Stevens v. Horn, 99-CV-1918.
| Decision Date | 26 May 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-CV-1918.,99-CV-1918. |
| Citation | 319 F.Supp.2d 592 |
| Parties | Andre STEVENS, Petitioner, v. Martin HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Billy H. Nolas, Esquire, Kathy Swedlow, Esquire, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Capital Habeas Unit, Philadelphia, Counsel for Petitioner.
Christy H. Fawcett, Esquire, Office of the Attorney General, Harrisburg, Counsel for Respondents.
Christopher D. Carusone, Esquire, Office of the Attorney General, Appeals and Legal Services Section, Harrisburg, Counsel for Respondents.
On April 19 through April 21, 1993, the Honorable Judge Robert E. Kunselman of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County presided over the non-jury guilt phase of Petitioner Andre Stevens' trial on two counts of first-degree murder in the homicides of his estranged wife, Brenda Jo Stevens, and her acquaintance, Michael Love. At the conclusion of that proceeding, the trial court convicted Stevens guilty on each count of first-degree murder. A jury empaneled for a separate penalty hearing conducted on April 27 through April 30, 1993, sentenced Stevens to death.
At issue today is Stevens' Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See dkt. 7). He argues that the proceedings against him were infected with federal constitutional error and that he is entitled to a new trial or, at a minimum, a new sentencing hearing. In support, he presents fourteen claims and numerous sub-claims for relief. First, I will address his claim alleging constitutional error during the jury selection process. He contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court improperly excluded a prospective juror for cause based upon her general objection to the death penalty. This claim is meritorious; therefore, he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Next, I will address Stevens' only claim alleging error regarding the guilt phase of his trial: that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did not develop and present a diminished capacity defense to the charges of first-degree murder. I have determined that this claim does not warrant habeas relief.
My disposition of the above-cited claims and the conclusion that a writ of habeas corpus is issued with respect to the death sentences renders it unnecessary to address the remaining sentencing-phase claims; any relief Stevens could obtain on those claims would be cumulative.
The trial court summarized the evidence presented at Stevens' trial as follows:
On February 8, 1992, [Stevens] was a customer at Armando's bar, a local drinking establishment. He was seated at the end of the bar closest to the entrance. Sometime before 1:00 a.m., his estranged wife, Brenda Jo Stevens, entered the establishment with friends. She proceeded past [Stevens] and sat near the end of the dance floor with Michael Love, an acquaintance whom she had met a few months before, and they began dancing.
[Stevens] saw them dancing together, left the bar, went to his car which was parked across the street, and secured a nine millimeter semi-automatic pistol loaded with hollow point bullets. He returned to the bar and walked across the dance floor area to the rear of the bar, cocking the gun as he proceeded. As the two victims were leaving the dance floor in different directions, [Stevens] opened fire on them. He fatally shot his estranged wife twice in the head. He turned on Michael Love and began firing a series of shots into Love's body. After a brief pause, he fired a final shot into Love's scrotum area. [Stevens] then calmly left the bar.
While [Stevens] was shooting the two victims, the bar was occupied by many patrons and employees, some of whom where in close proximity. They were all forced to scatter or find hiding places, including a bartender who was trapped behind the bar during the siege. At least one bullet was retrieved from a bar stool which was occupied by a patron. This particular witness later noticed a bullet hole in her jacket, which had been hung on the bar stool.
Although Brenda Jo Stevens died quickly, Michael Love remained in a state of consciousness while a friend futilely attempted to administer first aid. Love died as a result of the multiple wounds. The location and number of his wounds would have caused a great deal of pain. Several of his wounds were defensive in nature, inflicted when he raised his arms to deflect the attack.
In February 1992, Stevens retained Wendell Freeland, Esquire, to represent him in his defense of first-degree murder charges. (See dkt. 16, App. 21 at 4). After representing the indigent Stevens for approximately nine months, in November 1992 Attorney Freeland withdrew as counsel for lack of funds. (Id.; see also id., App. 23 at 104-05). The trial court then appointed the Beaver County Public Defender's office to represent Stevens. Initially, Public Defender Knafelc handled the case, but by March 1993 Public Defender Wayne S. Lipecky, Esquire, assisted by Thomas C. Phillis, Esquire, assumed representation. (Id., App. 23 at 104-05).
The non-jury guilt phase of Stevens' trial commenced on April 19, 1993. The court convicted him on each charge of first-degree murder. (Dkt. 13, App. 2 at 595-59). The day after the guilty verdicts Stevens' trial proceeded to the penalty stage. Over the course of the next several days, the parties selected the jury. (See dkt. 14, Apps. 3-4, 6). The penalty phase of the trial commenced on April 27, 1993. (Dkt. 15, App. 7). On April 29, 1993, the jury sentenced Stevens to death on each conviction of first-degree murder. (See dkt. no. 31, App. 6 at 91-93).
Stevens, still represented by Attorney Lipecky, filed a timely appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. On January 18, 1996, the court, in a unanimous decision, affirmed Stevens' judgment of sentences. Commonwealth v. Stevens, 543 Pa. 204, 670 A.2d 623 (1996) ("Stevens I"). The Governor of Pennsylvania signed Stevens' death warrant on May 8, 1995, scheduling his execution for the week of June 2, 1995. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, upon Stevens' motion, stayed the execution on May 23, 1995, to enable him to file a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court denied the petition on October 7, 1996. Stevens v. Pennsylvania, 519 U.S. 855, 117 S.Ct. 151, 136 L.Ed.2d 96 (1996). Accordingly, his conviction and sentence became final on that date. See e.g., Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir.2000).
Upon the conclusion of his direct appeal, Stevens filed a pro se petition with the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County seeking collateral relief under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). Ultimately, the PCRA court (which was presided over by Judge Kunselman) appointed Stevens' present counsel-attorneys from the Defender Association of Philadelphia-to represent him. On or around March 1997, they filed a counseled petition for PCRA relief. (See dkt. 15, App. 16). The PCRA court conducted hearings on January 26 through January 29, 1998. (See dkt. 16, Apps. 17-24).
Following the hearing, the PCRA court issued a decision denying Stevens relief on all claims. (Dkt. 17, Apps. 25-26). Stevens appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In a five to two decision, the court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief. Commonwealth v. Stevens, 559 Pa. 171, 739 A.2d 507 (1999) ("Stevens II").
After the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied PCRA relief, Stevens filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court.1
Stevens filed his petition for habeas corpus relief after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132 § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, so that statute applies to his case. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). AEDPA restricts a federal court's authority to grant relief when a state court has previously considered and rejected the petitioner's federal constitutional claims on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It provides, in relevant part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Supreme Court interpreted the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(1) for the first time in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). First, it instructed that the federal court must decide exactly what is the applicable clearly established law determined by the Supreme Court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Hameen v. State of Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir.2000). Next, the court must determine whether the state court's decision was "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of" that law.2 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
The Supreme Court also explained that the two clauses of § 2254(d)(1) have independent meaning: "[A] decision by a state court is `contrary to' our clearly established law if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent." Id. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495. "[A]...
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Stevens v. Beard
...to develop and present evidence of his alleged diminished capacity as a defense to the charges of first-degree murder. Stevens v. Horn, 319 F.Supp.2d 592 (W.D.Pa.2004). In that same decision, I granted Stevens a writ of habeas corpus on his claim that he is entitled to a new sentencing hear......