Stevens v. Wilber
| Decision Date | 16 June 1931 |
| Citation | 136 Or. 599,300 P. 329 |
| Parties | STEVENS v. WILBER. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; Jacob Kanzler, Judge.
Action by Orlea Stevens against W. B. Wilber. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
B. G Skulason, of Portland, for appellant.
Henry S. Westbrook, of Portland, for respondent.
The plaintiff, a beauty shop operator, brought this action against the defendant for damages for an alleged slander setting forth two causes of action, in the first of which she asked for both general and special damages. The second cause is for an alleged trespass.
In her first cause of action, plaintiff alleges that defendant, in her shop and in the presence of other parties, published and declared of and to the plaintiff that she was a "dirty low-down bootlegger," meaning that plaintiff was engaged in the traffic and illicit sale of intoxicating liquors. At the same time and place defendant used to and of the plaintiff the following words: "You are low--you are lower than the belly of a snake that crawls upon the grass; I know what you are; I can prove what you are"--meaning thereby that the plaintiff was a woman without principle or character, and was immoral and unchaste. Plaintiff then alleges that she sustained special damages and lost in her income and earnings from her business the sum of $1,500, and suffered general damages in the sum of $25,000. For a second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that at the same time and place, the defendant violently and boisterously trespassed upon her premises and in the presence of her customers assaulted a man by the name of White, further damaging plaintiff in the sum of $500. She alleges that said acts were willful, malicious and unlawful, and asks for punitive damages in the sum of $2,500.
The defendant answered and admitted that, at the time and place and in the presence of the parties alleged in the complaint, he referred to the plaintiff as being "a dirty, lowdown bootlegger"; that the statement was true; that the other language he also used at the same time and place, and in the presence of the same people, but it had reference to another party, not to plaintiff, but to a man by the name of Mr. White.
On these issues the case was tried to a jury who returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $1,231.75. There was also a special verdict submitted to and returned by the jury.
1. "What sum, if any, do you allow for special damages as part of your general verdict?" A. "$313."
2. "What sum, if any, do you allow in your general verdict as punitive damages?" A. "One dollar."
3. "To whom were the words about being 'lower than a snake' addressed, to the plaintiff or to John White?" A. "Plaintiff, Orlea Stevens."
Judgment was entered, and defendant appeals. There are three assignments of error.
1. This assignment of error is predicated on the refusal of the court to grant an involuntary nonsuit, or direct a verdict in favor of the defendant, which motions were made seasonably; the grounds for both being that plaintiff has failed to make a case, in this, that the words set forth in the complaint are not actionable per se, and no special damages having been proven, no verdict can be entered against defendant.
The real question submitted by this appeal is whether the words spoken are actionable per se. There are words that are uniformly held to be actionable in themselves, among these are "words which impute a charge, which if true, will subject the party charged to an indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, or subject him to an infamous punishment." Under the laws relating to the sale or gift of intoxicating liquor in the state of Oregon, the punishment may be either confinement in the penitentiary, or imprisonment in the county jail, according to the particular circumstance of each case. Punishment by confinement in the penitentiary is without question infamous, and it is also infamous to a woman to be imprisoned in the county jail. The term "bootlegger," when used as alleged in the complaint, is no longer susceptible of more than one meaning. It has passed into and become a part of our common language. Webster defines it as "one who carries about and sells intoxicating liquor in places where it is prohibited." It denotes to the ordinary person one engaged in the unlawful disposition of intoxicating liquor as a business.
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Grubb v. Johnson
...498; Lowe v. Brown, 114 Or. 426, 233 P. 272, 235 P. 395; Peck v. Coos Bay Times Pub. Co., 122 Or. 408, 259 P. 307; Stevens v. Wilber, 136 Or. 599, 300 P. 329; Gatley on Libel and Slander, 4th ed., p. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. v. Caskey, Tex.Civ.App., 33 S.W.2d 848, may be an authority as to......
-
Benassi v. Georgia-Pacific, GEORGIA-PACIFIC
...that the jury could find that the decline in business was the consequence of the libel, not a mere coincidence. In Stevens v. Wilber, 136 Or. 599, 300 P. 329 (1931), the plaintiff was slandered in her place of business in the presence of customers; she testified as to the amount by which bu......
-
Hammond v. State, 20770.
...term `bootlegger' definitely denotes, in the public mind, a person who violates the laws against the sale of liquor." In Stevens v. Wilber, 136 Or. 599, 300 P. 329, 331, after referring to Mr. Webster's definition of a bootlegger, the court said: "It denotes to the ordinary person one engag......