Stevens v. Floyd

• Decision Date: 30 June 1978
• Citation: 361 So.2d 1014
• Parties: Marie Fallin STEVENS, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mark Stevens, Deceased v. Robert FLOYD, Jr. and Bonitz Insulation Company, a Corp. 77-141.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1014

361 So.2d 1014

Marie Fallin STEVENS, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mark Stevens, Deceased v. Robert FLOYD, Jr. and Bonitz Insulation Company, a Corp.

77-141.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 30, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 25, 1978.

James H. Lackey, Mobile, for appellant.

John D. Richardson and Robert M. Montiel of Brown, Hudgens, Richardson, Whitfield & Gillion, Mobile, for appellee.

MADDOX, Justice.

Plaintiff, as administratrix of the Estate of Mark Stevens, her deceased husband filed this action for wrongful death, claiming damages for negligence and for wantonness due to her husband's death on February 2, 1976, in Jackson County, Mississippi, as the result of an automobile accident. Both parties are Alabama residents, and the case was tried in Mobile Circuit Court. The accident happened on Highway 90, just west of the Alabama state line.

Plaintiff gave notice, pursuant to Rule 44.1, A.R.C.P., that she intended to raise an issue concerning the law of the State of Mississippi.

The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in refusing several charges requested by the plaintiff.

"PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED CHARGE NO. 6

"The Court charges the jury that if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that the defendant suddenly and without proper warning brought his motor vehicle to a stop, and there was insufficient time and distance to permit the plaintiff's deceased to bring his motor vehicle to a stop without running into the rear of the motor vehicle of the defendant, then the defendant was negligent, and if you are further reasonably satisfied that this negligence proximately caused the death of the plaintiff's deceased, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff."

"PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED CHARGE NO. 7

"The Court charges the jury that if the defendant suddenly and without proper warning brought his vehicle to a stop, and there was insufficient time and distance to permit the Plaintiff's deceased to bring his vehicle to a stop without running into the rear of the vehicle of the defendant, then the defendant was negligent."

"PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED CHARGE NO. 8

"If you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that the defendant driver negligently failed to keep a proper lookout for other motor vehicles also using the street and highway, or if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that he negligently failed to continuously give a signal to indicate his intention to stop or to make a left turn, for a reasonable distance before stopping, or if you find that he negligently stopped his motor vehicle too suddenly without allowing sufficient time for the plaintiff's deceased vehicle behind him to reduce speed and to stop; and if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that any one or more of these negligent acts on his part, if you find one, were the sole proximate cause of the collision, you should bring your verdict for the plaintiff."

"PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED CHARGE NO. 4

"If a person, without fault of his own, is faced with a sudden emergency, he is not to be held to the same correctness of judgment and action as if he had time and opportunity to fully consider the situation, and the fact, if it be a fact, that he does not choose the best or safest way of escaping peril or preventing injury is not necessarily negligence, but the standard of care required in an emergency situation is that care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances."

"PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED CHARGE NO. 2

"The duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff's deceased was to exercise reasonable care not to injure or damage the plaintiff's deceased; that is, to exercise such care as a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances."

The accident occurred on a four-lane, uncontrolled access highway. Each of the parties involved was traveling toward Pascagoula, Mississippi. Plaintiff contended that the evidence showed that the defendant missed the entrance to truck scales which he was required to enter, that he then signaled a change to the left lane, changed lanes, that the signal went off, and then, without proper warning, he made a sudden and unexpected stop in the left lane of a four-lane roadway. Plaintiff further contends that the evidence showed that there was to the defendant's immediate rear a vehicle which avoided a collision by going to the left into a grass median and almost instantaneously the plaintiff's deceased slammed into the rear of the trailer which defendant was pulling.

The plaintiff relies almost solely on the testimony of one John Beitzel, who was traveling in the left lane immediately behind the defendant's trailer, and who avoided a rearend collision with the trailer by swerving to his left and entering the median. There was no direct testimony concerning the distance between the defendant's vehicle and the plaintiff's vehicle. Neither was there any testimony regarding the speed at which the plaintiff's deceased was traveling. Beitzel did testify that he heard the collision a split second after his vehicle left the road. Beitzel further testified that the defendant had brought his vehicle to a sudden stop.

I

The plaintiff argues that requested charges 6, 7 and 8, stated correct principles of law concerning the negligent failure of a driver to signal his intention to stop and should have been given. Plaintiff...