Stevens v. Floyd

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Writing for the Court: MADDOX
• Citation: 361 So.2d 1014
• Parties: Marie Fallin STEVENS, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mark Stevens, Deceased v. Robert FLOYD, Jr. and Bonitz Insulation Company, a Corp. 77-141.
• Decision Date: 30 June 1978

Page 1014

361 So.2d 1014 Marie Fallin STEVENS, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mark Stevens, Deceased
v.
Robert FLOYD, Jr. and Bonitz Insulation Company, a Corp. 77-141. Supreme Court of Alabama. June 30, 1978.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 25, 1978.

James H. Lackey, Mobile, for appellant.

John D. Richardson and Robert M. Montiel of Brown, Hudgens, Richardson, Whitfield & Gillion, Mobile, for appellee.

MADDOX, Justice.

Plaintiff, as administratrix of the Estate of Mark Stevens, her deceased husband,

Page 1015

filed this action for wrongful death, claiming damages for negligence and for wantonness due to her husband's death on February 2, 1976, in Jackson County, Mississippi, as the result of an automobile accident. Both parties are Alabama residents, and the case was tried in Mobile Circuit Court. The accident happened on Highway 90, just west of the Alabama state line.

Plaintiff gave notice, pursuant to Rule 44.1, A.R.C.P., that she intended to raise an issue concerning the law of the State of Mississippi.

The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in refusing several charges requested by the plaintiff.

"PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED CHARGE NO. 6

"The Court charges the jury that if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that the defendant suddenly and without proper warning brought his motor vehicle to a stop, and there was insufficient time and distance to permit the plaintiff's deceased to bring his motor vehicle to a stop without running into the rear of the motor vehicle of the defendant, then the defendant was negligent, and if you are further reasonably satisfied that this negligence proximately caused the death of the plaintiff's deceased, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff."

"PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED CHARGE NO. 7

"The Court charges the jury that if the defendant suddenly and without proper warning brought his vehicle to a stop, and there was insufficient time and distance to permit the Plaintiff's deceased to bring his vehicle to a stop without running into the rear of the vehicle of the defendant, then the defendant was negligent."

"PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED CHARGE NO. 8

"If you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that the defendant driver negligently failed to keep a proper lookout for other motor vehicles also using the street and highway, or if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that he negligently failed to continuously give a signal to indicate his intention to stop or to make a left turn, for a reasonable distance before stopping, or if you find that he negligently stopped his motor vehicle too suddenly without allowing sufficient time for the plaintiff's deceased vehicle behind him to reduce speed and to stop; and if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that any one or more of these negligent acts on his part, if you find one, were the sole proximate cause of the collision, you should bring your verdict for the plaintiff."

"PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED CHARGE NO. 4

"If a person, without fault of his own, is faced with a sudden emergency, he is not to be held to the same correctness of judgment and action as if he had time and opportunity to fully consider the situation, and the fact, if it be a fact, that he does not choose the best or safest way of escaping peril or preventing injury is not necessarily negligence, but the standard of care required in an emergency situation is that...