Stern v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: NORCOTT
• Citation: Stern v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 246 Conn. 170, 717 A.2d 195 (Conn. 1998)
• Decision Date: 11 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15805,15805
• Parties: Joan Poll STERN v. ALLIED VAN LINES, INC. Joan Poll STERN v. Warren D. WALTERS.

Page 195

717 A.2d 195

246 Conn. 170

Joan Poll STERN v. ALLIED VAN LINES, INC.

Joan Poll STERN v. Warren D. WALTERS.

No. 15805.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 29, 1998.

Decided Aug. 11, 1998.

John B. Farley, with whom were Steven H. Malitz and, on the brief, James V. Somers, Hartford, and Kathleen A. St. Onge, for appellants (defendants).

Michael F. Ewing, Bridgeport, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and PETERS, JJ.

NORCOTT, Associate Justice.

The issues in this appeal are whether a motion to open judgment and set aside the verdict following the rejection of a court-ordered additur is an appealable final judgment, and whether pursuant to General Statutes § 52-228b, ¹ a trial court may set aside the jury verdict and order a new trial after a plaintiff rejects a court-ordered additur. The defendants claim that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motions to set aside the verdict and order a new trial after the plaintiff moved to reject the order of additur, because a plaintiff who is dissatisfied with a trial court's order of additur is limited to challenging that award by way of appeal. We disagree with the defendants' interpretation of § 52-228b and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, Joan Poll Stern, brought this negligence action against the defendants, Warren D. Walters, and his employer, Allied Van Lines, Inc., for injuries she had sustained arising out of a collision between her automobile and a tractor trailer operated by Walters and owned by Allied Van Lines, Inc. ² After a jury trial, the jury found that the plaintiff was 50 percent contributorily negligent. The jury awarded the plaintiff economic damages in the amount of $31,084.08 but awarded her no noneconomic damages. ³ The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for additur and alternatively to set aside the verdict claiming that because no noneconomic damages had been awarded, the award was inadequate as a matter of law. The trial court agreed that the jury's verdict was inadequate and ordered an additur of $10,000. ⁴ The court instructed that "[i]f the defendants do not accept this additur to the verdict ... the verdict will be set aside and a new trial ordered on all issues." The defendants accepted the additur to the jury's verdict and judgment was rendered.

The plaintiff then filed a motion rejecting the additur, and thereafter filed a motion to correct the trial court's decision. Relying on § 52-228b, which provides that "the parties" must be given an opportunity to reject the additur, the plaintiff requested that the court's decision be corrected to indicate "that the plaintiff, as well as the defendant[s], [have] the opportunity to accept or reject the [c]ourt's additur." The plaintiff then moved the trial court to open and set aside the judgment, and to order a new trial on all issues. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motions and ordered a new trial on all issues. On appeal, ⁵ the defendants claim that: (1) because General Statutes § 52-263 provides for appeals to be taken from a trial court's decision granting a motion to set aside a verdict, this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal; and (2) General Statutes §§ 52-216a and 52-228a conflict with the plaintiff's interpretation of § 52-228b permitting a plaintiff who rejects a court-ordered additur to then move the trial court to set aside the verdict and receive a new trial.

I

We first address the defendants' claim that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Specifically, the defendants argue that § 52-263 ⁶ provides for an appeal of an order to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. The plaintiff contends that because the trial court's decision to set aside the verdict and order a new trial "will affect the further rights of the parties," it is not a final judgment from which an appeal can be taken. The plaintiff's claim is without merit.

" 'The right of appeal exists only by virtue of statutory authority.' " In re Judicial Inquiry No. 85-01, 221 Conn. 625, 633, 605 A.2d 545 (1992), citing State v. Audet, 170 Conn. 337, 342, 365 A.2d 1082 (1976). Generally, "appellate courts in this state do not have jurisdiction to entertain appeals not taken from final judgments. See General Statutes § 52-263; State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). The lack of a final judgment is a jurisdictional defect that mandates dismissal." Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, 241 Conn. 24, 34, 694 A.2d 1246 (1997). A judgment is considered final "if the rights of the parties are concluded so that further proceedings cannot affect them...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodson v. State, 228 Conn. 106, 112, 635 A.2d 285 (1993), on appeal after remand, 232 Conn. 175, 653 A.2d 177 (1995), quoting Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 176, 413 A.2d 819, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S.Ct. 20, 62 L.Ed.2d 14 (1979).

Although the plaintiff is correct that the present appeal does not constitute a final judgment under the traditional definition upon which she relies, this does not conclude our analysis. Section 52-263 explicitly grants an aggrieved party the right to "appeal ... from the decision of the court granting a motion to set aside a verdict...." The plain language of the statute expressly provides for the appeal of an order to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. See Robbins v. Van Gilder, 225 Conn. 238, 250-51, 622 A.2d 555 (1993) ("[T]he granting by the trial court of a motion to set aside a verdict and to grant a new trial is an appealable order. That decision, however, is not appealable because such an order is a 'final judgment' within the meaning of the principal appeal statute; General Statutes § 52-263; but because that statute specifically provides for an appeal from such an order as an alternative to the 'final judgment' basis of appeal." [Emphasis in original.] ). The trial court's granting of the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and receive a new trial is therefore appealable under § 52-263.

II

We next address whether the trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial after she had rejected the additur. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is limited to challenging the order of additur exclusively on appeal. They construe § 52-228b to provide only defendants with the option to reject a court-ordered additur, and argue that §§ 52-216a and 52-228a, when read in conjunction with § 52-228b, compel the rejection of a contrary construction. ⁷ The plaintiff claims that because § 52-228b permits "the parties" to reject an order of additur, it cannot be read to prohibit a plaintiff from rejecting an order of additur. We agree with the plaintiff. ⁸

Our resolution of the issue is guided by well established principles of statutory construction. "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, 'we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.' " (Citation omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 431, 692 A.2d 742 (1997).

We begin our analysis by examining the plain language of § 52-228b. Section 52-228b provides in relevant part that "[n]o ... verdict may be set aside solely on the ground that the damages are inadequate until the parties have first been given an opportunity to accept an addition to the verdict of such amount as the court deems reasonable." (Emphasis added.) We previously examined the meaning of § 52-228b in Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 217-18, 682 A.2d 106 (1996), ⁹ in which we analyzed individually the import of each sentence of § 52-228b. "The second sentence, which applies to the more specific instance of a court's setting aside such a verdict on the ground of an excessive damages award, requires that the prevailing party first be given the opportunity to accept an amount that the court deems not to be excessive. Similarly, the third sentence, which applies to the specific instance of a court's setting aside such a verdict on the ground of inadequacy of the award, requires that the parties first be given the opportunity to accept an adequate award." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 218, 682 A.2d 106. In Santopietro, we acknowledged the distinction that only a plaintiff may reject a remittitur, whereas either of "the parties" may reject an additur. Id. In order to accept the defendants' contention that "the parties" in § 52-228b should refer only to a defendant, we would have to conclude that the legislature made a mistake in drafting § 52-228b when it dictated that the singular "prevailing party" may reject a remittitur, whereas the plural "parties" may reject an additur. We are unwilling to conclude that the legislature unintentionally used the plural form and actually meant to permit only defendants the opportunity to reject an additur. See Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 29, 717 A.2d 77 (1998) ("[w]here words of a statute are clear we presume that they accurately reflect the legislature's intent"). Accordingly, we uphold our interpretation in Santopietro, that § 52-228b grants "the prevailing party" the right to reject a remittitur and "the parties," i.e., the plaintiff and the defendant, the right to reject an additur. Santopietro v. New Haven, supra, at 218, 682 A.2d 106.

Our prior application of the...