Stevens v. Brown, C-C-78-041-M
Decision Date | 02 June 1983 |
Docket Number | C-C-78-046-M,No. C-C-78-041-M,C-C-78-049-M and C-C-78-050-M.,C-C-78-041-M |
Citation | 564 F. Supp. 368 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
Parties | Byron L. STEVENS, Plaintiff, v. R.L. BROWN, Defendant. Byron L. STEVENS, Plaintiff, v. Ronald V. HAYES, Defendant. Byron L. STEVENS, Plaintiff, v. H.W. RICHARDSON, Defendant. Byron L. STEVENS, Plaintiff, v. D.L. SHARPE, Defendant. |
William K. Diehl, Jr., Charlotte, N.C., for plaintiff.
Frank B. Aycock, III, Charlotte, N.C., for defendants.
These cases were tried before a jury on August 24 and 25, 1982. The issues were submitted to the jury and resulted in a verdict which appears of record, as follows:
Defendants filed various motions addressed to the verdict. The court deferred action on those motions in the hope that the state of the law might be clarified by the forthcoming decision of the Supreme Court in Briscoe v. LaHue, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). That decision did not, however, answer the questions presented in these cases.
A hearing has been conducted at which the various post-verdict motions were heard and briefs were received from counsel.
Aside from procedural and evidentiary questions and claims of error with respect to the trial itself, the case presents a serious question of statutory construction:
Are police officers immune from liability for damages under the Civil Rights Acts if they conspire together and procure a murder conviction through the use of false testimony?
Byron J. Stevens, a black man now thirty-seven years old, moved from the northeast to Charlotte in 1973 or 1974. In June of 1976 he was living at 325 East Tremont Avenue in Charlotte with a man named Amos Belk. Stevens had no criminal record. During the afternoon of Sunday, June 6, 1976, Belk mowed the lawn and drank beer or wine. Stevens testified that at some time between 8:30 and 9:00 P.M., at Belk's request, Stevens picked up a can which contained gasoline for the lawnmower and which Belk had brought into the house, and started to move it to another place; that Belk struck a match and the gasoline ignited and a fire occurred. Stevens attempted to extinguish the flames on Belk's clothing and got him out of the house. Both were burned, Belk seriously. Belk died about four weeks later.
A few hours after the fire, investigating police officers interrogated Stevens, accusing him of pouring gasoline on Belk and setting him on fire. Stevens denied the accusations.
Stevens was ultimately tried in the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, for the first degree murder of Amos Belk, and was convicted and is serving a life sentence. He has not been at liberty since June 6, 1976, the day of the events above referred to.
Apparently Stevens has made no incriminating admissions in his murder trial or at any other time.
Stevens at all times denied any wrongful act, and insisted from the first that he did not set fire to nor harm nor murder the deceased.
The evidence, superficially, will support a finding of conspiracy to convict by false testimony.
The witness Richardson testified that he talked with the district attorney, Mr. Davis. He was asked the following question with respect to the actions of the district attorney and the witnesses (R. 55):
The witness Sharpe testified that they met with the district attorney and reviewed their testimony and attempted to eliminate inconsistencies so as to present "a united front" to the jury.
The testimony of Stevens, who, according to the evidence had no criminal record whatever, was that he was totally innocent.
The only evidence of Stevens' guilt was the mute dying declaration of the decedent Belk.
The evidence taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff was thought by me at the time of the trial to be strong enough to permit, though not to require, a finding of conspiracy to convict by perjury.
Under the law of North Carolina there is no civil liability, on the part of a witness for the prosecution, for damages resulting from false testimony or perjury in a criminal proceedings. Gillikin v. Springle, 254 N.C. 240, 118 S.E.2d 611 (1961). There is also no liability for such damages based upon subornation of perjury; that is, paying or otherwise inducing someone to testify falsely in a criminal case. Id.
Under federal law, it has been held that a witness for the prosecution in a criminal case may not be held liable under the Civil Rights Act for perjury or giving false testimony for the prosecution in a criminal case. Briscoe v. LaHue, supra (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
The question of liability in the federal courts under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, for money damages for conspiracy to convict through false testimony, has not yet been squarely decided. If I were at all satisfied that such a conspiracy had been formed and carried out in this case, I would go...
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