Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hospital

• Decision Date: 01 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 398,398
• Citation: 145 Md. App. 161,802 A.2d 440
• Parties: Edwin STERLING, Personal Representative of the Estate of Laverne Sterling et al., v. JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

802 A.2d 440

145 Md. App. 161

Edwin STERLING, Personal Representative of the Estate of Laverne Sterling et al., v. JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL.

No. 398, Sept. Term, 2001.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

July 1, 2002.

Jonathan Schochor (Kerry D. Staton, Schochor, Federico and Staton, P.A., Zev T. Gershon and Janet, Willoughby & Gershon, on the brief) Baltimore, for appellants.

Mairi Pat Maguire (Donald L. DeVries and Goodell, DeVries, Leech & Dann, LLP, on the brief) Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before DAVIS, ADKINS, RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

RAYMOND G. THIEME, Jr., Judge, Retired, Specially Assigned.

Appellants were plaintiffs in two medical malpractice actions that were filed against defendants in the Circuit Courts for Baltimore City and Wicomico County. The complaints alleged negligence against Peninsula Regional Medical Center (PRMC), Floyd Gray, M.D., a doctor with PRMC, and the Johns Hopkins Medical Center for malpractice in the diagnosis and treatment of complications surrounding the late Laverne Sterling's pregnancy.¹ The complaints alleged that the Johns Hopkins Medical Center was negligent in transferring Ms. Sterling from PRMC to Johns Hopkins Hospital in her unstable condition and that this negligent act contributed to her death.

The actions against Dr. Gray and PRMC were settled, after summary judgment motions filed by those parties were denied, leaving Johns Hopkins as the sole remaining defendant. On July 22, 1999, Hopkins had filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting as its principal ground for relief the absence of a physician-patient relationship between its physician and Ms. Sterling. A hearing on the motion was convened, and after argument and consideration of the pleadings, the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Hopkins, denied appellants' Motions for Reconsideration on March 27, 2000, and appellants noted this appeal on April 20, 2001. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Md.Code (1974 and 1998 Repl.Vol.) §§ 12-301, 12-308 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Issue on Appeal

On appeal, appellants ask us to determine whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee, Johns Hopkins Hospital. We affirm the circuit court and explain.

Facts

On August 2, 1993, Laverne Sterling was admitted to the PRMC. At the time she was 32.6 weeks pregnant and her personal physician recommended admission to the hospital due to borderline blood pressure and the presence of protein in her urine (proteinuria). Ms. Sterling also presented with edema (swelling due to fluid retention), hypertension, abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting.

On August 3rd, Ms. Sterling came under the care and treatment of Dr. Floyd E. Gray. By this time, her condition had deteriorated and she had developed hematuria (blood in the urine) and bleeding in her mouth. Dr. Gray ordered labwork and a CT scan of the abdomen. Dr. Gray rendered a presumptive diagnosis of severe pre-eclampsia and a potential HELLP syndrome.² As a result of the initial diagnosis, Dr. Gray ordered a magnesium-sulfate intravenous infusion for Ms. Sterling. The diagnoses of severe pre-eclampsia and HELLP syndrome were later confirmed around 12:30 p.m.

Due to this confirmation, Dr. Gray contacted the Emergency Medical Resource Center (EMRC) to arrange for the transfer of Ms. Sterling to another hospital.³ The transfer was deemed necessary because PRMC did not have a neonatal intensive care unit at this time and there was concern that Ms. Sterling's condition might require a premature delivery of the child. EMRC informed Dr. Gray that Hopkins was the perinatal referral center that he should contact.⁴

Upon being connected with Hopkins Hospital, Dr. Gray spoke with Dr. Erica Leventhal, a Hopkins resident. Dr. Gray informed Dr. Leventhal of Sterling's symptoms (hypertension, hematuria, proteinuria, elevated liver enzymes, severe abdominal pain, nausea and vomiting) and informed Dr. Leventhal that he had placed Sterling on a magnesium sulfate drip.

Dr. Leventhal conveyed this information to the attending physician, Dr. Adib Khouzami. Dr. Khouzami, in turn, telephoned Dr. Gray at approximately 1:10 p.m. During the conversation, it was decided that Sterling would be transferred to Hopkins through the Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services System (MIEMSS) perinatal referral program. According to MIEMSS protocol, Dr. Gray informed Dr. Khouzami that Sterling was diagnosed as having severe pre-eclampsia, was receiving magnesium sulfate, and was also diagnosed as having HELLP syndrome due to her hematuria and bleeding. Dr. Gray also conveyed Sterling's laboratory test results. Dr. Khouzami recorded this information on the Hopkins Maternal Transport Log. Having determined that Hopkins had the resources available to care for Sterling, it was agreed that she be transferred to the hospital by ambulance, in compliance with MIEMSS procedure.⁵

Dr. Gray thereafter arranged for the transportation of Sterling to Hopkins through a local ambulance company. Sterling's condition continued to deteriorate during this interval. At approximately 3:00 p.m., while en route to Hopkins, Sterling became unresponsive. The ambulance was diverted to Memorial Hospital in Easton, Maryland, where it was discovered that Sterling had suffered an intraventricular hemorrhage. An emergency cesarean section was performed at Easton Memorial Hospital to deliver Sterling's infant daughter. Sterling was airlifted to the University of Maryland where she died on August 5th as a result of the hemorrhage.

This litigation ensued. Before trial in this matter, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Johns Hopkins asserted its entitlement to summary judgment because its representative physician, Dr. Khouzami, did not have a physician/patient relationship with Laverne Sterling. Maintaining that this predicate for the hospital's legal duty to the decedent was absent, it contended that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Discussion

Appellants maintain that Dr. Khouzami established a physician-patient relationship, and that, as a result, Hopkins had a legal duty toward Ms. Sterling such that it must answer for its negligence. They contest the entry of summary judgment against them, asserting that the question of whether Hopkins owed a duty of care to Ms. Sterling constitutes a genuine issue of material fact. Appellants further aver that a physician-patient relationship was established under the facts of this case, and insist that "face-to-face" contact between a doctor and patient is not a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of the legal relationship between physician and patient. In this case appellants also assert that they have raised genuine issues of material facts that must be resolved at trial, and contend that, as a result, summary judgment would be inappropriate in this instance.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501(a). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the facts, including all inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 676, 766 A.2d 617, 621 (2001). "`A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.'" Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227, 783 A.2d 206, 209 (2001) (quoting King v. Bankerd, 303 Md 98, 111, 492 A.2d 608, 614 (1985)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). We are mindful that, as Judge Smith observed in Porter v. General Boiler Casing Co., 284 Md. 402, 396 A.2d 1090 (1979), "if [the] facts are susceptible of more than one permissible inference, the choice between those inferences should not be made as a matter of law[.]" Id. at 413, 396 A.2d at 1096 (quoting Fenwick Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 138, 265 A.2d 256, 258 (1970)). But where there is no dispute as to any material fact presented, summary judgment is appropriate to resolve purely legal questions. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 632 F.2d 1238, 1240 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980).

We exercise plenary review over the circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment. See generally Lippert, 366 Md. at 227, 783 A.2d at 209.

General Principles

I.

"The general principles which ordinarily govern in negligence cases also apply in medical malpractice claims."⁶ Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association, 276 Md. 187, 190, 349 A.2d 245, 247 (1975). The Court of Appeals has recently rehearsed the elements for negligence in Maryland:

In order to establish a claim for negligence under Maryland law, a party must prove four elements: "(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty."

Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 366 Md. 29, 85, 782 A.2d 807, 841 (2001) (footnote and emphasis omitted) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994)).

The threshold element is the question of whether the defendant owes a legal duty towards the injured party. Assuming the existence of this element, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case for medical negligence by proving "(1) the applicable standard of care; (2) that this standard has been violated; and (3) that this violation caused the complained of harm." Jacobs v. Flynn, 131 Md.App. 342, 354, 749 A.2d 174, 180,cert. denied sub nom. Kishel v. Jacobs, 359 Md. 669, 755 A.2d 1140 (2000).

The duty of care owed to an individual in...