Stettler v. State
| Citation | 70 N.E.3d 874 |
| Decision Date | 22 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 18A04-1607-CR-1638 |
| Parties | Thomas E. STETTLER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Attorney for Appellant : Ana M. Quirk, Muncie, Indiana.
Attorneys for Appellee : Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, J.T. Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana.
[1] After a jury trial, Thomas E. Stettler ("Stettler") was convicted of Child Molesting, as a Class B felony.1 He now appeals.
[2] We affirm.
[3] Stettler raises two issues for our review, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony of Stettler's victim concerning his prior conduct toward her under Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) ; andII. Whether the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument rising to the level of fundamental error.
[4] In 2012, Stettler, then eighteen years old, lived in a house in Muncie with his mother, his fiancée, and their infant son. In prior years, Stettler and his mother had shared a house with numerous relatives, including S.Y.; S.Y.'s sister, C.Y.; and their mother.
[5] On the evening of Friday, October 26, 2012, Stettler's mother invited S.Y., then twelve years old, and C.Y. to visit and to go with the family to a Halloween-themed corn maze. Because of some prior interactions with Stettler, S.Y. was somewhat hesitant to go, but eventually S.Y. and C.Y. went to Stettler's home.
[6] On either that Friday or the following Saturday, the group went to the corn maze. They left the maze late in the evening, and S.Y. and C.Y. decided to sleep on the couch at Stettler's home. The two laid down side by side, each with her head at an opposite end of the couch, with S.Y. lying closer to the front edge of the couch.
[7] At some point during the night, Stettler left the room he shared with his fiancée and child, and came into the living room where S.Y. and C.Y. were sleeping. After briefly standing over the couch and looking at S.Y., Stettler sat down in a chair immediately next to the couch. Stettler then pulled down S.Y.'s pants and put his penis into S.Y.'s "butt." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 89.) He also moved S.Y. and put his penis into her mouth. S.Y. pretended to be asleep during this, and Stettler stopped when S.Y. moved.
[8] C.Y. had awoken briefly during the night and had seen Stettler come into the living room and look down at S.Y., but went back to sleep soon afterward. After the girls returned home on the following Sunday, S.Y. told C.Y. about what had happened that Friday. S.Y. then told her mother that she did not want to go back to Stettler's house. When S.Y.'s mother asked why, S.Y. "told her that [Stettler] was raping me." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 94.)
[9] A police investigation ensued. Police interviewed Stettler and, subsequent to the interview, arrested him.
[10] On December 7, 2012, the State charged Stettler with Child Molesting. On August 29, 2014, the State filed its notice of intent to introduce evidence under Evidence Rule 404(b). The cause was set for a jury trial and, after numerous continuances, a jury trial was conducted from May 23 to May 25, 2016. During the trial, Stettler objected to testimony from S.Y. concerning prior alleged sexual conduct on Stettler's part, and the trial court admitted the evidence over his objection. In addition, at one point during closing argument, Stettler objected to a statement made by the State, but did not seek a jury admonishment or mistrial. At the end of the trial, the jury found Stettler guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgment of conviction against Stettler on May 26, 2016, and ordered a presentence investigation.
[11] On June 13, 2016, a sentencing hearing was conducted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Settler to fifteen years imprisonment.
[12] This appeal ensued.
Prior Conduct toward Victim
[13] Stettler contends that the trial court's admission of testimony from S.Y. concerning Stettler's prior conduct toward her was impermissible under Evidence Rule 404(b).2 We review such decisions for an abuse of discretion, Thompson v. State , 960 N.E.2d 224, 233 (Ind. 1997), which occurs when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. McClendon v. State , 910 N.E.2d 826, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied .
[14] Generally, evidence that is relevant—that is, evidence that has probative value as to an issue of fact in a case—is also admissible. Evid. R. 401 & 402. Evidence Rule 403 provides that where the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence, otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded. Evidence Rule 404(b) further limits the admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence, and provides:
[15] "The well established rationale behind Evidence Rule 404(b) is that the jury is precluded from making the ‘forbidden inference’ that the defendant had a criminal propensity and therefore engaged in the charged conduct." Thompson , 690 N.E.2d at 233.
[16] If the "sole apparent purpose" of evidence of a prior wrongful act is "to show the defendant acted in conformity with that character," the evidence is inadmissible. Pierce v. State , 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1269 (Ind. 2015). "But such evidence may be admissible for ‘other purposes,’ provided it survives Rule 403 balancing." Id. (quoting Halliburton v. State , 1 N.E.3d 670, 681-82 (Ind. 2013) ). "[I]t is sufficient that the evidence of ... prior bad acts is relevant to a matter at issue, other than ... propensity." Iqbal v. State , 805 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied .
[17] Here, the State sought to introduce S.Y.'s testimony concerning events that occurred with Stettler several years prior to the conduct charged. At the time of the charged offense, S.Y. was twelve years old. The State on direct examination solicited testimony from S.Y. concerning Stettler having repeatedly performed sexual acts on S.Y. from the time she was eight years old on the occasions when S.Y. and her family lived in the same home as Stettler and his family.
[18] When the State introduced this evidence, Stettler objected that S.Y.'s testimony was "highly inflammatory" and "does not prove any of the things allowed under 404B [sic] as a purpose for such testimony." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 73.) The State responded that S.Y.'s testimony "goes to plan, absence of fact [sic], and a motive that he committed the same type of behavior it's a plan and like a M.O. basically the time of night, how he would do it, that she was always asleep." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 72-73.) The trial court admitted the evidence over Stettler's objection.
[19] The State's argument for admissibility centered on "plan" as used in Rule 404(b). One branch of the "plan" exception is for acts that are part of a common scheme or plan, that is, evidence of acts that constitute an uninterrupted transaction, and of which the charged act is one. Greenboam v. State , 766 N.E.2d 1247, 1254-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). This Court has previously held that " ‘monthly molesting which continued for six years' " did not constitute an uninterrupted transaction within the contemplation of Rule 404(b). Id. at 1254 (quoting Sloan v. State , 654 N.E.2d 797, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Hicks v. State , 690 N.E.2d 215, 220-221 (Ind. 1997) ). Likewise, observing that " ‘an uninterrupted transaction requires that the crimes be committed in conjunction with each other,’ " we have held that evidence of a defendant's prior act, eleven months apart from the charged offense and in a separate county, but committed in a similar way—by posing as a police officer, initiating a traffic stop, and committing rape—did not amount to a common scheme or plan. Id. at 1255 ()).
[20] Here, the prior bad acts solicited through S.Y.'s testimony do not give evidence of an uninterrupted transaction. The prior acts elicited in S.Y.'s testimony were committed, in some cases, three years prior to the single act alleged in the instant case. There was no evidence that the prior acts were in any way committed in conjunction with the charged offense, and thus there was no basis upon which to conclude that the prior acts were evidence of a common scheme or plan.
[21] The second branch of the "plan" exception in Rule 404(b) relates to questions of identity and motive, and often involve an examination of the similarity of the prior bad acts to the charged offense, or to the relationship between the defendant and the victim as...
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