Stephenson v. McClelland
| Decision Date | 04 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-20182,15-20182 |
| Parties | DONATHON L. STEPHENSON; C. RENEE STEPHENSON, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. CHIEF CHARLES MCCLELLAND; C.M. DUNCAN, Defendants - Appellees |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Summary Calendar
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
*
Plaintiffs Donathon L. Stephenson1 ("Mr. Stephenson") and C. Renee Stephenson ("Mrs. Stephenson") appeal the dismissal of their claims under 42U.S.C. § 1983 and Texas law against defendants Chief Charles McClelland in his official capacity and Officers C.M. Duncan and Brian T. McCray in their individual and official capacities (collectively, "Defendants"). We AFFIRM.
On June 15, 2010, Houston police officer C.M. Duncan responded to an anonymous tip in a 911 call reporting the presence of a man brandishing a gun on a residential street in southwest Houston. Officer Duncan drove to the neighborhood where the caller reported seeing the individual. From a distance, Officer Duncan spotted an individual who appeared to match the caller's description, although he was too far away to determine whether the individual had a gun. The individual was standing in front of a residence near a car parked in a driveway. Officer Duncan pulled over to investigate further and activated the lights of his patrol car. As he exited his patrol car, he verbally commanded the individual to stop and show his hands. Officer Duncan observed that the individual did not immediately respond and instead began moving away from the car towards the front of the house. The individual was saying something that Officer Duncan could not understand. Officer Duncan testified that, based on the 911 call reporting that the individual had a gun and the fact that the individual did not comply with Officer Duncan's verbal commands, he was concerned for his safety. He began to draw his weapon as he exited his patrol car.
The suspect was later identified as Karlton Stephenson, a 16-year-old resident of the address where this incident occurred. Karlton testified that he had gone outside to his mother's car to retrieve her taser from the car before taking his dog for a walk. Karlton stated that he heard Officer Duncan orderhim to stop and not run, but that he continued walking to the house, saying, "Can I get my mom?"
As Officer Duncan approached Karlton, he was surprised by a large dog, which was later identified as the 50-pound, three-year-old boxer belonging to the Stephensons. Officer Duncan testified that the dog bared its teeth and jumped on him. Karlton claimed, however, that the dog did not jump and was "smiling." It is undisputed, however, that the dog was in the front yard without a leash and appeared suddenly as Officer Duncan reached Karlton. Officer Duncan fired one shot at the dog, testifying that he did so because he feared for his safety. Officer Duncan then proceeded to detain and search Karlton. The dog died later that day.
Having heard the gunshot, Mrs. Stephenson, Karlton's mother, came out of the front door of the residence. Officer Duncan told Mrs. Stephenson that he was responding to a 911 call and ordered her to keep her distance while he completed his investigation. Mrs. Stephenson acknowledged during her deposition testimony that she refused to comply, followed Officer Duncan as he walked Karlton to his police vehicle, and that she repeatedly questioned Officer Duncan about his actions. She testified that while Officer Duncan searched Karlton at the police car, she stood near Karlton, despite Officer Duncan's requests that she remain clear of his investigation.
Other neighbors began to emerge from the surrounding houses and family members began to arrive. Seeing a crowd develop, Officer Duncan called for backup, and other officers, including Officer Duncan's supervisor, Sergeant McCray, arrived at the scene to assist with crowd control. Sergeant McCray also ordered Mrs. Stephenson to stay clear of the scene to allow the officers to complete their investigation. Officer Duncan eventually askedanother officer to place Mrs. Stephenson in the back of his patrol vehicle. Mrs. Stephenson was escorted to the back of the vehicle, but she was not handcuffed.
Mr. Stephenson then arrived at the scene and officers also requested that he remain clear of the area of the investigation and refrain from interfering with the officers. The record indicates that Mr. Stephenson repeatedly questioned the officers and failed to comply with their instructions not to interfere with the investigation. After several warnings, he was handcuffed and placed in a patrol vehicle.
Officer Duncan eventually transported Karlton to the Houston Police Department Juvenile Division, where he was charged with evading arrest. Mr. and Mrs. Stephenson were both released before Karlton was taken to the station. No charges were filed against them. Karlton was later released to his parents and the charges against him were ultimately dismissed.
Mr. and Mrs. Stephenson filed this suit individually and on behalf of their son under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988, alleging that Defendants violated their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 They also brought a state law claim for malicious prosecution. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on all issues. The magistrate judge entered his memorandum and recommendations on one such motion, recommending that the trial court grant summary judgment in favor of the officers and the police department on all claims except for two claims against Officer Duncan: Karlton's § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims for unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment basedon the shooting of their dog. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations as its order and entered partial summary judgment dismissing with prejudice all claims except for the two against Officer Duncan. Officer Duncan subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining two claims against him, and the district court granted a second partial summary judgment on the claim of unreasonable seizure based on the shooting of the Stephensons' dog.
Before trial, the district court concluded that Karlton's malicious prosecution claim was properly addressed as a claim for unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. At trial, the jury found that Officer Duncan did not lack reasonable suspicion to detain Karlton and found that Officer Duncan was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court entered a partial take nothing judgment on Karlton's claim, and on March 6, 2015, the court entered a final judgment on all claims in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs filed this appeal.
The district court had jurisdiction over the Stephensons' claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction to review the district court's final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We note, however, that, to the extent Mr. and Mrs. Stephenson attempt to appeal claims on behalf of their son, Karlton Stephenson, we do not have jurisdiction to consider any such claims. At the time this case was filed, Karlton was a minor; thus, his parents brought suit both individually and on his behalf. But as of July 19, 2013, before the trial and entry of final judgment in this case, Karlton reached majority. His parents are therefore no longer his legal representatives and do not have standing to bring claims on Karlton's behalf. See, e.g., Valadez v. United Indep. Sch. Dist., No. L-08-22, 2008 WL 4200092, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2008) (). Karlton has not timely appealed from the entry of final judgment, and therefore, we lack jurisdiction over any claims belonging to Karlton Stephenson. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 314 (1988) (); cf. Colle v. Brazos Cty., 981 F.2d 237, 241-42 (5th Cir. 1993) ().
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, applying the same standards as the district court. Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Nickell v. Beau View of Biloxi, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2011); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "An issue is 'genuine' if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Cuadra v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000)). "A fact issue is 'material' if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law." Id. (citation omitted). We view all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010).
A government official performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity unless his actions violate a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Where, as here, a defendant invokes qualified immunity in amotion for summary judgment, it is the plaintiff's burden to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified...
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