Stevens G. v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 03 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-924 (BRM) |
| Parties | STEVENS G., Petitioner, v. WILLIAM ANDERSON, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Before this Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by Petitioner Stevens G. (“Petitioner”). (ECF No 1.) Following an order to answer, the Government filed a response to the petition (ECF No. 6), to which Petitioner replied (ECF No. 11.) In complying with an order from this Court (ECF No. 10), the Government filed a supplemental response (ECF No. 14.) For the following reasons, this Court will grant the Petition and direct Respondents to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge within 14 days of the date of this order in accordance with the Third Circuit's decision in German Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2020).
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Haiti who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in July 2009. (ECF No. 6-1 at 3.) On December 7, 2018, Petitioner was convicted in New Jersey Superior Court, Monmouth County for “Endangering-Sexual Conduct with Child by Non-Caretaker” in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4A(1). (Id.) On the same day, Petitioner was convicted in an unrelated matter for the offense of criminal sexual conduct in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3B.[1] (Id.)
On February 20, 2019, Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear charging Petitioner as removable pursuant to sections 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (Id.) At a master calendar hearing on March 14, 2019, Petitioner admitted to allegations one, two, three, and five, but denied allegation six, which the Court found to be true and correct based on the evidence submitted. (See ECF No. 6-3, at 3.) Petitioner denied all charges of removability, which the immigration judge (“IJ”) treated as an oral motion to terminate proceedings. (See Id. at 3, fn. 4) The matter was continued to allow the parties to brief the issue of removability. (See id.) At a master calendar hearing on May 8, 2019, Petitioner argued the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) failed to meet its burden of establishing Petitioner is removable. (See id.) The IJ continued to matter for decision and on May 14, 2019 the IJ denied Petitioner's motion to terminate and sustained the charges of removability.[2] (See generally id.)
On July 17, 2019, Petitioner filed an application for relief from removal. (See ECF No. 14-4, Burgus Declaration (“Burgus Decl.”) at ¶ 7.) The hearing was adjourned to October 15, 2019, for an individual calendar hearing on the merits, at which time the hearing was adjourned to January 6, 2020 at Petitioner's request. (Id. at ¶ 7-8; see also ECF No. 14-1, Attachment 1, January 9, 2020 IJ Oral Decision.) Following the January 6, 2020 hearing, the IJ continued the matter until January 9, 2020 for issuance of decision. (Id. at ¶ 9.) On January 9, 2020, the IJ issued an oral decision denying Petitioner's application for relief and ordered him removed. (See ECF No. 14-1, Attachment 1.) Petitioner appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration (“BIA”) and on June 18, 2020, the BIA denied Petitioner's appeal. (ECF No. 14-1, June 18, 2020 BIA Decision.)
On July 17, 2020, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals under docket number 20-2484. On the same day, the Third Circuit granted a temporary stay of removal. (ECF No. 14-2.) On November 23, 2020, the Third Circuit granted Petitioner's stay, however, the petition for review remains pending.[3] (ECF No. 14-3.)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas relief may be extended to a prisoner only when he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A federal court has jurisdiction over such a petition if the petitioner is “in custody” and the custody is allegedly “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989). As Petitioner is currently detained within this Court's jurisdiction, by a custodian within the Court's jurisdiction, and asserts that his continued detention violates due process, this Court has jurisdiction over his claims. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95, 500 (1973); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001).
In his habeas petition, Petitioner argues that his continued detention has become so prolonged that it amounts to an unconstitutional application of § 1226(c). Petitioner's claim and request for an individualized bond hearing is governed by the Third Circuit's recent decision in German Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2020).
There, the Third Circuit clarified that its due process analysis in Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 2015) and Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011), survives the Supreme Court's 2018 decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830 (2018).[4] See German Santos, 965 F.3d at 210 (); see also Borbot v. Warden Hudson County Correctional Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Jennings did not call into question our constitutional Diop that detention under § 1226(c) may violate due process if unreasonably long.”). Thus, the constitutional analysis in Diop and Chavez Alvarez is still good law, and those cases govern as-applied challenges under § 1226(c). See id.
Under the German Santos test, a district court evaluating the constitutionality of prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) must consider the following factors - the length of detention in light of the likelihood of whether detention under the statute is likely to continue, the reasons for the delay which caused the petitioner's detention to become prolonged including whether either party made errors in bad faith or out of carelessness which unnecessarily prolonged removal proceedings; and finally whether the conditions of confinement are “meaningfully different from criminal detention.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 210-11. The first factor - the length of detention - is the most important factor and should be accorded the greatest weight in the weighing of the length of a petitioner's detention. Although the Third Circuit rejected a bright line rule and held that detention of even over a year may well pass constitutional muster, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that “when detention [becomes so prolonged as to be] unreasonable, the Due Process Clause demands a [bond] hearing.” Id. at 210. Where an alien has been detained for a considerable period of time well in excess of a year, the alien's detention is likely to continue, and the alien's delay has resulted from good faith challenges to his removal, the factors suggest that the alien's detention has become unreasonable, and a bond hearing is warranted, especially if his conditions of confinement are punitive in nature. Id. at 210-213. In Diop, the Third Circuit explained that detention “becomes more and more suspect” after five months, 656 F.3d at 234, and held that the two-year-and-eleven-month detention of an alien who had been granted withholding of removal was unreasonable. Id. at 233-34. In Chavez Alvarez, the Court held that a lawful permanent resident's detention became unreasonable sometime between six months and one year. 783 F.3d at 478.
The Third Circuit examined German Santos's two and one- half years detention and determined that, “[g]iven its length, likelihood of continuing, and conditions, [the detention had] become unreasonable. Id. at 212. The Third Circuit explained it was likely German Santo's detention would continue, as his appeal before the BIA was still pending, and he would thereafter seek review of the BIA's decision by the court of appeals. See Id. The Court found no evidence of bad faith by the government or by German Santos, so “this factor [did] not favor either side.” Id. Finally, the Court noted that German Santos was detained “alongside convicted criminals since late 2017” and “[d]espite its civil label, his detention is indistinguishable from criminal punishment.” Id. at 212-13.
Here Petitioner has been detained pursuant to § 1226(c) for nearly twenty-six months, longer than the petitioner in Chavez Alvarez and almost as long as the petitioner in German Santos. Based on the length of detention considered in German Santos, Petitioner's length of detention strongly weighs in Petitioner's favor. Petitioner's petition for review is still pending with the Third Circuit, who found some likelihood of success on the merits and appointed counsel. The Third Circuit has not resolved the merits of the petition for review, as such, his detention is likely to continue of a period of time out of Petitioner's control. Petitioner's lengthy detention does not appear to be attributable to any unnecessary delay of bad faith on the part of Petitioner or the government. Petitioner's conditions of confinement Bergen County Jail are not meaningfully distinguishable from criminal punishment, particularly in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Based on the above weighing of the German Santos factors, the Court finds Petitioner's twenty-six-month detention is unreasonable and will grant the habeas petition. The Court directs the Government to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing...
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