Stevens v. Berger
Decision Date | 03 March 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 76 C 1554.,76 C 1554. |
Citation | 428 F. Supp. 896 |
Parties | David STEVENS et al., Plaintiffs, v. Stephen BERGER, Individually and as Commissioner of New York State Department of Social Services, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
McEvily & Kluewer, Community Legal Assistance Corp., Hempstead, N.Y., by Charles McEvily and Steven Satkin, Legal Intern, for plaintiffs.
Jonathan A. Weiss and Mary Susan Birkett, Legal Services for the Elderly Poor, New York City, amicus for plaintiffs.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., New York City, by Joan P. Scannell, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, for defendant Stephen Berger.
Jerome A. Campo, Hauppauge, N.Y., for defendant James E. Kirby.
David G. Trager, U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Brooklyn, N.Y., by Leonard A. Sclafani, Asst. U.S. Atty., for defendant Joseph Califano.
Plaintiffs Virginia and David Stevens, acting for themselves and on behalf of their four minor children, seek a permanent injunction prohibiting the State of New York Department of Social Services, the Suffolk County Department of Social Services, and the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare from withdrawing their welfare benefits. Insistence that the children obtain social security numbers as a condition of continued public assistance allegedly violates their right of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and their right to privacy. While the social security number requirement is designed to reduce fraud by welfare recipients, in the particular circumstances of this case it does violate plaintiffs' rights.
The Stevens family was receiving Home Relief aid from the state, supplementing their below-subsistence private income. New York Social Services Law §§ 157 et seq. In January 1976, they received notice from the Suffolk County Department of Social Services that they were to supply a photostatic copy of each child's social security card, as required by New York's Welfare Regulations. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.2(c).
The Stevenses replied that the children had no social security numbers and that, because of their religious convictions, the parents would not obtain such numbers for them. They explained that, in their view, the use of social security numbers was a device of the Antichrist, and that they feared the children, if numbered in this way, might be barred from entering Heaven. (The adult Stevenses had obtained social security numbers years earlier, before developing their current convictions, and those numbers had been duly supplied to the Department of Social Services.)
Hoping to find some compromise solution, the Stevenses sought to cooperate with the department to develop an alternative way to identify their children for the welfare system's record-keeping needs. The offer was rejected.
The Stevenses unsuccessfully challenged the decision to cease aid at a hearing before the county. In August, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services affirmed the county's decision, and payments to the Stevenses under the Home Relief program were discontinued. The plaintiffs then instituted this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. A temporary injunction restored the plaintiffs to the relief rolls.
Before the trial, Mr. Stevens lost his job. The family, for this reason, was no longer entitled to Home Relief but was within the ambit of a federally-funded welfare program. Plaintiffs were permitted to file an amended complaint, naming the Department of Health, Education and Welfare as an additional defendant, since each member of a family receiving monies under national welfare programs must also supply a social security number as identification.
The Social Service Amendments of 1975 mandated that the numbers be provided to obtain assistance under Aid to Families with Dependent Children. P.L. 93-647. The applicable federal statute now reads:
(A) that, as a condition of eligibility under the plan, each applicant for or recipient of aid shall furnish to the State agency his social security account number (or numbers, if he has more than one such number), and (B) that such State agency shall utilize such account numbers, in addition to any other means of identification it may determine to employ in the administration of such plan. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25), P.L. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337. It was approved on January 4, 1975, four days after a seemingly contradictory segment of the Federal Privacy Act, P.L. 93-579, was passed. The Privacy Act provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or local government agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual's refusal to disclose his social security account number.
P.L. 93-579, § 7(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1896, reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a, note at 98 (Cum. Supp.1976). There is no need to deal with this apparent conflict, however, since section 7 of the Privacy Act then goes on specifically to exempt from its provisions "any disclosure which is required by Federal statute". P.L. 93-579, § 7(a)(2)(A), 88 Stat. 1896, reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a, note at 98 (Cum.Supp.1976). Moreover, section 1211(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, P.L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1711, 42 U.S.C. § 405, explicitly provides that, notwithstanding prior law, social welfare agencies may require applicants for aid to supply their social security numbers as a prerequisite for qualifying for aid. The pertinent portion of section 1211 reads as follows:
P.L. 94-455 § 1211(b). See also, H.Conf. Rep.No.94-1515 at 490-91, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
Because this case so clearly presents a dispositive First Amendment issue, there is no need to reach the question posed by plaintiffs of whether some constitutional right to privacy under the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments has been violated by the social security number requirement. We turn, therefore, to the issue of religious belief.
Not every belief put forward as "religious" is elevated to constitutional status. As a threshold requirement, there must be some reasonable possibility 1) that the conviction is sincerely held and 2) that it is based upon what can be characterized as theological, rather than secular — e. g., purely social, political or moral views. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) ( ); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965) ( ); Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) ( ); Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 323, 42 L.Ed.2d 279 (1974) ( ); Founding Church of Scientology of Washington v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 229, 409 F.2d 1146 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963, 90 S.Ct. 434, 24 L.Ed.2d 427 (1969) ( ); United States v. Kahane, 396 F.Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y.1975) ( ). See also, Greenawalt, Book Review (Konvitz, Religious Liberty and Conscience: A Constitutional Inquiry), 70 Colum.L.Rev. 1133, 1135-36 (1970); Note, Free Exercise of Religion in Prisons — The Right to Observe Dietary Laws, 45 Ford.L.Rev. 92 (1976).
The court, in undertaking this difficult and sensitive factfinding task, recognizes stringent limitations on its right of inquiry. Under the United States Constitution, an individual's right to believe in anything he or she chooses is unquestioned. Religious beliefs are not required to be consistent, or logical, or acceptable to others....
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