Sterling v. Hill
| Decision Date | 15 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 6:21-cv-06115 |
| Parties | PHILLIP JAY STERLING, JR. PLAINTIFF v. SHERIFF TRAVIS HILL, Pike County, Arkansas DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff, Phillip J Sterling, Jr. (“Sterling”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. Sterling proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Sterling maintains he was improperly extradited from Pike County, Arkansas, to Tarrant County, Texas. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Robert T. Dawson, Senior United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.
The case is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) filed by the Defendant, Sheriff Travis Hill (“Sheriff Hill”) of Pike County, Arkansas. Sterling has responded. (ECF Nos. 20, 21). Sheriff Hill filed a reply. (ECF No. 22). The Motion is ready for decision.
On June 19, 2019, a two-count indictment was filed against Sterling in Tarrant County, Texas, in State of Texas v. Sterling, Case No. 1583147. (ECF No. 18-2 at 15). Sterling was charged with the continuous sexual abuse of a child-under the age of 14 for a period of 30 days or more in duration and the sexual assault of a minor under the age of 14. Id.
On April 1, 2021, a fugitive warrant was issued by the 432nd District, County of Tarrant, Texas. (ECF No. 18-2 at 5). Sterling was arrested in Pike County, Arkansas, on April 2, 2021. Id. at 3. On April 7, 2021, for verification of Sterling's identity, Jeffrey Farr of the Tarrant County Sheriff's Office sent Sterling's photograph and fingerprints to Pike County. Id. at 16, 20-23.
On May 14, 2021, the designee of the Governor of Texas issued a warrant/requisition requesting that Sterling be delivered to Tarrant County Sheriff Bill Waybourn or his designated agent. (ECF No. 18-2 at 9). On May 25, 2021, Arkansas' Governor Asa Hutchinson issued a warrant commanding the delivery of Sterling to Sheriff Waybourn or his designee. Id. at 8. Sterling was released to Deputies William Gudgell and Stacy Rhines of the Tarrant County Sheriff's Office on June 1, 2021. Id. at 4. Sterling remains in the custody of Tarrant County. (ECF No. 18-3 at 1-4).
Sterling alleges he was falsely imprisoned in Pike County in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 10 at 1-2). He maintains case number 6:21-cv-06049 is an (ECF No. 1 at 5). Sterling maintains he was unlawfully extradited on June 1, 2021, in violation of the extradition laws and procedures. Id. at 6. Specifically, Sterling asserts that under Arkansas law once he was served a governor's warrant he should have been taken before a judge or justice of the peace, informed of the demand for his surrender and advised of the crime with which he was being charged, and advised of his right to counsel; and, “if the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he or they wish to test the legality of his arrest; the court shall allow a 30 day period for prisoner to contest by way of a writ of habeas corpus.” (ECF No. 10 at 2).
Sterling maintains he was not taken before a judge and was denied his right to counsel and to contest the extradition. (ECF No. 10 at 2). He maintains the extradition also denied his right to liberty and to travel in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. Sterling has sued Defendant in his official capacity only. (ECF No. 1 at 6). He seeks damages in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242, per officer, official, agent, or representative involved in the abuse of authority and for cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 9. He also seeks damages on a per day basis for false imprisonment “since June 1st, 2021, through current date-7-13-2021.” Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” National Bank of Com. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).
The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat. Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Sheriff Hill moves for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Sterling has been extradited and there is no longer any case or controversy; (2) in accordance with the ruling in Sterling v. Waybourn, Civil Nos. 4:21-cv-608-P and 4:21-cv-755-P (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2021) (ECF No. 18-1), the legality of Sterling's extradition is no longer the proper subject of any legal attack; (3) extradition was mandated by the Constitution and 18 U.S.C. § 3182; (4) there is no basis on which Pike County, legally the only Defendant, may be held liable; (5) Pike County is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Supreme Court's holding in McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781 (1997); and (6), alternatively, the case should be stayed pursuant to Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In making this argument, Sheriff Hill relies on the ruling in Sterling v. Hill, Case No. 6:21-cv-06049, a habeas corpus case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. There, the Court noted that under the case and controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution, the habeas petitioner must, throughout the proceeding, have an “identifiable injury traceable to the respondent and likely to be redressed by a favorable outcome of the habeas proceeding.” (6:21-cv-06049; ECF No. 10 at 3 () (emphasis in original)). The Court further noted that when a person seeks to challenge his proposed extradition in the asylum state, the issues are limited. Id. Given the fact Sterling was in the custody of Texas charged under a criminal indictment and the existence of valid warrants from the Governors of both States, the Court concluded there was no further case or controversy. Id. The case was dismissed as moot for lack of a case or controversy. Id.
Sheriff Hill overreaches in making this argument. Clearly, the jurisdiction of federal courts extends only to actual cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, §2, cl. 1. “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 745 (8th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). The federal courts lack the power “to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” Ringo v. Lombardi, 677 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). The party asserting that the case has become moot bears the “heavy burden of proving mootness.” Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., 375 F.3d at 745 (cleaned up).
It is true that the case or controversy requirement under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution applies to all types of cases. However, the inquiry into the existence of a case or controversy depends on a case-by-case analysis, including an analysis of the remedies available in each case. The available remedies are different for habeas corpus cases and damages suits under § 1983.
If a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief for past exposure to unlawful conduct, this does not show the existence of a case or controversy unless accompanied by continuing, present adverse effects. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974); In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litigation, 893 F.3d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 2018). Here, since Sterling is no longer in Pike County, any claims for relief in the form of declaratory or injunctive relief are moot. See e.g., Watts v. Brewer, 588 F.2d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1978) (). Indeed, Sterling's habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Sterling v. Hill, Case No. 6:21-cv-06049, was dismissed as moot since Sterling had been transferred to Texas.
In this § 1983 case, however, Sterling is seeking monetary damages for past constitutional violations; he has a personal stake in the outcome and an actual case or controversy exists. See e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 113 (1983), finding no actual case or controversy with respect to claims for injunctive relief but noting that “[h]e still has a claim for damages against the City that appears to meet all Article III requirements ”...
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