Stern v. Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians, (2012)
| Decision Date | 29 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | 11APP08 |
| Parties | Raymond Stern, Appellant, v. Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians, Respondent. |
| Court | Non-Removable Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians Court of Appeals Dist of Nay-Ah-Shing |
The present case is an appeal from a final judgment of the District Court of the Non-Removable Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe ("District Court"). Raymond Stern and the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians each appealed the judgment of the District Court for different reasons. Mr. Stern appealed the judgment because the District Court concluded that it was without authority to award monetary damages, even thought it concluded that Mr. Stern was wrongfully terminated from his employment. Mr. Stern asks the Court of Appeals to award him monetary compensation as a result of his wrongful termination.
The Mille Lacs Band appealed the District Court's judgment because it disagrees with the lower court's conclusion that Mr. Stern was wrongfully terminated. The Mille Lacs Band asks the Court of Appeals to reverse the District Court's judgment that Mr. Stern was wrongfully terminated from his employment. In an effort to avoid confusion, the Court of Appeals will refer to Mr. Stern as Appellant; and will refer to the Mille Lacs Band as Respondent. This case was submitted to the Court of Appeals without oral argument.
This Court accords substantial deference to the District Court's findings of fact because the lower court had an opportunity to observe the witnesses, and weigh the credibility of the witnesses' testimony. This Court will not disturb the District Court's findings of fact unless such findings represent a clear abuse of discretion.
This Court does not accord any deference to the District Court's conclusions of law. Instead, this Court considers de novo the conclusions of law that are applied to the facts of a particular case.
Appellant Stern was previously employed as a Lab Manager at the Mille Lacs Band's Ne la Shing Clinic. Dr. Salina Rizvi, Health Director, was Appellant's supervisor. On March 8, 2011 Appellant's employment was terminated for the following reasons: 1) Mishandling a pre-employment urine sample and sharing the results of the test with co-workers in violation of the Mille Lacs Band's Nondisclosure of Confidential Information Policy and the Health Insurance Portability and Accessibility Act of 1996 (HIPAA); 2) Violating the Mille Lacs Band's Business Ethics and Work Rules Policy by impersonating a supervisor; and 3) Violating the Mille Lacs Band's Business Ethics and Work Rules and Harassment Policies by harassing an applicant for a job at the Ne la Shing Clinic.
Pursuant to the Mille Lacs Band Personnel Policy, Appellant Stern appealed his termination through the Grievance Committee. The Grievance Committee upheld Appellant's termination. Appellant then timely filed a complaint with the District Court. The District conducted an evidentiary hearing with respect to the three reasons listed in Appellant Stern's notice of termination, and ultimately decided that none of the reasons were supported by the evidence. The District Court concluded that Appellant Stern was wrongfully terminated from his position at the Ne la Shing Clinic. The Respondent Mille Lacs Band appealed to this Court, and argues that the District Court should be reversed because each of the three reasons listed in Appellant's notice of termination are meritorious. Appellant Stern also appeals the decision of the District Court because the lower court concluded that it was without authority to award monetary damages, and Appellant argues that he is entitled to compensation as a result of his wrongful termination.
The District Court determined that there was no basis for terminating Appellant Stern's employment for impersonating a supervisor because there was no written policy putting him on notice that he was prohibited from making an employment offer to a prospective employee. Additionally, the District Court determined that there was no basis for terminating Appellant Stern's employment for a violation of the Mille Lacs Band's harassment policy because his action of delivering pre-employment paperwork to a prospective employee's home was not prohibited; and because the prospective employee testified at the trial that she did not feel threatened by Stern's actions. Finally the District Court concluded that no HIPAA violation occurred when Appellant Stern conducted a pregnancy test on a urine sample submitted by a prospective employee as a pre-employment drug test because the donor of the sample is unknown, and because no personally identifiable health information was disclosed.
The District Court determined that Appellant Stern was wrongfully terminated from his employment. The District Court also concluded that by enacting the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Personnel and Policy Procedures the Band had waived its sovereign immunity and consented to be sued by a former employee who appeals a decision of the Grievance Committee. The District Court further concluded that the Mille Lacs Band did not waive its sovereign immunity so as to permit an award of monetary damages to an employee who was wrongfully terminated. The District Court explained that it is restricted to issuing a decision as to whether Appellant Stern was wrongfully terminated. Accordingly, the District Court denied any monetary damages to Appellant Stern.
On appeal, the parties continue to dispute the harassment and impersonating a supervisor issues; and the Respondent Band raises additional technical issues such as its disagreement over the manner in which Appellant Stern's lay advocate conducts his written advocacy; and the failure of the District Court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the primary issue over which the parties strenuously disagree is whether Appellant Stern violated HIPAA. This Court will now turn to the HIPAA issue.
THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY ACT OF 1996 (HIPPA)
HIPAA was enacted by the United States Congress for the purpose among other things, of protecting the privacy of individual's health information, Congress established a federal standard for the use and disclosure of individual health information. HIPAA is codified in federal law (42 USC Section 201, et seq.) and federal regulation (45 CFR Sections 160, 162, 164). HIPAA laws and regulations are applicable to health care providers. Because the Ne la Shing Clinic is a health care provider, the clinic is subject to the requirements of HIPAA. Additionally, all employees of the clinic, including Appellant Stern, are subject to HIPAA requirements. HIPAA protects all "individually identifiable health information" (protected health information) in its privacy protections. Protected health information includes any information relating to a medical condition that can reasonably be used to identify an individual.
In general, protected health information cannot be used or disclosed unless it falls within an exception to HIPAA's Privacy Rule, or if the test subject authorizes disclosure of the protected health information in writing. Federal regulations define "use" of protected health information as "the sharing, employment, application utilization, examination, or analysis of such information with an entity that maintains such information". 45 CFR Section 160.03. Federal regulations define "disclosure" of protected health information as "the release, transfer, provision of, access to, or divulging in any other manner of information outside the entity holding the information. Id.
A covered health care provider may disclose protected health information without the consent of the test subject for specific reasons, such as for treatment or payment for medical services. See, 45 CFR Section 164.502 and 45 CFR Section 164.506. Protected health information may also be disclosed without a patient's consent or authorization for certain specific public purposes, such as when disclosure is required by law, 45 CFR Section 164.51 (a); the disclosure is pursuant to a court order for judicial or administrative proceedings, 45 CFR Section 164.512 (e); the disclosure is for law enforcement purposes such as a search warrant, 45 CFR Section 164.512 (f); or other specified purposes. If the disclosure of private health information is not permitted pursuant to a specific exception to the...
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