Stevens v. Miller
| Decision Date | 10 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 11–5343–pr. |
| Citation | 82 Fed.R.Serv.3d 303,676 F.3d 62 |
| Parties | Edward STEVENS, Petitioner–Appellee, v. David MILLER, Superintendent, Eastern Correctional Facility, Eric T. Schneiderman, New York State Attorney General, Respondents–Appellants.* |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alyson Gill, Assistant Attorney General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Roseanne B. MacKechnie, Deputy Solicitor General for Criminal Matters, Lisa Ellen Fleischmann, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief) for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General for the State of New York, New York, NY, for Respondents–Appellants.
Richard Joselson, Legal Aid Society, Criminal Appeals Bureau, New York, NY, for Petitioner–Appellee.
Before: McLAUGHLIN, B.D. PARKER, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
Respondents–Appellants (the “State”) appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kaplan, J.), entered on December 23, 2011, which denied the State's motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the district court's grant of habeas relief to Petitioner–Appellee Edward Stevens more than a year earlier. The State argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying its Rule 60(b)(6) motion. We find that the State's motion is nothing more than an attempted end-run around the one-year time limitation on a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, which allows the district court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State's Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
In early 2000, Edward Stevens was convicted of Robbery in the Third Degree in violation of New York Penal Law § 160.05. See People v. Stevens, 8 A.D.3d 2, 3, 778 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 2004). Although Robbery in the Third Degree is ordinarily punishable by a maximum of seven years in prison, the trial court determined that Stevens was a persistent felony offender under New York law and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of fifteen years to life. Id. Stevens's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See People v. Stevens, 8 A.D.3d 2, 778 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 2004), leave denied, 5 N.Y.3d 810, 803 N.Y.S.2d 39, 836 N.E.2d 1162 (2005).
Stevens commenced habeas proceedings in the district court in December 2005. He claimed that his designation as a persistent felony offender and his resulting sentence was contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). In a report and recommendation issued on December 31, 2008, Magistrate Judge Maas recommended that the district court deny the petition.
By letter dated January 9, 2009, Stevens's counsel informed the district court that the issue of whether New York's persistent felony offender sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment was pending before a panel of this Court. As such, he requested that the district court extend the time to file objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation until ten days after this Court's decision. A few days later, the district court transferred Stevens's case to the “suspense docket” and instructed Stevens's counsel to “notify the court promptly upon resolution of the [appeals pending before the Second Circuit panel].”
On March 31, 2010, a panel of this Court, in a number of appeals consolidated under Besser v. Walsh, 601 F.3d 163 (2d Cir.2010), declared New York's persistent felony offender sentencing scheme unconstitutional. The next day, Stevens's counsel informed the district court of Besser and urged the court to grant Stevens's habeas petition. The State responded by letter dated April 16, 2010. In that letter, the State noted that a petition for rehearing en banc was pending in Besser and asked that the court refrain from relying on Besser until this Court rendered a decision on the petition for rehearing. Although the State's letter was apparently never docketed, the district court acknowledged receiving it.
This Court granted rehearing en banc on the issue of whether New York's persistent felony offender sentencing scheme contravened clearly established Supreme Court precedent on April 30, 2010, but the State never informed the district court of our decision to reconsider the panel's opinion in Besser. On September 27, 2010, the district court relied on the Besser panel decision and granted Stevens's habeas petition. Judgment was entered on September 29, 2010. The Clerk's Office mailed notice of the judgment to Stevens's attorney but failed to provide the State with notice. Because the State failed to check the docket sheet, as required by case law and the district judge's individual practices, it was unaware of the order granting Stevens habeas relief.
Less than three weeks after the district court granted habeas relief to Stevens, this Court, sitting en banc, overruled Besser in Portalatin v. Graham, 624 F.3d 69 (2d Cir.2010).1 In Portalatin, we held that New York's persistent felony offender sentencing scheme did not run afoul of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 78. Thus, Portalatin ensured the State of certain victory in Stevens's habeas proceeding. What's more, the State was surely aware of the Portalatin decision because the Solicitor General of New York argued the case. Nevertheless, the State did not apprise the district court of the en banc decision. And because the State never checked the docket sheet to ascertain the status of Stevens's petition, the State let its time to appeal expire.
On September 29, 2011, exactly one year after the entry of judgment granting Stevens habeas relief, Stevens's counsel wrote a letter to an attorney in the New York State Department of Corrections, enclosed a copy of the district court's order granting Stevens's petition, and requested Stevens's release. On October 12, 2011, the New York Attorney General's Office became aware of the letter and of the district court's order. The following day, the State made a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the district court's judgment granting Stevens habeas relief.
On October 18, 2011, the district court held a hearing on the State's Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Time and again, the State admitted its negligence in failing to check the docket sheet and failing to apprise the district court of Portalatin.2 Nevertheless, the State contended that it was entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief because “extraordinary circumstances” existed. In support of its argument, the State noted that (1) the district court's order to release Stevens was based on a panel decision of this Court that was overruled less than three weeks after the entry of judgment in this matter; (2) the mandate in the Besser panel decision never issued; 3 (3) Stevens's counsel never informed the district court of Portalatin; and (4) the Clerk's Office never provided the State notice of the district court's decision.
Stevens's counsel countered that Rule 60(b)(6) relief was inappropriate because the State's motion was not made within a reasonable time following entry of judgment and because Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a mere substitute for a party's failure to appeal in a timely manner. He candidly admitted that he delayed seeking Stevens's release until a year had elapsed from the entry of the district court's judgment so as to prevent the State from pursuing relief under Rule 60(b)(1), which allows a district court to vacate its judgment on the basis of the moving party's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
By memorandum and order filed on December 23, 2011, the district court denied the State's motion. The court found that even if the State's neglect was excusable—a premise that the court clearly believed to be dubious at best—the proper avenue for relief was a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, which was no longer available to the State because more than a year had passed. The court also noted that because Rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6) are “mutually exclusive,” Rule 60(b)(6) relief was inappropriate. In the alternative, the district court determined that the State was not entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief because the State's motion was not made “within a reasonable time,” as required by Rule 60(c). The court concluded by noting that “[t]he State's negligent failures ... have been egregious” and that “[f]air play demands that the State be held responsible for its extraordinary neglect.” It thus ordered Stevens's release on the force of its September 27, 2010 order.
The State now appeals the district court's denial of its Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
The State claims that the district court abused its discretion in denying its Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The State's primary argument on appeal is that the district court should have granted its motion because Portalatin constituted a supervening change in governing law that called into question the correctness of the district court's judgment. It also points to other circumstances it believes make this case “extraordinary.” The State asserts, among other things, that it had no reason to suspect that the district court would issue a ruling when it did, that the Clerk's Office failed to provide the State notice of judgment, that Stevens's counsel “misled” the district court, and that “comity concerns” counsel in favor of granting the State's motion. We find that, even when viewed in the light most charitable to the State, the State's motion is nothing more than one premised on its own mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and neglect—in other words, an untimely Rule 60(b)(1) motion masquerading...
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