Stevens v. The Vill. of Red Hook
| Decision Date | 20 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20 CV 08152 (NSR) |
| Parties | FRED STEVENS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF BOBBIE JO FORTE, Plaintiff, v. THE VILLAGE OF RED HOOK, THE COUNTY OF DUTCHESS, DUTCHESS COUNTY SHERIFF ADRIAN H. ANDERSON, DUTCHESS COUNTY DISTRCIT ATTORNEY WILLIAM V. GRADY ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY MIRIAM CITRO, THOMAS D'AMICANTONIO, TRAVIS STERITT, NICHOLAS NORTON, individually and in their Official capacity as Village of Red Hook DETECTIVE/POLICE OFFICERS and DANA RUSSO, individually and in her official capacity as DUTCHESS COUNTY SHERIFF DEPTUY. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Fred Stevens, in his capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Bobbie Jo Forte,[1] brings this action against Defendants the County of Dutchess, Adrian H. Anderson, the Sheriff of the County of Dutchess, William V. Grady, the District Attorney of the County of Dutchess, Miriam Citro, a Dutchess County Assistant District Attorney, and Dana Russo a Dutchess County Sheriff Deputy, individually and in their official capacities (the “Dutchess County Defendants”) and Defendants the Village of Red Hook and Red Hook Detective/Police Officers Thomas D'Amicantonio, Travis Sterritt, and Nicholas Norton, individually and in their official capacities (the “Red Hook Defendants”) in the Complaint. (“Compl.,” ECF No. 12). Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Section 1983”), including violations of Fourth Amendment rights to be free from false arrest and unreasonable search and seizure, denial of the First Amendment right to free speech, and for municipal liability (commonly referred to as a Monell claim). Plaintiff also advances a litany of related claims under New York state law, including for civil battery, civil trespass, and negligence. The Dutchess County Defendants and Red Hook Defendants each move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 46 49.) The Court addresses Defendants' motions together in this Opinion. For the following reasons, Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
The following facts are derived from the Complaint and are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff for purposes of this motion.
On October 1, 2019, Bobbie Jo Forte (“Forte”) was present in her home at 44 Morehouse Ln in the Village of Red Hook, New York when Defendant Thomas D'Amicantonio, a Village of Red Hook police officer, arrived at her home. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 18.) Plaintiff requested that D'Amicantonio, who was dressed in plain clothes, produce evidence that he was a police officer with a lawful reason to be on her property. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.) D'Amicantonio held up a piece of paper to the window of Forte's door, asserting that it granted him authority to arrest her. (Id. ¶ 21.)
Although Forte asked D'Amicantonio to produce a warrant no warrant had been issued or signed for Forte's arrest at this time. (Id. ¶¶ 21-23.)
Forte called emergency services at 911 to verify D'Amicantonio's identity. She was connected to the Village of Red Hook Police Station, where she alleges police officers at the station ridiculed her and refused to provide information or protection. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 26.) Subsequently, Forte was connected to the office of Defendant Dutchess County Sherriff Adrian H. Anderson; Defendant Dutchess County Sheriff Deputy Dana Russo was then dispatched to Forte's home. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28.)
After calling emergency services, Forte noticed a police car parked in her driveway and observed Defendant Red Hook police officer Travis Sterritt emerge from this car. (Id. ¶ 30.) Forte generally alleges that Sterritt used threats of violence to attempt to force her to exit her home and enter his vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.)
Defendant Russo then arrived at Forte's home, where she joined the attempt to arrest Forte and searched the perimeter of the home with Defendants D'Amicantonio and Sterritt in order to gain access (Id. ¶¶ 33-35.) Forte claims D'Amicantonio, Steritt, and Russo invaded the curtilage of Forte's home and areas used for ingress and egress not visible from public spaces despite Forte's request that they leave her property. (Id. ¶¶ 36-41.)
Forte alleges she was trapped for a prolonged period in her home by D'Amicantonio, Sterritt, and Russo, and that D'Amicantonio continued to question and express anger at her without advising her of her right to remain silent. (Id. ¶¶ 41-43.) During this time, Forte called a retired judge, who counseled her that she was not required to allow D'Amicantonio, Sterritt, and Russo into her home or take her into custody. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 45.) D'Amicantonio, Steritt, and Russo subsequently left Forte's home. (Id. ¶ 47.)
On October 10, 2019, Forte contacted the office of Defendant Dutchess County District Attorney William V. Grady through a criminal defense attorney, at which point she was asked to turn herself in for arrest. (Id. ¶ 48.) Forte alleges that, when she did so, an information was issued, produced, and signed for the first time. (Id. ¶ 49.) Additionally, she contends that Defendants D'Amicantonio and Sterritt acted on casual information obtained from a person known to be involved in civil dispute with Forte rather than on a warrant, desk appearance ticket, or information. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 51.)
Forte pleaded guilty to a violation arising from the casual information described above and was charged with resisting arrest and making a false report based on the events that occurred at her home on October 1, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 52-54, 58, 59.) Forte alleges that Defendant Assistant District Attorney Miriam Citro threatened to persist in prosecuting her on the charges of resisting arrest and making a false report unless Forte agreed not to pursue a civil case; Citro also admonished Forte for suing law enforcement and expressed a desire to protect law enforcement from Forte's grievances. (Id. ¶¶ 56, 60.) Ultimately, Citro offered Forte an Adjournment with Contemplation of Dismissal (hereinafter “ACD”) disposition for the charge of resisting arrest, to which Forte agreed. (Id. ¶¶ 60, 61.)
Forte continued to appear for mandatory court appearances until the charges of resisting arrest and making a false report were dismissed. (Id. ¶ 62.) These charges were sealed on June 18, 2020 in an order signed by Hon. Jonah Triebwasser on June 13, 2020. (Id.)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the inquiry for motions to dismiss is whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. The Court must take all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor, but the Court is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,'” to credit “mere conclusory statements,” or to accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, a district court must consider the context and “draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the factual content pleaded allows a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (). A document is incorporated by reference where the complaint “make[s] a clear, definite and substantial reference” to it. Thomas v. Westchester Cnty. Health Care Corp., 232 F.Supp.2d 273, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (collecting cases). “[E]ven if not attached or incorporated by reference, a document ‘upon which [the complaint] solely relies and which is integral to the complaint' may be considered by the court in ruling on [a motion to dismiss].” Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007) () (quoting Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991)). “A document is integral to the complaint ‘where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect.'” Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153).
Additionally the Court may take judicial notice of certain publicly available documents, including, for example, a plaintiff's arrest reports, indictments, and criminal disposition data. Corley v. Vance, 365 F.Supp.3d 407, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (collecting cases); see Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Can.), Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004) () (citing Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 776 (2d Cir. 2002); and Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1998)). When taking judicial notice of such documents, the Court does so “not for the...
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