Stephens v. United States

Decision Date29 March 2023
Docket Number22-cv-1596
PartiesDANIELLE STEPHENS, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
CourtU.S. Claims Court

Danielle Stephens, Tulsa, Oklahoma, appearing pro se.

Kelly A. Krystyniak, United States Department of Justice Washington, D.C., appearing for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ELENI M. ROUMEL, Judge.

Plaintiff Danielle Stephens, appearing pro se, seeks redress against the United States for various claims including alleged improper disclosure of contract terms, violations of her constitutional rights, violations of criminal law, fraud and multiple statutory violations. See Complaint (ECF No. 1) (Compl.) at 1-5; Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (ECF No. 8) (Resp.) at 1-6.[1] Presently before the Court is the United States' (Defendant's) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Motion to Dismiss) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Rule(s)). ECF No 7 (Mot.). Defendant contends this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. Mot. at 1, 3. For the reasons stated below, this Court agrees and GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3).

BACKGROUND

In December 2019, Plaintiff entered into a "Retail Installment Sale Contract" (sale contract) with Regional Hyundai in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma for the purchase of a vehicle. ECF No. 1-1 (Ex.) at 13-15. This sale contract provided Regional Hyundai a security interest in "[t]he vehicle and all parts or goods put on it" in order to secure payment of Plaintiff's obligations under the contract. Id. at 15. While Plaintiff's Complaint characterizes the sale contract as being between her and Defendant United States, the terms of the sale contract make clear Plaintiff and Regional Hyundai are the only two parties to the agreement. Ex. at 13-14. Plaintiff states she became ill one year after purchasing the vehicle and her payments subsequently "became delinquent." Compl. at 3.

On October 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed suit against Regional Hyundai and TTCU Federal Credit Union in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (District Court), alleging Regional Hyundai and TTCU Federal Credit Union used Plaintiff's "identity to obtain a 'loan' without [her] consent." Ex. at 6, 9. While the case was pending before the District Court, Plaintiff alleges Defendant "submitted to have [her] vehicle repossessed." Compl. at 4. The District Court dismissed Plaintiff's case on August 5, 2022. Stephens v. Reg'l Hyundai, LLC, No. 21-CV-0414-CVE-SH, 2022 WL 3139749, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 5, 2022); see Compl. at 3- 4. On October 19, 2022, a tow truck - which Plaintiff believes was sent by the United States - removed the vehicle from Plaintiff's driveway. Compl. at 4; see also Ex. at 17-21, 34 (providing "ring.com" photographs dated October 19, 2022 that show a tow truck removing a vehicle from a driveway). Plaintiff alleges "[a] device must have been used to block my wifi because my Ring device did not notify me until it [the tow truck] was driving off with my vehicle." Compl. at 4; see also Ex. at 17-21, 34.

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant "sent a letter to the Plaintiff stating that if the Plaintiff didn't pay the alleged balance that it would close down the Plaintiff['s] checking account," and ultimately did so. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff's Complaint does not provide a copy of any communications allegedly sent to Plaintiff by Defendant. In response to the alleged letter from Defendant, Plaintiff claims to have "sent a letter to the United States to state that the Plaintiff disapproves of its actions etc," a copy of which Plaintiff's Complaint cites and includes as an exhibit. Compl. at 4; Ex. at 25, 32. Despite Plaintiff's characterization, the exhibit clearly reflects that Plaintiff sent her correspondence to TTCU Federal Credit Union rather than to Defendant. Compare Compl. at 4 (stating Plaintiff sent a letter to the United States and citing to Ex. at 32), with Ex. at 32 (providing a screenshot of a message sent by Plaintiff to TTCU Federal Credit Union on October 10, 2022).

Plaintiff filed her Complaint (ECF No. 1) in the present case on October 24, 2022, bringing suit against the United States for alleged improper disclosure of contract terms, fraud, violations of her constitutional rights under several provisions of the United States Constitution - including Article I and the First, Fourth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Amendments - and violations of 15 U.S.C. § 78ff, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e), 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 28 U.S.C. § 1359, 18 U.S.C. § 1512, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and 18 U.S.C. § 1961. See generally Compl.; Resp. As relief, Plaintiff requests damages totaling over $34,000,000, the return of her vehicle, and that her checking account be "restored and line of credit reopened to $25,000.00 a month and any balance[] used cleared on the 10th of the month." Compl. at 4-5.

On December 23, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7), arguing this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims as she "fails to plead the requirements for a contract with the United States" and does not invoke a money-mandating statute. Mot. at 1-2. Additionally, Defendant notes the exhibits attached to Plaintiff's Complaint demonstrate Plaintiff contracted with a "private business" and communicated with TTCU Federal Credit Union, refuting Plaintiff's statements that she contracted with and subsequently communicated with Defendant regarding her vehicle and bank account. Id. at 2-3.

Plaintiff filed her "Response to Motion to Dismiss" (Response) on January 3, 2023, stating,

whereas this Court has jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. 1681(p) of the FDCPA and TILA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 28 U.S.C.S. 1346(a)(1) & (b)(1). Venue is proper pursuant to 28(b) as the conduct giving rise to this action occurred in this judicial district. Any law incomplete is et seq.

Resp. at 1. In addition to these jurisdictional arguments, the Response's "Facts" section includes new claims of alleged statutory violations by Defendant that were not included in Plaintiff's Complaint. See Resp. at 1-5. Defendant filed its reply on January 20, 2023, asserting "Ms. Stephens fails to set forth the basis for the Court's jurisdiction over her claims, as required by law," and that her Complaint should thus "be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Defendant's Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 11) at 1-2.

On January 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a document this Court liberally construed as a Motion for Entry of Default and for Default Judgment under Rule 55 (Plaintiff's Default Motion), contending that Defendant was in default because it allegedly did not timely respond to her Complaint. ECF Nos. 9-10. This Court noted Defendant's timely filing of its Motion to Dismiss and denied Plaintiff's Default Motion on January 23, 2023. Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default and for Default Judgment (ECF No. 12).

On February 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike and for Alternative Claims (Motion to Strike), requesting this Court "strike the appearance and all filings by the unauthorized attorney[s] purporting to represent the United States in this case." ECF No. 13 at 1. This Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Strike on February 10, 2023, noting Defendant's attorney of record is an attorney with the United States Department of Justice who may conduct this case per 28 U.S.C. § 516. Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and for Alternative Claims (ECF No. 14).

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, provides this Court with jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, . . . or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity for "certain claims for monetary relief against the United States," but it does not create a right to relief itself. Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed Cir. 2014); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 218 (1983). To establish a right to relief under the Tucker Act, a "substantive right must be found in some other source of law." Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; see Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[J]urisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act itself."). The constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision must be "fairly . . . interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, this Court's jurisdiction under the Tucker Act does not extend to "every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation." Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216. Additionally, this Court's jurisdiction does not extend to cases against private parties or government employees in their individual capacities. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (discussing how the Court of Federal Claims' limited jurisdiction does not include relief "against others than the United States"); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over suits against the United States, not against individual federal officials."). This Court must dismiss claims outside its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3).

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