Sterns v. Lundberg

• Decision Date: 08 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. IP 95-674 C B/S.,IP 95-674 C B/S.
• Citation: 922 F. Supp. 164
• Parties: Gerald C. STERNS and George W. Murgatroyd III, Plaintiffs, v. Donald R. LUNDBERG, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary of the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission; and Sherrill Wm. Colvin, Julia Blackwell Gelinas, Marce Gonzales, Jr., Grant W. Hawkins, William F. Lawyer, Jr., Kerry L. Thompson, and Barbara Coyle Williams, in their official capacities as members of the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

922 F. Supp. 164

Gerald C. STERNS and George W. Murgatroyd III, Plaintiffs, v. Donald R. LUNDBERG, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary of the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission; and Sherrill Wm. Colvin, Julia Blackwell Gelinas, Marce Gonzales, Jr., Grant W. Hawkins, William F. Lawyer, Jr., Kerry L. Thompson, and Barbara Coyle Williams, in their official capacities as members of the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission, Defendants.

No. IP 95-674 C B/S.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

April 8, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Samuel J. Goodman, Goodman Ball & Van Bokkelen, Highland, Indiana, F. Thomas Schornhorst, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana, James H. Voyles, Symmes Voyles Zahn Paul and Hogan, Indianapolis, Indiana, for plaintiffs.

Wayne E. Uhl, Office of Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, for defendants.

ENTRY

BARKER, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the following motions: (1) defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); and (2) plaintiffs' motion requesting an evidentiary hearing and oral argument on defendants' motion. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted; plaintiffs' motion is denied in part and denied as moot in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

In February of 1992, a Kentucky Air. National Guard cargo plane crashed near the Evansville, Indiana airport, killing as many as sixteen people and injuring several others. Following the crash, plaintiffs Gerald Sterns and George Murgatroyd, although not admitted to practice law in Indiana, directed mailings to survivors and the families of deceased crash victims in order to solicit potential clients.

On March 9, 1992, the Chief Justice and an associate justice of the Indiana Supreme Court conducted two news conferences. According to plaintiffs, the conferences were held "for the purpose of criticizing the conduct" of lawyers who had contacted crash victims or their families through advertising or personal correspondence. (Plaintiff's Brief in Response, p. 3). The Chief Justice went on to announce that the Indiana Supreme Court had directed its Disciplinary Commission ("the Commission") to conduct a comprehensive investigation of the alleged solicitations, and to adopt an "aggressive posture" with respect to the Court's rules governing attorney advertising and solicitations of business. (Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 11).

Disciplinary actions before the Indiana Supreme Court are conducted in accordance with the Indiana Admission and Discipline Rules. As a general matter, the initial or investigative step occurs when the Commission's Executive Secretary inquires into the charges brought against an attorney to determine whether "there is a reasonable cause to believe that the respondent is guilty of misconduct...." Ind.Admin.Disc.R. 23(10)(b). If the Executive Secretary determines that such cause exists, the grievance is then passed on to the whole Commission, which may either dismiss the grievance or file a complaint with the Indiana Supreme Court.

Once a complaint is filed, the Supreme Court appoints an officer to preside over the disciplinary hearing. The adjudicative stage of the proceedings then commences with an adversarial hearing, where the attorney charged with misconduct is given an opportunity to respond to the charges, be represented by counsel, cross-examine witnesses and produce evidence and witnesses on his own behalf. After the hearing, the hearing officer "shall determine whether misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence and shall submit to the Supreme Court written findings of fact." Disc.R. 23(14)(f).

The appellate stage of the disciplinary proceedings begins when either the charged attorney or the Commission files a petition for review of the findings or recommendations with the Indiana Supreme Court. The court may either adopt the findings and recommendations submitted or, after review of the record, issue its own findings and discipline.

On March 8, 1993, defendant Donald Lundberg, the Commission's Executive Secretary, initiated separate disciplinary actions before the Indiana Supreme Court against both plaintiffs, sub nom. In the Matter of Gerald C. Sterns, No. 98S00-9303-DI-310, and In the Matter of George W. Murgatroyd, III, No. 98S00-9303-DI-307. Lundberg charged that Sterns and Murgatroyd had solicited clients in violation of Indiana's disciplinary rules, and further requested that the Supreme Court enjoin them from the unauthorized practice of law in the State.

Each plaintiff, acting separately through counsel, then moved to dismiss the disciplinary proceedings on the grounds that the Indiana Supreme Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The plaintiffs also challenged the Court's subject matter jurisdiction because, as out-of-state lawyers not licensed to practice in Indiana, they were not subject to Indiana's disciplinary rules, or so they claimed. On October 29, 1993, the Court denied both motions in tersely-worded orders.

On May 22, 1995, plaintiffs filed their Verified complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, seeking to enjoin the defendants from progressing with the disciplinary proceedings. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the Commission's attempt to assert personal and subject matter jurisdiction over them violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on August 31, 1995, arguing that the Court abstain from considering the merits of this action in light of the related judicial proceedings currently pending before the Indiana Supreme Court.

II. ANALYSIS.

As a general rule, federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them." Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). Since Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), however, the Supreme Court has instructed that principles of equity, comity and federalism counsel abstention in deference to ongoing state proceedings in most circumstances. Thus, federal suits seeking to enjoin state criminal proceedings, Younger, or ongoing civil nuisance actions, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975), or even proceedings before state administrative agencies, Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986), have all been dismissed in order to foster "a proper respect for state functions...." Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750.

In a case similar to the one at bar, the United States Supreme Court in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982) held that Younger required a district court to abstain from interfering in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding. In so doing, the Court enumerated a three-part test which forms the basis of our analysis today:

1) Do state bar disciplinary hearings constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding?

2) Do the proceedings implicate important state interests?

3) Is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges?

Id. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521; Trust & Investment Advisers, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir.1994). Because the parties agree that the first element is satisfied, we will address each of the remaining two elements in turn.

(1). The Disciplinary Proceedings Implicate Important State Interests.

Federal courts are in universal agreement that the regulation of lawyers' conduct is a fundamentally important state interest. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 434, 102 S.Ct. at 2522; Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 745 (6th Cir.1996); Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme Court of California, 67 F.3d. 708 (9th Cir.1995); Storment v. O'Malley, 938 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir.1991); Hensler v. Dist. Four Grievance Committee, 790 F.2d 390, 392 (5th Cir.1986); Sekerez v. Supreme Court of Indiana, 685 F.2d 202, 207 (7th cir.1982); cf. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2376, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (citations omitted). "The judiciary as well as the public is dependent upon professionally ethical conduct of attorneys and thus has a significant interest in assuring and maintaining high standards of conduct of attorneys engaged in practice." Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 434, 102 S.Ct. at 2522. Indeed, the fact that the Disciplinary Commission, an agency of the Indiana Supreme Court, is a defendant in the present suit and was the body which initiated the state proceedings against Sterns and Murgatroyd easily demonstrates Indiana's interest in this litigation. Id. at 434-35, 102 S.Ct. at 2522.

To counter this logic, plaintiffs offer two arguments. First, as they did in the state disciplinary proceedings, plaintiffs reassert that the Indiana Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to impose sanctions upon out-of-state lawyers who are not licensed to practice in Indiana. Because that court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiffs maintain that Indiana has no interest in the issues raised in the disciplinary proceeding: "There can be no `important state interest' in the adjudication of a matter over which the state lacks power to begin with." (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition, p. 11).

Whatever the actual reach of the Indiana Supreme Court's disciplinary jurisdiction, however, the State itself still has a strong interest in protecting its citizens from unethical attorneys, regardless of their bar affiliation. Cf. Matter of Fletcher, 655 N.E.2d 58, 60 (Ind.1995) (supreme court's primary responsibility in discipline matters is to protect the public against unethical professionals, "regardless of whether the practitioner is...