Stevens v. State

Decision Date08 December 1976
Docket NumberNo. 1275S366,1275S366
Citation357 N.E.2d 245,265 Ind. 396
PartiesJohn W. STEVENS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

DE BRULER, Justice.

Appellant has petitioned for rehearing of his appeal, which we decided September 24, 1976 (reported at 354 N.E.2d 727, Ind.). His contention is that this Court failed to consider one of his assigned errors which was preserved and argued on appeal. The error arises from appellant's discovery, after the jury had been sworn and some evidence presented, that one of the jurors was a former co-worker of a defense witness, and had discussed the facts of this case with that witness. The trial court held a hearing to determine whether the juror had formed conclusions as to appellant's guilt, and following the hearing overruled appellant's challenge of the juror for cause. We approved this procedure and result.

Appellant, however, also sought to challenge the juror peremptorily at the same time. We did not treat this issue in our original opinion. We therefore grant appellant's petition for a rehearing upon this issue only.

Appellant relies upon Kurtz v. State, (1896) 145 Ind. 119, 42 N.E. 1102, which was not included in his original appellate brief, to support his position that the trial court was required to entertain his peremptory challenge after the swearing of the jury. In Kurtz the defendant sought to challenge a juror peremptorily after the swearing of he jury. The trial court refused to permit the challenge to be made. This Court noted numerous cases dating back as far as 1842, which held that peremptory challenges could be exercised until the swearing of the jury. 145 Ind. at 123, 42 N.E. 1102. The Court held that after their swearing, it was too late to exercise such challenges unless there was first made a 'motion to set aside the submission' of the case to the jury. The opinion seems to hold that this procedure operates as a discharge of the jury and necessitates the selection of a new panel. We have been unable to discover any cases in which Indiana courts have considered when a trial court must withdraw submission of a case to the jury in order to allow a peremptory challenge.

We now hold that a defendant in a criminal prosecution is not entitled to...

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12 cases
  • Averhart v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 29, 1984
    ...Jones v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 285, 385 N.E.2d 426; Stevens v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 396, 354 N.E.2d 727-730 reh. granted, (1976) 265 Ind. 396, 357 N.E.2d 245; Jarver v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 525, 356 N.E.2d 215, reh. Averhart's claim that there was a due process violation based on citat......
  • Johnson v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • September 29, 1981
    ...to dispel jury confusion." Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10, 354 N.E.2d 727, 736, reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410, 357 N.E.2d 245. It must be emphasized that statutes should be drafted in language that is readily comprehensible to persons unversed in the law. Articl......
  • State v. Williamson
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • April 11, 2000
    ... ... State v. Lupino, 268 Minn. 344, 356, 129 N.W.2d 294 (1964); People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 349-50, 442 N.E.2d 1205, 456 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1982); State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 678, 473 S.E.2d 291 (1996); State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432, 437-38, 333 S.E.2d 743 (1985); but see Stevens v. State, 265 Ind. 396, 410, 357 N.E.2d 245 (1976) (holding, without reliance on court rule or statute, that a criminal defendant is not entitled to peremptorily challenge a juror after the jury is sworn) ...         In Lupino, a juror after being sworn disclosed information that raised ... ...
  • Wooten v. State, 1-1180A322
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • March 31, 1981
    ... ... Clark v. Ellenbogen, (1970) 319 F.Supp. 623, Aff'd, 402 U.S. 935, 91 S.Ct. 1615, 29 L.Ed.2d 104 ...         The statute setting forth the jury qualifications as that of a freeholder or householder is, in our opinion, a status classification based on maturity, as explained in Stevens, supra. Thus, it is not unreasonable and unconstitutional per se, and is within the power of the General Assembly to prescribe. See Carter, supra ... Issue II. Denial of Wooten's instruction No. 1 ...         The court refused to give to the jury Wooten's instruction No. 1, which reads ... ...
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