Stevens v. Wait
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | CRAIG |
| Citation | Stevens v. Wait, 112 Ill. 544, 1884 WL 13859 (Ill. 1885) |
| Decision Date | 31 January 1885 |
| Parties | EMMA STEVENS et al.v.JOHN WAIT et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Coles county; the Hon. J. W. WILKIN, Judge, presiding.
Mr. JOHN FAVORITE, and Mr. S. M. LEITCH, for the appellants.
Messrs. WILEY & NEAL, for the appellees. Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:
This was a bill in equity, brought by Emma Stevens and Cornelia Canup, against John Wait and others, to partition a certain tract of land in Coles county, containing 34 69/100 acres. It is alleged in the bill that Emma Stevens, (formerly Emma Wait,) Cornelia Canup, (formerly Cornelia Wait,) together with John Wait, William Wait, and Samuel M. Russell, are owners in fee simple, as tenants in common, in equal parts (except Samuel M. Russell, who is owner in fee simple as tenant in common of two-fifteenths parts,) of the following real estate, in Coles county, Illinois, known and designated as follows, to-wit: Being 34 69/100 acres off the south side of the south-east quarter of the north-east quarter of section 14, in township 12, north of range 9, east, beginning at the intermediate corner on the east boundary line of the said section; running thence south 83° 40' west, seventy-nine poles to a stake on the road; thence north 6° 30' west, sixty-nine and one-quarter poles to a stake; thence north 84° east, seventy-nine and four-tenths poles to a stake in the section line; thence south 6° 30' east, sixty-eight and three-quarters poles to the place of beginning, containing 34 69/100 acres,--which said real estate is described in the records of deeds of Coles county, in said State, in a deed dated June 17, 1857, from Stephen Wait to Almarinda Wait, Cornelia Wait, Precilla Wait, Emma Wait, and William Wait, as recorded therein in words and figures following: “Situate, lying and being in the county of Coles and State of Illinois, known and designated as follows, to-wit: Being 34 69/100 acres off of the south side of the south-east quarter of section 14, in township 12, north of range 9, east, beginning at the intermediate corner on the east boundary line of the said section; running thence south 83° 40' west, seventy-nine poles to a stake on the road; thence north 60° 30' west, sixty-nine and one-quarter poles to a stake; thence north 84° east, seventy-nine and four-tenths poles to a stake in the section line; thence south 6°>>> 30' east, sixty-eight and three-quarters poles to the place of beginning, containing 34 69/100 acres.”
Stephen Wait owned the land in question on the 17th day of June, 1857, and on that day he made a deed to his children, Almarinda Wait, and others, with the intention, no doubt, of conveying the land to them; but it is contended the description of the premises contained in the deed does not describe the land which complainants claim in the bill,--and this is the first, and, indeed, the main, question presented by the record.
The correct description of the land is as follows: “Being 34 69/100 acres off of the south side of the south-east quarter of the north-east quarter of section 14, in township 12, north, of range 9, east, beginning at the intermediate corner on the east boundary line of the said section; running thence south 83° 40' west, seventy-nine poles to a stake on the road; thence north 6° 30' west, sixty-nine and one-quarter poles to a stake; thence north 84° east, seventy-nine and four-tenths poles to to a stake in the section line; thence south 6° 30' east, sixty-eight and three-quarters poles to the place of beginning, containing 34 69/100 acres.” The copy of a deed read in evidence by complainants, under which they claim title, describes the land as follows: “Being 34 69/100 acres off of the south side of the south-east quarter of section 14, in township 12, north of range 9, east, beginning at the intermediate corner on the east boundary line of the said section; running thence south 83° 40' west, seventy-nine poles to a stake on the road; thence north 60° 30' west, sixty-nine and one-quarter poles to a stake; thence north 84° east, seventy-nine and four-tenths poles to a stake in the section line; thence south 6°>>> 30' east, sixty-eight and three-quarters poles to the place of beginning, containing 34 69/100 acres.” Does this deed convey the land?
The law is well settled that any description of land in a deed of conveyance by which the identity of the premises intended to be conveyed can be established, is sufficient, and for the purpose of sustaining a grant, extrinsic evidence may be used to identify and establish the objects and calls in the deed. ( Colcord v. Alexander, 67 Ill. 582; Smith v. Crawford, 81 Id. 296.) Oral evidence may be introduced to explain an ambiguity in a deed, but such evidence is not admissible to enlarge or vary the terms of a deed.
In Myers v. Ladd, 26 Ill. 415, where a mortgage described the property as situated in the mill of the mortgagor, “in Lancaster, Timber township, Peoria county, Illinois,” it was held that parol evidence was admissible to prove that the mortgagor had a mill four miles from Lancaster, in Timber township, in which was the property described, and that the mortgagor had no other mill in that county, and that the word “Lancaster,” in the description, might be rejected as surplusage. It is there said: “The rule is, that where there are two descriptions in a deed, the one, as it were, superadded to the other, and one description being complete and sufficient of itself, and the other, which is subordinate and superadded, is incorrect, the incorrect description, or feature, or circumstance of the description, is rejected as surplusage, and the complete and correct description is allowed to stand alone.” In Kruse v. Wilson, 79 Ill. 233, we had occasion to consider a similar question in reference to the construction of a description in one of the deeds which was read in evidence in the chain of title relied upon by one of the parties, and we there held, where one of the calls in the description of land in a deed was, “thence north-westerly along Mass street,” etc., which, taken in connection with the other calls, was senseless and unmeaning, but which, by the omission of the word “north-westerly,” and adapting the line to Mass street, answered the call, and made a complete description, the word “north-westerly” was rejected as surplusage. It is there said: ...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial
-
County of Grand forks v. Frederick
... ... owner's rights. Kershaw v. Jansen, 68 N.W. 616; ... Colcord v. Alexander, 67 Ill. 581; Stevens v ... Wait, 112 Ill. 544; Taylor v. Wright, supra ... If it ... enables a surveyor to identify the land. Law v ... People, ... ...
-
Reed v. Munn
... ... ' By the decided weight of ... authority this description was sufficient. Blair v ... Burns, 8 Colo. 397, 8 P. 569; Stevens v. Wait, ... 112 Ill. 544; Small v. Jenkins, 82 Mass. 155; ... Travelers' Insurance Company v. Yount, 98 Ind ... 454; Frey v. Clifford, 44 ... ...
-
Motor Aid, Inc. v. Ray
... ... (2d) 7; ... Hewlett v. Owens, 51 Cal. 570; Barnum v ... Landon, 25 Conn. 137; Roberts v. Cox, 259 Ill ... 232, 102 N.E. 204; Stevens v. Reynolds, 143 Ind ... 467, 41 N.E. 931, 52 Am.St.Rep. 422; Avey v ... Hogancamp, 172 Ky. 675, 189 S.W. 917; Cook v ... Clinton, 64 Mich ... supra; Harlan v. Central Phosphate Co ... (Tenn.Ch.App.) 62 S.W. 614; Coleman v. Stewart, ... 170 Ala. 255, 53 So. 1020; Stevens v. Wait, 112 Ill ... 544; Sims v. Dame, 113 Ind. 127, 15 N.E. 217. Mrs ... Bolding, as a tenant in common, was seized per my et per tout ... of the ... ...
-
Gibbs v. Gerdes
...those words included the description is senseless and without meaning. Such words may therefore be considered sidered surplusage. Stevens v. Wait, 112 Ill. 544. Under the views herein expressed it does not become necessary to determine when the decree for partition became a matter of record......