Stevens v. Baggett
| Decision Date | 10 April 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 59564,59564 |
| Citation | 154 Ga.App. 317,268 S.E.2d 370 |
| Parties | STEVENS v. BAGGETT et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
J. Sewell Elliott, Macon, for appellant.
Joseph H. Chambless, John E. James, Cubbedge Snow, Jr., Thomas W. Talbot, George N. Skene, Thomas C. Alexander, Macon, for appellees.
Plaintiff brought suit against defendants-joint tortfeasors for injuries sustained as the result of defendants' alleged negligence. From the grant of the resident defendants' motions for summary judgment and the grant of the nonresident defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff brings this appeal. We reverse.
The facts are as follows: On November 11, 1978, at approximately 2:00 a. m., appellees Baillee and Bennett (driving automobiles) and appellee Berta (operating a motorcycle) were involved in a collision on the Spring Street bridge in Bibb County, Georgia. As a result of the collision, defendant-Berta was thrown from his motorcycle. Apparently, he lay injured in the street when police officers arrived at the scene. The plaintiff, a nurse, arrived shortly thereafter and asked one of the officers if she could be of assistance in attending the victim. (Although an ambulance had been called for Berta, it had not yet arrived.) At the same time that plaintiff was examining Berta, defendant-appellee Baggett (the nonresident defendant) drove his pickup truck onto the bridge in a southbound direction. Baggett testified on deposition that when he came onto the bridge he saw that there had been an accident. He stated, however, that in his attempt to avoid hitting any persons at the scene of the accident he swerved his truck into the bridge and inadvertently slid into the wreckage. As a result of this second collision, plaintiff was injured, for which injuries she brought suit against all defendants as joint tortfeasors. The trial court granted resident-defendants' motions for summary judgment, presumably on the grounds that their negligence (if any) was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, concomitantly dismissing plaintiff's action against the nonresident defendant for lack of venue (venue having been predicated upon resident defendants).
Since we find that genuine issues of fact remain as to whether or not plaintiff's purported attempt to rescue was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances (and not reckless or wanton); whether or not the alleged negligence of the resident defendants (the first actors) continued while a rescue effort was made; or whether or not defendant-Baggett's actions in driving into the wreckage constituted the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries (as a superseding act of negligence cutting off the resident defendants' liability), we must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the resident defendants and its dismissal pursuant thereto of the suit against nonresident defendant Baggett for lack of venue.
1. Resident appellees argue that, even assuming their negligence in the first collision, such negligence was too remote, complete and static to be considered a concurring proximate cause, as a matter of law, with any other negligence (that is, either plaintiff's subsequent negligence in attending the victim, or the subsequent negligence of defendant-Baggett in colliding with the wreckage).
We cannot agree that plaintiff's act in coming to the aid of the victim was, as a matter of law, not an act of rescue. This is a question for jury determination.
"(T)he doctrine of rescue necessarily contemplates an assumption of the risk inherent in the peril created by the defendants' negligence and allows recovery for injuries thereby incurred, for the reason that the defendants were charged with the duty of anticipating that their negligence might attract rescuers who would necessarily have to assume the dangers inherent in the situation." Flowers v. Slash Pine EMC, 122 Ga.App. 254, 258-259, 176 S.E.2d 542, 546.
"The . . . question . . . is, does the stimulus of the negligence under the circumstances call for the effort to rescue as a normal reaction to the situation, which cannot be said to be rash and reckless as a matter of law? . . . 'Whether of not reasonable and prudent (persons) would act in the same way, under such circumstances, is a question for the jury to determine.' " Rushton v. Howle, 79 Ga.App. 360, 361-362, 53 S.E.2d 768, 769. See also Stone's Independent Oil Dist. v. Bailey, 122 Ga.App. 294, 176 S.E.2d 613.
The fact that in reality the victim's life may not have been in imminent peril does not mandate the finding that the doctrine of rescue was inapplicable in the case at bar.
"(E)ven though no danger is actually imminent, the rule is applicable to one who acts on appearances, if his conduct is that of an ordinary prudent (person) under the circumstances." 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 124, pp. 83, 85.
Thus, we believe it is the function of the jury to determine whether or not, under the circumstances, plaintiff reasonably believed that the victim was in imminent peril and whether or not plaintiff acted in a reasonably prudent manner in coming to the plaintiff's rescue. See Stone, supra, Division 2.
2. Even if plaintiff was in the reasonably foreseeable role of rescuer, resident appellees submit that they cannot be held liable for plaintiff's injuries, since defendant Baggett's act of negligence did, in fact and as a matter of law, intervene as the actual, immediate and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Because of the conflicting evidence presented on motion for summary judgment, we cannot find as a matter of law that Baggett's actions, as a superseding cause, were the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, precluding plaintiff from recovering against the first actors for their purported negligence.
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...be classified as reckless or wanton." Lorie v. Standard Oil Co., 186 Ga.App. 753, 755, 368 S.E.2d 765 (1988). Stevens v. Baggett, 154 Ga.App. 317, 318(1), 268 S.E.2d 370 (1980). "[T]he doctrine of rescue necessarily contemplates an assumption of the risk inherent in the peril created by the......
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McAuley v. Wills
...mother's paraplegia constituted an intervening act not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the car crash. E.g. Stevens v. Baggett, 154 Ga.App. 317(2), 268 S.E.2d 370 (1980). To hold that an intervening act was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant's negligent conduct is ......
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...an independent superseding cause "was a question for the jury to determine under proper instructions." See also Stevens v. Baggett, 154 Ga.App. 317, 268 S.E.2d 370, 373 (1980) (whether the party that caused the original accident is liable for injuries sustained by a nurse who was struck by ......
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