Sterling Merch. Fin. Ltd. v. Republic of Cabo Verde
Decision Date | 13 June 2017 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16–1285 (ESH) |
Citation | 261 F.Supp.3d 48 |
Parties | STERLING MERCHANT FINANCE LTD., Sterling, v. REPUBLIC OF CABO VERDE, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Jeffrey Marc Hamberger, Law Offices of Jeffrey M. Hamberger, P.C., Rockville, MD, for Sterling.
Petitioner Sterling Merchant Finance Ltd. ("Sterling") brings this action against Respondent Republic of Cabo Verde ("Cabo Verde"), pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (the "New York Convention"), to confirm a foreign arbitral award. Before the Court is Sterling's motion for default judgment. (Mot. for Default Judgment, ECF No. 20.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will grant the motion and confirm the underlying arbitral award.
Sterling is a limited liability company, organized in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware and engaged in the business of investment banking, private equity, and international consulting.1 (Pet. ¶ 11.) Cabo Verde is a foreign state, as defined in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. (Pet. ¶ 12.) On or about October 30, 2006, Sterling and Cabo Verde entered into a contract, pursuant to which Cabo Verde agreed to pay Sterling $950,490.62 to manage Cabo Verde's airline and flag carrier, Transportes Aereos Cabo Verde ("TACV"), for a one-year period. (Pet. ¶¶ 13, 14 & Ex. B ("Management Contract").) On December 1, 2006, the management of TACV was transferred to Sterling. (Pet. ¶ 14.) Sterling fully performed all the services required under the Management Contract, the final act of which was the submission of a final report on November 30, 2008. (Pet. ¶ 15.) Cabo Verde, however, failed to pay Sterling all of the money that it was due, thereby breaching the Management Contract. (Pet. ¶ 15.)
Sterling attempted to collect the money it was owed or to reach a settlement. (Pet. ¶ 17.) On June 30, 2014, after those efforts were unsuccessful, it invoked the Management Contract's arbitration clause.2 (Pet. ¶ 17.) On January 12, 2015, the matter was submitted to arbitration before a Sole Arbitrator, who was appointed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, seated in the Hague in the Netherlands.3 (Pet. ¶¶ 17–19 & Exs. C & D.) On November 27, 2015, the Sole Arbitrator issued his final decision, concluding that Cabo Verde had breached its obligations to Sterling under the Management Contract. (Pet. ¶ 20 & Ex. E ("Arbitral Award").) As relief, the Arbitral Award:
(See Pet. ¶¶ 20–22 & Arbitral Award ¶ 273.) To date, Cabo Verde has not complied with the Arbitral Award.
On June 24, 2016, Sterling filed the pending petition to confirm the Arbitral Award. Because Cabo Verde is a foreign state, Sterling was required to effect service in accordance with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 – 1610. (See Order, Oct. 12, 2016, ECF No. 6.) On January 6, 2017, Sterling requested that the Clerk of the Court effect service, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3),4 by mailing a copy of the Petition, Summons, and Notice of Suit to Cabo Verde's Foreign Minister through a courier, DHL World Wide Express. (Affidavit Requesting Foreign Mailing, ECF No. 9.) The Clerk complied (see Certificate of Mailing, ECF No. 12), and Cabo Verde received the mailing on January 10, 2017. (See Return of Service, ECF No. 11.) Cabo Verde's response to the petition was due on March 11, 2017. (Id. ) No response was filed. On April 28, 2017, Sterling requested that the Clerk enter a default against Cabo Verde (Aff. for Default, ECF No. 18), which the Clerk did on May 1, 2017. (Clerk's Entry of Default, ECF No. 19.) Sterling then filed the pending motion for default judgment.
Sterling's motion for default judgment asks the Court to confirm the Arbitral Award and to enter judgment against Cabo Verde in accordance with its terms. Before granting a default judgment against a foreign state, the Court must satisfy itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and that "the claimant [has] establishe[d] his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court." 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e).
As the bases for this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, Sterling relies on the New York Convention, chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 – 208, and the FSIA.
The New York Convention is a treaty which addresses "the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought." New York Convention, art. I(1). It provides that "[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon." New York Convention, art. III. However, it allows a Contracting State at the time it becomes a signatory to the Convention to insist on reciprocity—to "declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State." New York Convention, art. I(3). With that reservation, the United States became a signatory to the Convention in 1970, see 21 U.S.T. 2566, and Congress enacted implementing legislation later that year, giving the federal district courts jurisdiction to enforce its provisions. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 – 208 ; id. § 201 (); id. § 203 () Under the FSIA, a foreign state is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.5 However, the FSIA excepts from that immunity actions against a foreign state to confirm certain arbitral awards, including awards governed by the New York Convention. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)(B) ;6 Creighton Ltd. Ltd. v. Government of State of Qatar , 181 F.3d 118, 123–24 (D.C.Cir. 1999) . Thus, based on the New York Convention, the Federal Arbitration Act, and the FSIA, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Sterling's petition to confirm the Arbitral Award against Cabo Verde as long as (1) the award "fall[s] under" the New York Convention; and (2) it was issued in the territory of a Contracting State.
Both these requirements are satisfied here. An arbitral award "falls under" the Convention if it "aris[es] out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial...." 9 U.S.C. § 202. Here, the Arbitral Award meets this definition as it arises out of a commercial contractual relationship between Sterling and Cabo Verde for the management of Cabo Verde's airline and flag carrier. (See Arbitral Award at 18–27.) In addition, the Arbitral Award was also issued in the territory of a Contracting State—the Netherlands. (See Arbitral Award at 63.)7 Accordingly, the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Sterling's petition to enforce the Arbitral Award against Cabo Verde.
The FSIA "specifies that personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have [subject-matter] jurisdiction ... where service has been made under § 1608." GSS Group Ltd. v. Nat'l Port Auth. , 680 F.3d 805, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) ). In other words, " ‘under the FSIA, subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal jurisdiction.’ " Id. (quoting Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia , 811 F.2d 1543, 1548 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ). Here, the Court has concluded that it has subject matter jurisdiction, see supra § I.A., and the record establishes that Sterling served Cabo Verde in accordance with § 1608(a)(3). (See Certificate of Mailing; Return of Service.) Accordingly, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Cabo Verde.
Before entering a default judgment against a foreign state, the Court must conclude that "the claimant [has] establishe[d] his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court." 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) ; see Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 573 F.3d 835, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ( ). Sterling has met this standard.
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