Stevenson, In re

Decision Date15 April 1953
Docket NumberNo. 378,378
Citation75 S.E.2d 520,237 N.C. 528
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesIn re STEVENSON et al.

Robert S. Cahoon, Greensboro, for appellants.

H. Nelson Woodson, Salisbury, for North Carolina Finishing Co., appellee.

R. B. Overton, R. B. Billings, D. G. Ball, and W. D. Haloman, Raleigh, for Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, appellee.

WINBORNE, Justice.

G.S. § 96-14(d) of the Employment Security Law of North Carolina provides that 'An individual shall be disqualified for benefits * * *. (b) For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed * * *.'

Admittedly in the case in hand a stoppage of work because of a labor dispute occurred on 24 March, 1952, at the plant of the North Carolina Finishing Company at which claimant-employees were last employed. A strike, involving all production and maintenance employees, was commenced on that day, and continued until 7 June, 1952, and claimant-employees participated, and were interested in the strike, and the causes of it, and were unemployed during the strike.

And appellants state in their brief filed on this appeal that 'the sole issue, and the only one upon which evidence was taken, was whether the appellants were disqualified to receive benefits under the provisions of Section 96-14(d) of the General Statutes * * *.'

Indeed, the claimant-appellants have the burden to show to the satisfaction of the Commission that they were not disqualified for benefits under this section of the Employment Security Law. In Re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 544; Employment Security Comm. v. Jarrell, 231 N.C. 381, 57 S.E.2d 403.

And it is provided in G.S. § 96-15(i) that on appeal to the Superior Court from any final decision of the Employment Security Commission, the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court is confined to questions of law. And an appeal may be taken from the decision of the Superior Court, as provided in civil actions.

A reading of the record on this appeal reveals ample evidence to support the findings of fact made by the Special Claims Deputy, and adopted and affirmed by the Commission. And there is no suggestion of fraud. Hence the findings of the Commission are conclusive on appeal to Superior Court and in this Court. Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Martin, 228 N.C. 277, 45 S.E.2d 385; Employment Security Comm. v. Kermon, 232 N.C. 342, 60 S.E.2d 580.

Therefore in the light of the findings of fact of the Commission, does it follow as a matter of law that the unemployment of claimant-employees, after the strike ceased to exist to date of the hearing before the Special Claims Deputy, to wit, 27 June, 1952, was due to a stoppage of work which existed because of the labor dispute?

This exact question has not been presented heretofore to this Court. However, it has been considered and passed upon by courts of other States which have adopted statutes in almost identical language as G.S. § 96-14(d). See Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 1947, 117 Ind. App. 379, 72 N.E.2d 622; Blakely v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 1950, 120 Ind.App. 257, 90 N.E.2d 353; Chrysler Corp. v. Review Board, 1950, 120 Ind.App. 425, 92 N.E.2d 565; American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 1949, 404 Ill. 174, 88 N.E.2d 465; Ablondi v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Security, Dept. of Labor & Industry, 1950, 8 N.j.Super. 71, 73 A.2d 262; Magner v. Kinney, 1942, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W.2d 689; Saunders v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board, Md., 1947, 53 A.2d 579; Bako v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 171 Pa. Super. 222, 90 A.2d 309; M. A. Ferst...

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10 cases
  • Peaden v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Employment Sec. Commission
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • April 13, 1959
    ...cases holding that a stoppage of work does not cease until normal operations may reasonably be resumed by the employer. In re Stevenson, 237 N.C. 528, 75 S.E.2d 520 and cases cited; Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Comm., 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W.2d 260, 154 A.L.R. 660......
  • General Elec. Co. v. Director of Division of Employment Sec.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 14, 1965
    ...Commn., 330 Mich. 223, 236-237, 47 N.W.2d 11; Legacy v. Clarostat Mfg. Co., 99 N.H. 483, 485-487, 115 A.2d 424; In re Stevenson, 237 N.C. 528, 534, 75 S.E.2d 520; Leach v. Republic Steel Corp., 176 Ohio St. 221, 224-225, 199 N.E.2d 3.6 The burden, of course, is upon the claimants to show th......
  • Dowdy v. Southern Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 15, 1953
  • Adomaitis v. Director of Division of Employment Sec.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • August 7, 1956
    ...Security Division, 117 Ind.App. 379, 72 N.E.2d 662; Department of Industrial Relations v. Savage, Ala.App., 82 So.2d 435; In re Stevenson, 237 N.C. 528, 75 S.E.2d 520; Climax Fire Brick Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 166 Pa.Super. 481, 72 A.2d 300; Chrysler Corp. v. Revie......
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