were void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Cecelia moved to quash the petition for rehearing on the ground that the 1980 orders had not been appealed and were therefore final.

The J & DR court ruled in favor of Cecelia, accepting her arguments. Lawrence appealed the ruling to the circuit court. That court denied his appeal "on the grounds that the previous petition to rehear [filed by Lawrence following the entry of the September 8, 1980 order] was not appealed from and therefore, [it had] no jurisdiction."

Lawrence appeals from the circuit court's ruling denying his petition to set aside the 1980 orders. According to Lawrence, the 1980 orders are void for lack of personal jurisdiction and as such are subject to attack either directly or collaterally. Lawrence contends that even though he did not appeal, he is nevertheless entitled to have the 1980 judgments declared void. However, because of a procedural deficiency discussed infra, we must affirm the trial court's ruling in Lawrence's appeal.

Since, as we stated at the outset, the question of personal jurisdiction in Virginia, over Lawrence, is critical to both appeals, we will address that issue first. Cecelia contends that when the Stephens were divorced in Florida, in 1965, Florida had personal jurisdiction over both parties. She contends further that when she registered the Florida decree in Virginia in 1980, it became for all intents and purposes a decree of a Virginia court. She argues, in effect, that when she registered the Florida judgment in Virginia the act of registration transferred to Virginia the personal jurisdiction of the Florida courts. ² She then relies on Sheffield and says, based on that case, that notice to Lawrence vests the trial court with personal jurisdiction over him.

Cecelia's argument has some surface appeal but it cannot withstand scrutiny. First, she focuses entirely upon one provision in a much larger statutory scheme. The portion of the statute relied upon by Cecelia reads as follows:

Upon registration, the registered foreign support order shall be treated in the same manner as a support order issued by a court of this State. It has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a support order of this State and may be enforced and satisfied in like manner.

Code § 20-88.30:6(a). This language is admittedly broad but it must be read within its statutory context.

RURESA is divided into four articles. The portion of the statute dealing with registration is merely the last of the four articles. A review of the entire Act makes clear that the drafters took steps to ensure that the defendant/obligor would be present and amenable to process in the state in which the support question was litigated. For example, Code § 20-88.15 says that the duties imposed by the Act "bind the obligor present in this State regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee." (Emphasis...