Stephenson v. State
| Decision Date | 19 April 1887 |
| Docket Number | 13,634 |
| Parties | Stephenson v. The State |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Clinton Circuit Court.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to sustain appellant's motion for a new trial.
W. R Moore, J. C. Suit and C. S. Wesner, for appellant.
J. V Kent and W. A. Staley, for the State.
Appellant was charged in the indictment with having committed murder in the first degree.
He was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and sentenced to the State prison for a term of twelve years.
His counsel argue nine different grounds upon which they claim the judgment should be reversed. These, so far as necessary, we examine in the order of the argument.
1st. Jacob Price, called as a juror, answered upon his voir dire, that notwithstanding he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the merits of the case, he could render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence. He was further interrogated, and answered as follows:
The attorneys for the State challenged Mr. Price for cause, and the court, over appellant's objection and exception, discharged him.
One of the causes for challenge to a person called as a juror, as prescribed by the statute, is, that he has such conscientious opinions as would preclude his affixing the death penalty in a capital case, should the defendant be found guilty. R. S. 1881, section 1791.
The examination of Price did not bring the case strictly within the letter of the above statute, for the reason that he answered, that, notwithstanding his conscientious scruples upon the subject of capital punishment, and his convictions that the law providing for the infliction of such punishment is unjust and wrong, he could yet render a verdict enforcing the law.
It may well be doubted, however, whether the case is not within the spirit of the statute.
The case is different from one where a juror may confess to having formed opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, from newspaper reports or rumors, and yet be able to say that he can render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence. In such a case, the evidence, and the charge of the court, may remove all former impressions, by showing that there was no ground at all for them. And so, the case is different from one where a juror may confess to a prejudice against the business in which the defendant may have been engaged, for example, the sale of intoxicating liquors, and yet be able to say that he could give the accused a fair trial upon the evidence. In such a case, an honest and intelligent juror might be able to separate the case and the defendant from the business, and act with impartiality. Here nothing could be expected to occur during the trial, in the natural order of such trials, that could in any way change the conscientious scruples of the juror. He might believe from the evidence, that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree as charged, and yet his scruples against capital punishment would remain unchanged. When the charge is murder in the first degree, the statute lodges with the jury a discretion to inflict the death penalty upon conviction, or to imprison the defendant for life in the State prison.
It can hardly be supposed that a juror, who has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, and believes the law authorizing such punishment to be unjust and wrong, could sit with entire freedom and impartiality, and inflict the death penalty in a case where the law authorizes him to punish the offender by a life sentence.
There is nothing in the record from which we can know, or infer, that appellant was injured by the discharge of Price, unless we resort to speculation, and assume that the juror called to fill the place made vacant by his discharge, was objectionable to appellant, and that to get him off the jury, he was compelled to exhaust one of his peremptory challenges, or that he was compelled to leave him on the jury, because his peremptory challenges had been exhausted.
We do not think that in a case like this we should indulge in such assumptions for the purpose of overthrowing the judgment.
Appellant had no right to demand that Price, or any other person, should sit as a juror in the case, unless he was entirely free to act with impartiality, both as to the evidence and the law.
As the record shows nothing to the contrary, this court should presume that the juror called in the place of Price, was impartial and in every way competent. More than this appellant had no right to ask; indeed, for aught that is made to appear by the record, the juror called in the place of Price was in every way satisfactory to appellant.
The case here is different from that of Brown v. State, 70 Ind. 576, where the record showed that the trial court improperly refused to discharge a juror for cause, and that, in order to protect himself, the defendant was compelled to exhaust one of his peremptory challenges.
The question of the competency of a juror, under his statements, is left, in a measure, to the sound discretion of the trial judge, which will not be reviewed unless the facts show that it was abused. Moore Crim. Law, section 308; Bradford v. State, 15 Ind. 347; Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231 (237); Elliott v. State, 73 Ind. 10; Stout v. State, 90 Ind. 1.
Upon the question of the competency of jurors generally, see the late case of Stoots v. State, 108 Ind. 415, 9 N.E. 380.
The record here presents no such error or abuse of discretion in the discharge of Price, as calls for the interposition of this court.
2d. Before proceeding to an examination of the second question discussed by counsel, it should be stated that the mortal wound was inflicted in a combat, and that the claim on the part of appellant is, that he inflicted the wound in self-defence.
Samuel Carson was called as a witness in behalf of appellant. To the following questions he made the following answers:
Following the above questions and answers, appellant's counsel propounded to the witness this question: "Were you acquainted with Mr. Stephenson (appellant) and Mr. Hardesty (the deceased) sufficiently to have an opinion as to the relative strength of each of the parties?" Upon objection by counsel for the State, appellant's counsel announced that they proposed to prove by the witness, in response to the question, that it would be difficult to find a man among a thousand to compare favorably with Hardesty in strength, judging from his appearance in make of limbs, chest and constitution; that he "was as well muscled and as well made" as any man the witness knew; that appellant was the taller man of the two, but very frail in strength; that he has a long, sinewy arm, but no power back of it; that in his (the witness') opinion, Hardesty was by far the abler man in any kind of a contest.
The court sustained the objection to the question, and ruled out the offered testimony. Appellant's counsel contend that it was competent for the witness to give his opinion of the relative strength of the two parties.
It was doubtless competent for appellant to show, in a proper mode, the relative strength of the parties, but we think that it was not competent for the witness to give his opinion upon that question.
It will be observed that the witness had already given the weight of Hardesty, and stated that he was a robust, muscular man. It will be observed, also, that he had been acquainted with appellant but for a year or eighteen months, and had seen him but three or four times during the year preceding the trial.
He did not state that he had ever seen the parties, or either of them, test or exhibit their strength in any contest or otherwise. He was, therefore, illy prepared to form or express an opinion of the relative strength of the parties if opinions by a non-expert witness upon that subject were competent in any case. There are general statements to be found in the books, to the effect that non-expert witnesses may give their testimony, if they first state the facts, but such general statements are not to be understood as stating the rule to be, that such...
To continue reading
Request your trial