Stevens v. Hollingsworth

• Decision Date: 30 September 1874
• Citation: 1874 WL 9109,74 Ill. 202
• Parties: JAMES C. STEVENSv.WILLARD HOLLINGSWORTH et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

74 Ill. 202

1874 WL 9109 (Ill.)

JAMES C. STEVENS

v.WILLARD HOLLINGSWORTH et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1874.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Mercer county; the Hon. GEORGE W. PLEASANTS, Judge, presiding.

Mr. B. C. TALIAFERRO, for the appellant.

Mr. I. N. BASSETT, for the appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action of ejectment, by appellant against appellees, which, on the trial in the court below, resulted in a judgment for appellees.

One count in the declaration is for a mill-house, machinery and appurtenances to the mill, situated on lot four in block six in Keith's second addition to the town of Keithsburg in the county of Mercer, and the only controversy is in respect to this property.

It was admitted on the trial that the lot was, from before the second day of March, 1869, until the time of trial, the homestead of the plaintiff, who was the head of a family, residing with the same thereon; and that the defendants were in the possession of the mill-house and machinery in controversy, but of no other part of the lot.

The evidence shows that the lot is 156 1/2 feet long, about 100 feet of the south end being occupied by the plaintiff's residence and yard, and the mill occupying about 20 by 40 feet of the north end. There is also another lot owned by plaintiff adjoining this one, on which he has fruit trees, etc.

The defendants claimed to be lessees of Abercrombie, who claimed to be the owner of the lot by virtue of a deed made to him by the sheriff of Mercer county on the fourth day of February, 1871. This deed was supported by a judgment of the circuit court of Mercer county, rendered on the second day of March, 1869, against the plaintiff, for $466, upon which execution was issued and levied on the lot, which was sold to John C. Humphreys, and he assigned his certificate of purchase to Abercrombie. There is no evidence that the plaintiff ever abandoned his residence on the lot, or that he ever relinquished, in writing, his claim of homestead in the mill. It is claimed, however, by the defendants, that he voluntarily surrendered the mill to Abercrombie, and, subsequently, with the defendant, Willard Hollingsworth, rented the same from Abercrombie.

There is a conflict of evidence upon this point, but we think the preponderance is clearly with the plaintiff.

Abercrombie is a son-in-law of plaintiff, and claims that he bought the certificate of purchase at the request of plaintiff, to keep the property from falling into the hands of strangers. Plaintiff denies that he ever requested him to purchase the certificate, but they agree that it was understood that if plaintiff would refund to Abercrombie his money, plaintiff was to retain the property.

Abercrombie swears that plaintiff gave him possession of the property when he got his deed; that he then rented it to one Young for a time, and subsequently to plaintiff, and Willard Hollingsworth, one of the defendants; that plaintiff afterwards requested him to rent the property to one Brewer; that plaintiff and Hollingsworth being unable to agree, he resumed possession of the property, and then rented it to the defendant Willard Hollingsworth. He says that plaintiff did not object to this, but did not seem pleased with the arrangement.

Plaintiff swears that he rented the mill to Dunn and Thompson on the 15th day of June, 1870; that they afterwards sublet it to Hinsey and Smith, who sub-let it to Young; that Young, on quitting the mill, surrendered it to plaintiff; that he remained in possession until the eleventh day of December, 1873, when Abercrombie came into the mill, saying that he was going to take plaintiff's place; that for fear of having trouble he went out of the mill, fully determined to test the title to the property. He further swears that the defendant Willard Hollingsworth was his partner in the mill at the time; that he (Hollingsworth) refused to let plaintiff have any thing to do with the mill, after Abercrombie ordered him out, and thenceforth refused to recognize him as his landlord; that, when he first let Hollingsworth into the mill, Hollingsworth was to pay him $500 per annum rent; that subsequently it was agreed between plaintiff, Hollingsworth and Abercrombie that Hollingsworth should pay Abercrombie $250 per annum, which Abercrombie was to apply on what he had paid for the certificate of purchase; and that plaintiff agreed to pay Abercrombie as much more as he could. He positively denies that he ever rented the property from Abercrombie.

Plaintiff is sustained in his version in regard to the renting to Young by his son, Charles Stevens, and G. L. Dunn. He is sustained in his statement that he and the defendant Willard Hollingsworth went into partnership while he was himself in possession of the mill, and that Hollingsworth rented from him and not from Abercrombie, by David Hinsey, who swears: “Willard Hollingsworth, one of the defendants, ordered Stevens, the plaintiff, out of the mill. This was after Abercrombie came and took possession. Hollingsworth told me that, in the first place, he had arranged to run the mill in partnership with Stevens, and was to pay Stevens $22 per month, and furnish means to run the mill, and that Stevens was to keep up the engineer's part.”

By Charles Stevens, who swears: “Hollingsworth first went into partnership with father. * * * Father had possession and continued in possession until Hollingsworth came into the mill with father. * * * I heard Abercrombie say he was satisfied when he got his money back, and father said he would pay him out of the rent of the mill.”

And by B. C. Taliaferro, who swears, after proving demand made by him on the defendants for the possession of the mill, for plaintiff: “Hollingsworth refused to give possession; he stated to me that he had commenced running the mill in partnership with Stevens, in the first place, but he had afterwards rented of Abercrombie; that he was running it under Abercrombie's lease and would not give Stevens possession.”

We are not satisfied, from the evidence, that plaintiff ever voluntarily surrendered possession of the property to Abercrombie, but, on the contrary, are of opinion that it was agreed between these parties that Abercrombie, instead of insisting on his claim of ownership to the property, was to accept from plaintiff what he had paid for his certificate of purchase; and that the rents were to be appropriated in this way. This view, in connection with the fact, which seems to have been known, that Abercrombie had the certificate of purchase, sufficiently explains why Brewer, in desiring to rent the property, deemed it important to have Abercrombie's consent to any negotiation he should make, and why plaintiff consulted him in that respect.

This brings us to the question, did Abercrombie's deed give him a legal right to the possession of the property? It is insisted, for the defendants, that notwithstanding plaintiff's dwelling-house, etc., is on the same lot with the mill, yet inasmuch as the mill itself is no part of his residence, and he uses an adjoining lot, in part, for fruit and vegetables, and the portion occupied by the mill may be separated from the residue of the lot without inconvenience, it cannot be a part of his homestead. Linton et al. v. Quimby, 57 Ill. 271, and Loomis v. Gerson, 62 Id. 11, are cited in support of the position. In the first of these cases lots 12, 13, 14 and 15 had been sold on execution, and it was asked that the sale be set aside for the reason that they were the complainant's homestead. The court set aside the sale as to lot 13, only. It was shown that complainant's residence was on this lot, and that it greatly exceeded in value $1,000. This court held that the complainant had received all the relief to which he was entitled It was, however, said: “If the lots had been sold in a body, it would have been impossible to give this relief without setting the sale aside as to the other lots. But, as they were sold separately, complete justice can be rendered to Linton as to his homestead rights without doing a wrong to Quimby. The fact that each lot was sold separately, and that the lot on which Linton's house was situated was confessedly worth more than one thousand dollars, makes it easy to fix the precise limit to which the court should go in administering equitable relief.” It will thus be seen that whatever inferences, applicable to the present case, can be drawn from that case, are against the defendants. Here, the sale was of the entire lot, and it is impossible to apportion the amount bid to any particular part of it.

In the other case referred to, it was held, on bill filed to set aside a sale on the ground that the premises were a homestead, it appearing that the premises were worth $1,800, that the sale should not be absolutely set aside, but that the purchaser should be allowed to pay the $1,000 to the defendant in execution, if he so chose, and retain the property. But this was upon equitable principles purely, and manifestly can have no application in an action of ejectment, where the naked legal title only can be considered. Moreover, instead of being an authority to show that the right of homestead does not extend to the entire lot upon which the dwelling-house is located, it by implication recognizes the opposite doctrine. The language of the statute is, “The lot of ground and the buildings thereon, occupied...