Stettner v. International Printing Pressmen & AU

Citation278 F. Supp. 675
Decision Date17 November 1967
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 2136.
PartiesMax Harry STETTNER et al., Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL PRINTING PRESSMEN AND ASSISTANTS' UNION OF NORTH AMERICA et al., Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Eastern District of Tennessee

Robert W. Ritchie, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

John S. McLellan, Kingsport, Tenn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NEESE, District Judge.

This is an action by four members of the subordinate local union of the defendant International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North America at Knoxville, Tennessee, to enjoin the defendants from moving the union's headquarters from Pressmen's Home, Tennessee, to Washington, D. C., and disposing, inter alia, of the real estate of a subsidiary corporation of the union at the former place. The individual defendants, who constitute the board of directors of that union, were ostensibly enabled to take these steps by an amendment to the union's constitution. The plaintiffs claim that the purported amendment was made unlawfully in violation of their political rights in the union, and is a nullity.

There is a general national policy against courts' interfering in internal disputes of trade unions, Calhoon v. Harvey (1964), 379 U.S. 134, 145, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190, 197 (separate opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart). For that reason, this Court considers the merits of the dispute only to the extent deemed necessary to determine whether the rights of the plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) were violated in the process of balloting within the union on the proposition of whether the union's constitution should be amended in the manner suggested; and if so, whether the extraordinary relief of injunction should be awarded the plaintiffs under the circumstances presented.

Before the apparent adoption of the amendment mentioned, the union's constitution provided that its headquarters must be permanently located at Pressmen's Home. The board of directors of the union initiated a proposition to amend that provision to permit the directors to select the site of its headquarters. The proposition was then submitted to a referendum vote of the members of the union. This balloting was conducted in some 750 local unions in the continental United States, Alaska and Canada. Local officers of each subordinate union returned certified results of the voting in the respective local elections to a board of electors of the international union. The aggregate of these returns reflected that the votes of 44,708 members of the union had been properly cast and certified, of which 24,544 favored the proposition and 20,164 opposed it. When no complaints of irregularity in the voting in any local were received seasonably by officials of the union, they proceeded with steps in implementation of the will of the apparent plurality of 4,380 of their members.

After this litigation was instituted, union authorities took cognizance of complaints, although filed after the time prescribed in the union's constitution, that there were blatant irregularities in the balloting at the union's local no. 388 at Los Angeles. There, the returns certified reflected that 2,650 members of that local had voted, with 2,446 favoring the proposition and 204 opposing it. Finding that only 64 votes were registered in conformity with all the pertinent provisions of the union's constitution in the balloting at Los Angeles, these authorities disallowed all 2,650 votes.

The plaintiffs claim, it is conceded by the defendants, and the Court finds, that by far the greater majority of the balloting in other subordinate local unions located at Atlanta and New York City was also accomplished contrary to the plain provisions of the union's constitution. These nonconforming votes were counted by the union's board of electors and are included in the published tabulation of the final results, although the union's constitution specifically forbids the counting of such votes. About 1,884 unconforming votes appear to have been thus included. The certified returns of the results from these two locals showed 2,011 for and 114 against the proposition in the New York balloting and 1,079 for and 97 against in the voting at Atlanta.

Every member of this union was guaranteed equal rights and privileges to vote in this referendum "* * * subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws. * * *" 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1). Plainly, this is no more than a command that members of this union must not have been discriminated against in their right to vote in the referendum involved. "* * * And Congress carefully prescribed that even this right against discrimination is `subject to reasonable rules and regulations' by the union. * * *" Calhoon v. Harvey, supra, 379 U.S. at 139, 85 S.Ct. at 295, 13 L.Ed.2d at 193-194. The crux of the matter, then, is whether there was discrimination against the plaintiffs' equality of rights and privileges in such voting.

It is undisputed that the plaintiffs cast their four respective votes against the proposition submitted, in conformity with the reasonable rules and regulations of the union's constitution and bylaws pertaining to balloting in referenda. It is now undisputed that many others of their fellow members cast their respective votes in favor of the proposition submitted, but not in conformity with such reasonable rules and regulations, and that these votes favoring the proposition were counted, contrary to the plain mandate of that document, along with the opposing votes of the plaintiffs. This Court concludes, therefore, that the negative votes of the plaintiffs were "killed" by the aforementioned improperly-cast positive votes; that the plaintiffs, accordingly, have been discriminated against; and that their rights under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1) were infringed.

Federal courts will review the constitution and bylaws of a union where there is evidence that provisions therein "* * * are being applied in such a way as to deny equality in voting * *." Cf. Gurton v. Arons, C.A.2nd (1964), 339 F.2d 371, 374 2. The constitution and bylaws of this union constitute a contract between the union and its members and bind all its members alike. DeMille v. Am. Fed. of Radio Artists (1947), 31 Cal.2d 139, 187 P.2d 769, 175 A.L.R. 382, 389-390, certiorari denied (1948), 333 U.S. 876, 68 S.Ct. 906, 92 L.Ed. 1152, cited in Smith v. General Truck Drivers, Etc., Union Local 467, D.C.Cal. (1960), 181 F.Supp. 14, 17 4. Officer-members of a union are as subject to 29 U.S. C. § 411(a) (1) as are nonofficer-members of that union, the political rights guaranteed by this statute having been adopted to strengthen internal union democracy. Grand Lodge of International Ass'n of Machinists v. King, C.A.9th (1964), 335 F.2d 340, 344 2, certiorari denied (1964), 379 U.S. 920, 85 S.Ct. 274, 13 L.Ed.2d 334.

The statute under consideration directed that all members of this union vote in this referendum in a particular manner, viz., in accordance with the reasonable rules and regulations in the union's constitution and bylaws applicable to such voting. A statute which directs that a thing be done in a particular manner ordinarily implies that it shall not be done in any other manner. Botany Worsted Mills v. United States (1929), 278 U.S. 282, 289, 49 S.Ct. 129, 73 L.Ed. 379, 385 (headnote 2); Raleigh & G. R. Co. v. Reid (1872), 13 Wall. 80 U.S. 269, 270, 20 L.Ed. 570, 570-571. As observed hereinbefore, the plaintiffs voted against the proposition submitted as directed in 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1), while thousands of other members of their union voted for the proposition submitted in a manner not so directed. It can hardly be contended, in the light of deviations of such magnitude from the statutorily-required direction, that the equal rights and privileges of these plaintiffs to vote in this referendum have not been effectively diluted. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1382, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 527.

The remaining question is whether this Court should, in view of these factual and legal conclusions, enjoin the defendants from proceeding to move the union's headquarters and sell its subsidiary's realty. This Court subscribes to the basic theory that courts should be hesitant to utilize this extreme device, except in the face of a clear showing of its need. The holding of one Court of Appeals indicates that the answer should be in the negative. It was said:

"* * * The plaintiff has not been denied the right to vote and makes no claim based on any such denial. But he would have us construe the language of the statute 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1) as granting authority to the federal courts to control and direct the entire conduct of union elections on the theory that the right to vote is a right to cast an `effective' vote, and that a vote cannot be effective unless the election is properly conducted in all its aspects. * * * We would be reluctant to hold that such a simple guaranty of the equal right to vote would carry with it the broad implications with which the plaintiff would freight it.1 Surely if Congress intended the federal courts to assume a general supervision over the conduct of union elections it would express that intent in terms which are at the same time more specific and more general than are found in Section 101(a) (1) 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1). * * *" Robins v. Rarback, C.A.2nd (1963), 325 F.2d 929, 930 2.

One of the three members of the panel of that Court declined to concur in this holding of his judicial brethren, because "* * * their construction of this important section of the `Bill of Rights' title of the LMRDA2 unduly constricts the right to vote that is therein guaranteed to union members." Ibid., 325 F.2d at 931 (concurring opinion). Circuit Judge Waterman, in pertinent part, wrote: "* * * I regard the Section 101(a) (1) voting right as being broad enough to protect union members from election ...

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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
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    ...and that if the union fails to do so it ipso facto violates the Act. Brief of Appellee at 14, citing Stettner v. International Printing Pressmen, 278 F.Supp. 675, 678 (E.D.Tenn.1967). This construction of the proviso is illogical. The "subject to" clause was designed not to elaborate or "de......
  • Aguirre v. Automotive Teamsters, 79-4435
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
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    ...v. Local No. 46, International Association of Iron Workers, 314 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1963); Stettner v. International Printing Pressman and Assistants Union, 278 F.Supp. 675 (E.D.Tenn.1976). In a similar fashion, liability has often been imposed on unions in LMRDA suits without mention of the......
  • PRINTING SPECIALTIES v. INTERNATIONAL PRINTING, CIV-2-77-98.
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    • April 20, 1978
    ...(1971), 451 F.2d 706, 7092, certiorari denied (1972), 406 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 1768, 32 L.Ed.2d 135; Stettner v. International Printing Pressmen & A. U., D.C.Tenn. (1967), 278 F.Supp. 675, 6761. While it might be more convenient for all the parties hereto if the Court were to instruct them pr......
  • Kupau v. Yamamoto, AFL-CIO
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
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    ...aff'd, 477 F.2d 825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067, 94 S.Ct. 576, 38 L.Ed.2d 472 (1973); Stettner v. International Printing Pressmen, 278 F.Supp. 675 (E.D.Tenn.1967). In each of these cases the court upheld relief under Title I despite the fact that the plaintiffs could have sought......
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