Sterrett v. Sterrett

• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Author: Musmanno
• Citation: Sterrett v. Sterrett, 401 Pa. 583, 166 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1960)
• Decision Date: 01 December 1960
• Parties: William STERRETT, Appellant, v. Dorothy A. STERRETT, Appellee.

166 A.2d 1

401 Pa. 583

William STERRETT, Appellant, v. Dorothy A. STERRETT, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

December 1, 1960.

Abraham Gratz, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Allen N. Brunwasser, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, MUSMANNO BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN, BOK and EAGEN, JJ.

MUSMANNO, Justice.

On May 1 1939, William Sterrett and Dorothy Willis agreed to live together as a married couple. They went through a homemade ritual wherein Dorothy said to William: 'I, Dorothy, take you Bill for my lawful wedded husband,' and he replied to her in reciprocal language. From then on they lived together as husband and wife, they were so regarded in the community in which they made their home, and all went as well as a wedding bell, although it had never ceremonially rung in their behalf.

On July 22, 1952, they decided to supply this deficiency. They took out a marriage license in Washington County and were now civilly and ceremonially joined together in accordance with the procedure of formal law.

The law is now called upon to decide a question which has been raised by the plaintiff, namely: When did the marriage between William and Dorothy Sterrett really begin? When the marriage bells proclaimed them husband and wife on July 22, 1952, or when they declared, on May 1, 1939, each unto the other, that they were now married until death (or divorce) parted them? The answer to this question is of conclusive importance to this case because on February 23, 1946, they had come into possession of a property, the deed to which named the grantees as 'William Sterrett and Dorothy A. Sterrett, his wife.'

The plaintiff, who, despite the double marriage bond, has now left his wife, asks for partition of the real estate of February 1946. The defendant, who is living on the property, maintains that partition is not in order because, being Sterrett's wife at the time of the conveyance, (on account of the common law relationship,) her title in the property is one of estate by the entireties. If they were indeed married, in the eyes of the law, on May 1, 1939, Mrs. Sterrett's claim is well founded.

The common law and romantic concept that husband and wife were but one person has undergone considerable modification by legislation and modern decisions. Today, husband and wife are, for most purposes, regarded in law, as what they have always physically been, two separate human beings. The wife is entitled to her own separate earnings and she may own her own property. However, the change of the poetic concept of two-in-one has not affected the oneness of the property which they own together as husband and wife. That property remains indivisible and can only be conveyed by the consent of both parties. If one of the spouses incurs debts, their liquidation cannot be discharged against the property held by entireties. If one of the parties dies, his unpaid obligations cannot be met from any part of the estate by entireties.

Husband and wife own an estate in entireties as if it were a living tree, whose fruits they share together. To split the tree in two would be to kill it and then it would not be what it was before when either could enjoy its shelter, shade and fruit as much as the other. Former Chief Justice Stern of this Court well described the nature of estates by the entireties in the case of C. I. T. Corporation v. Flint, 333 Pa. 350, 5 A.2d 126, 128, 121 A.L.R. 1022, where he said:

'Tenancy by entireties is a venerable institution of the common law; it rests upon instincts which form the very warp and woof of our domestic and social fabric. In such a tenancy each spouse is seized per tout et non per my. There is but one legal estate, which, by a long course of judicial decisions, has been buttressed against inroads attempted either by the parties themselves or by their individual creditors. Thus, a purchaser at sheriff's sale, under a judgment against the husband, does not acquire any right to possession, joint or exclusive, during the life of the wife. McCurdy and Stevenson v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39. Where there is a judgment against the husband, the surviving wife takes the property free of it, nor can a tenancy by entireties be changed into one in common by any act or deed of the parties so long as they remain the owners of the property and the marriage relation continues. Hetzel v. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60, 64 A. 866.'

Even after the passage of the Act of May 10, 1927, P.L. 884, 68 P.S. § 501, which is now amended, permits partitioning of property by a married couple after divorce, the estate by entireties was regarded so indestructible and indivisible that the Superior Court refused to permit partitioning where the married couple held property by entireties prior to the passage of the Act:

'Real estate held by tenants by entireties prior...