Stevens v. City of Columbus
| Decision Date | 07 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:20-CV-1230 |
| Parties | ANDREW H. STEVENS, and MELANIE COPENHAVER, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO, and TIMOTHY J. NOLL In his official capacity as Code Enforcement Officer of the City of Columbus, OH Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction ("PI"). (ECF No. 3). On April 8, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion to consolidate the hearing on their motion for a preliminary injunction with trial on the merits. (ECF No. 12). On April 17, 2020, Defendants filed a response requesting that this Court deny Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief and for consolidation of the PI hearing with trial on the merits. (ECF No. 15). This Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to consolidate the PI hearing with trial on the merits because the facts of the case were not in dispute and the issues for determination were primarily legal. (ECF No. 24). For the reasons set forth below, this Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for injunctive and declaratory relief.
This case relates to the City of Columbus' landscape alteration policies for owners of homes located in the City's historic districts. Plaintiffs, Andrew Stevens and Melanie Copenhaver, purchased a home that is not subject to any restrictive covenants but is located within the City of Columbus' Bryden Road Historic District. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4; ECF No. 3 at 4). They renovated the home and the yard, and as part of the renovation process, installed a terraced garden in the front yard. Id.
Plaintiffs' Home at 1734 Bryden Road - August 2018 (Before Landscaping)
Image materials not available for display.
Plaintiffs' Home at 1734 Bryden Road - October 2018 (After Landscaping)
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The Bryden Road Historic District, where Plaintiffs' home is located, is governed by the City of Columbus's Planning and Historic Preservation Code ("Historic Preservation Code"), codified in Title 31 of the City's Code. The City's Historic Preservation code was:
enacted to preserve and promote the public health, safety and welfare by means of regulations and restrictions enacted to encourage the orderly growth and development of the city; to provide for adequate light, air, open space and convenience of access; to protect against fire and natural hazards; and to maintain and enhance the value of buildings, structures and land throughout the city.
Columbus City Code § 3101.01. The Historic Preservation Code requires that property owners in certain historic districts first obtain certificates of appropriateness (also, "permits") prior to altering or making significant changes to their property.
In June 2018, Defendant Timothy J. Knoll, a Columbus city code enforcement officer, issued Stevens a code violation notice for having installed a retaining brick wall in his front yard without first obtaining a required certificate of appropriateness from the Historic ResourceCommission composed of individuals appointed by the mayor. Id. at 5; (ECF No. 15 at 2). Mr. Stevens was directed to comply with the notice within 30 days or face significant fines and punishment of sixty days imprisonment. Id. at 5. Mr. Stevens' appeal to keep the "improvements" to his yard were denied by the City of Columbus Historic Resources Commission ("HRC") in December 2018 because the garden was not "'in character with the neighborhood or the house' because it 'was too suburban.'" Id. at 6.
After the HRC denied Mr. Stevens' request to keep his "improvements," Stevens appealed this denial to the Board of Commission Appeals in January 2019. (ECF No. 1 at 7). The Board of Commission Appeals ("BCA") denied his appeal in April 2019. Id. Mr. Stevens next appealed the BCA's decision to the Environmental Division of the Franklin County Municipal Court. Id. at 8. The Municipal Court ultimately dismissed Mr. Stevens' case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction since the appeal was in essence a constitutional challenge to the Columbus zoning ordinance for which the Court lacked the jurisdiction to determine the merits of the claim and no facts were alleged regarding improper or unconstitutional acts by the reviewing administrative bodies. (ECF No. 15-1 at 3).
Plaintiffs argue that they launched their appeal in the Municipal Court because City Code §3118.09 provides that the BCA's decision is appealable only to it. (ECF No. 1 at 8). Defendants argue that instead of appealing to the Municipal Court, Mr. Stevens should have appealed the BCA's decision to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to Oh. Rev. C. § 2506.01, since his appeal was "actually a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of such action" and not merely an "appeal of the decision of an administrative body." (ECF No. 15 at 2).
Mr. Stevens requests that this Court permanently enjoin the City of Columbus from imposing criminal, civil, or other penalties on Plaintiff and other Columbus homeowners if they fail to obtain Historic Resources Commission approval of gardening and landscaping alterations. He argues that this landscaping policy violates his rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since the standards used by the members of the Historic Resources Commission are so broad and vague that "no person of ordinary intelligence can predict what is subject to its review or what should be approved." Id. at 5.
This Court has granted Plaintiffs' motion to partially consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with trial on the merits because the facts of this case are not in dispute and the issues in this suit are entirely legal in nature. (ECF No. 24). Accordingly, in determining whether to grant Plaintiffs' requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, this Court will consider the factors that courts consider in determining whether to grant a permanent injunction.
When determining whether to grant a request for a permanent injunction, Courts require a plaintiff to show: "(1) that [he] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction." eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839, 164 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006). Furthermore, the decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief "is an act of equitable discretion by the district court." Id. A plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction if he or she can establish that he or she "suffered a constitutional violation and will suffer 'continuing irreparable injury' for which there is no adequate remedy at law." Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov'tof Nashville & Davidson County, 466 F.3d 391, 394 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 602 (6th Cir.2006)).
Plaintiffs challenge the Historic Preservation Code both facially and as applied to them arguing that sections of the ordinance are impermissibly vague in violation of the procedural due process guarantees of the United States Constitution and the substantive property rights guaranteed in the Ohio Constitution. (ECF No. 3). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate an irreparable injury because they have not exhausted their administrative remedies and the City's regulations are not unconstitutional either on their face or as applied. (ECF No. 15 at 5).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' motion should be denied since Stevens failed to exhaust administrative remedies by pursuing an appeal pursuant to Oh. Rev. C. 2506.01 in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. (ECF No. 15 at 6). Oh. Rev. Code §2506.01 provides that:
Oh. Rev. Code §2506.01 (A)-(B)
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not exhausted their remedies because they were required to file an appeal pursuant to § 2506.01 of the Oh. Rev. Code. (ECF No. 15 at 6). The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has made clear that individuals challenging existing zoning restrictions may do so either through a §2506 action or a through a declaratory judgment action. See Driscoll v. Austintown Assocs., 42 Ohio St. 2d 263, 270-71, 328 N.E.2d 395, 401 (1975)( that Ohio Civil Rule 57 means that "the existence of the R.C. Chapter 2506 remedy does not preclude resort to an action for a declaratory judgment."). In Driscoll, the Supreme Court of Ohio clarified that there are substantive differences between a 2506 action and a declaratory judgment action and that while both "seek the same ultimate relief-elimination of an existing zoning regulation which prohibits a proposed use of the property" the similarities end there since a "declaratory judgment action is independent from the administrative proceedings; it is not a review of the final administrative order." Driscoll v. Austintown Assocs., 42 Ohio St. 2d 263, 270-71, 328 N.E.2d 395, 401 (1975).
While the Supreme Court of Ohio does require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies by obtaining a "final decision concerning the application of a zoning regulation to the specific property in question," there is no requirement that a...
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