Stevens v. Allen

Decision Date28 June 1999
Docket NumberNo. 3017.,3017.
Citation336 S.C. 439,520 S.E.2d 625
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesColleen STEVENS and Gerald Stevens as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Kevin Marc Stevens, Appellants, v. Edgar Daniel ALLEN and Betty D. Allen, Respondents.

Daniel D. D'Agostino and Cherie R. Teat, both of Roberts & D'Agostino, of York, for appellants.

Edward R. Cole, of The Ward Law Firm, of Spartanburg; and Thomas A. McKinney, of McKinney, Givens & Associates, of Rock Hill, for respondents.

ANDERSON, Judge:

These wrongful death and survival actions arise from a single car accident. Colleen Stevens and Gerald Stevens as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Kevin Marc Stevens (the Personal Representatives) brought the claim against Edgar Daniel Allen, the alleged driver, and Betty D. Allen, the car's owner, after Stevens was killed in the accident. The jury found Stevens and Allen both 50% responsible for Stevens' death and awarded zero damages. The Personal Representatives claimed this award was inconsistent and inadequate, and requested the trial judge (1) instruct the jury to continue deliberations and return with an award of damages; (2) grant a new trial absolute; or (3) grant a new trial nisi additur. The trial judge refused. The Personal Representatives made post-trial motions for a new trial as to damages, a new trial nisi additur, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial judge denied all motions. The Personal Representatives appeal. We reverse and remand for a new trial.1

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Stevens and Allen were involved in a single car accident in the early morning of August 14, 1993. The teenagers had been out partying. A party attendee testified Allen had been drinking and smoking marijuana. Stevens and Allen left the party in Betty Allen's car. The car struck a bridge sign and the bridge before falling down the embankment into a creek. Stevens was killed, and Allen survived with injuries. According to one of the county pathologists, Stevens died from drowning.

The Personal Representatives filed an amended complaint on March 13, 1995, seeking damages for wrongful death and pain and suffering due to Allen's negligence. Liability was contested at trial. Allen denied (1) he was driving the car at the time of the accident and (2) the Personal Representatives suffered damages to the extent claimed. He averred Stevens' conduct was contributorily negligent.

At trial, the Personal Representatives attempted to offer medical records pursuant to Rule 803(6), SCRE, the Business Records Exception. The records consisted of the urinalysis performed on a sample from Allen collected after the crash. The judge refused to admit the evidence, finding a proper chain of custody could not be established and therefore it lacked sufficient trustworthiness.

As evidence of actual damages, the Personal Representatives offered funeral bills. They testified about the pain and suffering caused by the loss of their son. Allen introduced evidence that Stevens had been living with him for a period of time and there was a rift between Stevens and his family.

The jury concluded each party 50% liable on both the survival action and the wrongful death action. However, the jury found the Personal Representatives were entitled to "Zero Dollars" in damages on both actions. The Personal Representatives asked the court to instruct the jurors to return to deliberations and render a verdict with damages or to find for the defendant. The trial judge accepted the verdict as presented. The Personal Representatives made post-trial motions for a new trial nisi additur or for a new trial absolute. After a discussion about the amount of the additur requested, the trial judge denied the motion. The Personal Representatives filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to damages, a motion for additur, and a motion for a new trial as to damages. The trial judge denied all three motions.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
I. Did the trial judge err in accepting a verdict finding the defendant 50% liable for negligence, but awarding the plaintiff "Zero Dollars" in damages?
II. Did the trial judge err in not allowing the medical records into evidence under the Business Records Exception of Rule 803(6), SCRE?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. New Trial Absolute

The grant or denial of new trial motions rests within the discretion of the trial judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless his findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence or the conclusions reached are controlled by error of law. Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 477 S.E.2d 715 (Ct.App.1996).

A trial court may grant a new trial absolute on the ground that the verdict is excessive or inadequate. The jury's determination of damages, however, is entitled to substantial deference. The trial judge must grant a new trial absolute if the amount of the verdict is grossly inadequate or excessive so as to shock the conscience of the court and clearly indicates the figure reached was the result of passion, caprice, prejudice, partiality, corruption or some other improper motives. The failure of the trial judge to grant a new trial absolute in this situation amounts to an abuse of discretion and on appeal this Court will grant a new trial absolute.

Vinson, 324 S.C. at 404-05, 477 S.E.2d at 723 (citations omitted).

II. New Trial Nisi Additur

The trial judge alone has the power to grant a new trial nisi when he finds the amount of the verdict to be merely inadequate or excessive. McCourt by and Through McCourt v. Abernathy, 318 S.C. 301, 457 S.E.2d 603 (1995)

. Compelling reasons, however, must be given to justify invading the jury's province in this manner. Pelican Bldg. Ctrs. v. Dutton, 311 S.C. 56, 427 S.E.2d 673 (1993).

While the trial judge may not impose his will on a party by substituting his judgment for that of the jury, he may give the party an option in the way of additur or remittitur, or, in the alternative, a new trial.The consideration of a motion for a new trial nisi additur requires the trial judge to consider the adequacy of the verdict in light of the evidence presented. The trial judge who heard the evidence and is more familiar with the evidentiary atmosphere at trial possesses a better-informed view of the damages than this Court. Accordingly, great deference is given to the trial judge.
The denial of a motion for a new trial nisi is within the trial judge's discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. This Court has the duty to review the record and determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law.

Vinson, 324 S.C. at 405-06, 477 S.E.2d at 723-24.

III. Admission of Evidence

The admission of evidence is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge and, absent clear abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal. Carlyle v. Tuomey Hosp., 305 S.C. 187, 407 S.E.2d 630 (1991); Hofer v. St. Clair, 298 S.C. 503, 381 S.E.2d 736 (1989). For this Court to reverse a case based on the admission of evidence, both error and prejudice must be shown. Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 175 S.E.2d 805 (1970),app. dismissed, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 986, 91 S.Ct. 460, 27 L.Ed.2d 435 (1971), reh. denied, 401 U.S. 949, 91 S.Ct. 922, 28 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971).

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Zero Damages
A. Facially Inconsistent

The Personal Representatives argue the trial court erred in failing to require the jury to return to deliberations to consider the Issue of damages, and in refusing to grant one of their post-trial motions for (1) a new trial nisi additur, (2) a new trial as to damages, or (3) a new trial absolute, based on the inconsistency of the verdict. The Personal Representatives contend they are entitled to a new trial as to damages or a new trial absolute as a result of the abuse of discretion by the trial judge in accepting a facially inconsistent verdict. We find the Personal Representatives are entitled to a new trial absolute.

The Personal Representatives brought this action alleging negligence on the part of Allen resulting in Stevens' death. To prevail in an action founded in negligence, the plaintiff must establish three essential elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by a negligent act or omission; and (3) damage proximately caused by a breach of duty. Reiland v. Southland Equip. Serv., Inc., 330 S.C. 617, 500 S.E.2d 145 (Ct.App. 1998)

(Emphasis added.); Rickborn v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 321 S.C. 291, 468 S.E.2d 292 (1996).

The judge charged the jury on both negligence and comparative negligence. The jury's verdict was on a seven question special verdict form. The relevant questions and jury's answers are:

Ql. Do you find that the defendant, Edgar Daniel Allen, was negligent and that such negligence proximately caused Kevin Marc Stevens' injuries?
A. Yes.
Q3. Do you find that Kevin Marc Stevens was negligent and that such negligence proximately caused his injuries?
A. Yes.
Q4. If your answers to both question number 1 and question number 3 are yes then answer this question.
Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused Kevin Marc Stevens' injuries as one hundred percent (100%), what percentage of that negligence is attributable to Kevin Marc Stevens and what percentage is attributable to Edgar Daniel Allen?
A. Kevin Marc Stevens 50% Edgar Daniel Allen 50%
Q5. Please state the total amount of damages (conscious pain and suffering), if any sustained by Kevin Marc Stevens.
A. Zero Dollars ($0)
Q6. Please state the total amount of damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiffs.
A. Zero Dollars ($0)

The jury found the negligence of the defendant proximately caused Steven's injuries, but failed to award any damages. This is facially inconsistent. Once a plaintiff proves damages proximately...

To continue reading

Request your trial
29 cases
  • Limehouse v. Hulsey
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 10 Marzo 2011
    ...disturbed on appeal unless the finding is wholly unsupported by the evidence or based on an error of law. Stevens v. Allen, 336 S.C. 439, 446, 520 S.E.2d 625, 628-29 (Ct. App. 1999). a. South Carolina's default damages procedure Hulsey argues the process employed by the State of South Carol......
  • Proctor v. Dept. of Health
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 20 Marzo 2006
    ...317 S.C. 462, 465, 454 S.E.2d 907, 909 (Ct.App.1995); Cudd, 279 S.C. at 629, 310 S.E.2d at 833; see also Stevens v. Allen, 336 S.C. 439, 448, 520 S.E.2d 625, 629 (Ct.App.1999) ("For this Court to reverse a case based on the admission of evidence, both error and prejudice must be shown."), a......
  • Wright v. Craft
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 27 Noviembre 2006
    ...336 S.C. 439, 446, 520 S.E.2d 625, 628-629 (Ct.App.1999). The jury's determination of damages, however, is entitled to substantial deference. Id.; Brabham v. S. Asphalt Haulers, Inc., 223 S.C. 421, 430, 76 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1953). Compelling reasons must be given to justify invading the jury......
  • Limehouse v. Hulsey
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 12 Agosto 2011
    ...disturbed on appeal unless the finding is wholly unsupported by the evidence or based on an error of law. Stevens v. Allen, 336 S.C. 439, 446, 520 S.E.2d 625, 628–29 (Ct.App.1999).a. South Carolina's default damages procedure Hulsey argues the process employed by the State of South Carolina......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT