Stephens v. Stephens

Decision Date13 June 1997
Citation699 So.2d 194
PartiesHelen STEPHENS, as successor trustee of an inter vivos trust v. Charles H. STEPHENS. 2960113.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

M. Wayne Wheeler, Birmingham, for appellant.

John J. Kubiszyn and Eddie Leitman of Leitman, Siegal, Payne & Campbell, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.

YATES, Judge.

This is the second time this case has been before this court. See Stephens v. Stephens, 680 So.2d 329 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) ("Stephens I "). In Stephens I, Charles H. Stephens had appealed from a $65,872.25 judgment in favor of Helen Stephens, in her capacity as successor trustee of an inter vivos trust created by her husband, Roger Stephens, Charles's brother. The issue before this court was whether certain testimony of the trustee, John Sudderth, should have been considered by the trial court in reaching its judgment. Id.

The facts were as follows. Sudderth served for a number of years as trustee. Upon his resignation in 1994, he filed with the court a final accounting, which showed that Charles had made payments totaling $32,000 on a $60,000 promissory note, with $7,500 being applied to the interest and the remaining $24,500 being applied to the principal. The accounting also included a "Reconciliation of Principal and Interest on Note," which stated that the net principal due on the note was $35,500; that the interest due on the note was $27,500; and that the total amount due on the note was $62,500. When Sudderth resigned as trustee the note was in default. The trial court approved Sudderth's final accounting and resignation and appointed Helen as successor trustee. Helen sued Charles to recover on the note, alleging that the note was in default in the amount of $60,515.84, plus interest. Id.

At trial Sudderth was permitted to testify, over Helen's objection, regarding an oral modification of the payment terms of the promissory note and the accounting method he had used as trustee. He explained the modified payment terms and how he had applied interest payments to a note that was in default. He stated that when he had resigned as trustee only $35,500 was actually left owing on the note. The trial court permitted this testimony; however, it expressly stated in its order that it had refused to consider Sudderth's testimony, because of the Dead Man's Statute, and that it had also relied upon the parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds in awarding its $65,872.25 judgment to Helen. We held that the trial court had erred in refusing to consider Sudderth's testimony, reversing the judgment, and remanding the case for the trial court to consider Sudderth's testimony before entering its judgment. Id., at 334. On remand, the trial court, on September 6, 1996, entered a judgment in favor of Helen for $33,872.25; Helen appeals. This case was transferred to this court by the supreme court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

Helen first argues that the trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence; we agree.

"It is well settled that in a non-jury case, the trial judge is the finder of fact, and a presumption of correctness attaches to his findings and to the judgment based on these findings. The resulting judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly unjust, palpably wrong, or without supporting evidence."

Kennedy Co-Op, Inc. v. Bell, 644 So.2d 18, at 18 (Ala.Civ.App.1994) (citation omitted). Sudderth testified that at the time he resigned as trustee the note was in default and that $35,500 was actually left owing on it. Further, Charles concedes on appeal that the amount of the judgment should be $35,500 and that that amount is supported by the evidence in this case. Additionally, the issues of an attorney fee award and an award of interest were before the trial court; however, we cannot discern from the trial court's judgment if it considered these issues.

We, therefore, conclude...

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8 cases
  • Wilkinson v. Wilkinson
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • April 16, 2004
    ...account, the alimony award, or the requirement that the wife be made to pay for health-insurance costs. See Stephens v. Stephens, 699 So.2d 194, 196 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). "`Under the doctrine of "law of the case," whatever is once established between the same parties in the same case continue......
  • Grace v. Standard Furniture Mfg. Co. Inc.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • July 23, 2010
    ...to be the facts of the case.” ' ” McMorrough v. McMorrough, 930 So.2d 511, 514 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (quoting Stephens v. Stephens, 699 So.2d 194, 196 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) (quoting in turn Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So.2d 922, 924 (Ala.1987))). Thus, we will not consider again whether a ......
  • McMorrough v. McMorrough
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • August 26, 2005
    ...principles, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case.'" Stephens v. Stephens, 699 So.2d 194, 196 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997) (quoting Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So.2d 922, 924 (Ala. 1987)). See also Mims v. Mims, 472 So.2d 1063 (Ala. Civ......
  • Vajner v. Vajner
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • June 15, 2012
    ...to be the facts of the case.” ' ” McMorrough v. McMorrough, 930 So.2d 511, 514 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (quoting Stephens v. Stephens, 699 So.2d 194, 196 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), quoting in turn Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So.2d 922, 924 (Ala.1987)). The former husband cites Whited for the prop......
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