Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. # 5
Decision Date | 31 August 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 14–3746.,14–3746. |
Citation | 800 F.3d 955 |
Parties | James E. STEVENSON, III; Sharyn Stevenson, Plaintiffs Heath Adkisson; Lori Adkisson; Ryan Braswell; Melissa Braswell; Oliver Coppedge; Tracy Coppedge; George A. Hale, III; Stephanie Hale; Jeff Langston ; Missy Langston, Plaintiffs–Appellants v. BLYTHEVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT # 5, Defendant–Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Jess Askew, III, argued, Ashley W. Hudson, Samantha Leflar, on the brief, Little Rock, AR, for Appellant.
George Jay Bequette, Jr., argued, Little Rock, AR, Robert L. Coleman, on the brief, Blytheville, AR, for Appellee.
Before BYE, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
The Arkansas General Assembly (“General Assembly”) enacted the Public School Choice Act of 2013 (“2013 Act”).1 Act 1227, 2013 Ark. Acts 1227 (Apr. 16, 2013), codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 6–18–1901 et seq. The 2013 Act contained a “broad school choice transfer option.” Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973, 975 (8th Cir.2013). But the 2013 Act also contained limitations. In relevant part, it provided that “[a] school district annually may declare an exemption under this section if the school district is subject to the desegregation order or mandate of a federal court or agency remedying the effects of past racial segregation.” Ark.Code Ann. § 6–18–1906(b)(1) (2013). The 2013 Act required a school district to “notify the [Arkansas Department of Education] by April 1” if the district intends to declare an exemption “in the next school year.” Id. § 6–18–1906(b)(3). The “exemptions under the 2013 Act are limited to individual school districts that are subject to federal desegregation mandates.”Teague, 720 F.3d at 977 n. 2.
Heath Adkisson, Lori Adkisson, Ryan Braswell, Melissa Braswell, Oliver Coppedge, Tracy Coppedge, George A. Hale III, Stephanie Hale, Jeff Langston, and Missy Langston (collectively, “appellants”) have minor children who reside within the Blytheville School District # 5 (“District”). The appellants applied to transfer their children from the District to neighboring school districts, but the District's Board of Directors subsequently adopted a resolution to exempt the District from the 2013 Act under § 6–18–1906(b) on the basis that the District “is subject to a desegregation order or mandate of a federal court of [sic] agency remedying the effects of past racial segregation.” The appellants brought suit against the District, alleging that the District violated their constitutional rights when it resolved, for the 2013–2014 school year, to opt out under § 6–18–1906(b) of the 2013 Act. They sued for violations of their due process and equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for violations of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA). As relief, the appellants requested a declaration and permanent injunction against the District, as well as damages allegedly stemming from their due process claims. The appellants also sought punitive damages for the District's allegedly race-based conduct. The appellants moved for partial summary judgment, and the District filed a counter-motion for summary judgment. The district court2 denied the appellants' motion for partial summary judgment but granted the District's counter-motion for summary judgment. The court denied the appellants' request for a declaration, permanent injunction, and damages. On appeal, the appellants argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the District because the undisputed facts show that the District (1) violated due process by abusing its power under state law and failing to provide pre-deprivation process, and (2) violated equal protection by using race as the reason for its exemption and ifying the 2013 Act within its borders on the pretense that it was subject to a desegregation order. We affirm.
Despite containing a “broad school choice transfer option,” Teague, 720 F.3d at 976, the 2013 Act also enabled certain resident school districts to restrict or defeat a student's ability to transfer to a nonresident district. See Ark.Code Ann. § 6–18–1906(a) –(b) (2013). One of those limitations set forth an exemption for a qualifying school district, providing:
The General Assembly's intent was “that the 2013 Act would be effective on the date of its approval by the Governor.” Teague, 720 F.3d at 975–76. It specifically stated its intent to dispel any “ ‘uncertainty about the viability of [existing] transfers and future transfers' ” and that the 2013 Act was “ ‘immediately necessary to resolve the uncertainty in the law before the 2013–2014 school year and preserve existing student transfers.’ ” Id. at 976 (emphasis added) (quoting Act 1227, 2013 Ark. Acts 1227, § 7 (Apr. 16, 2013)). But the General Assembly enacted the 2013 Act on April 16, 2013–15 days past the April 1 deadline to declare an exemption as provided in § 6–181–906(b)(3). As a result, on May 1, 2013, the Arkansas Department of Education (ADE)3 released a memo that stated:
The 2013 Act also provided that the parents of students seeking to transfer to attend a school in a nonresident district had to submit an application to the nonresident district with a copy to the resident district on a form approved by the ADE and postmarked no later than June 1 of the year in which the student sought to begin the fall semester at the nonresident district. Ark.Code Ann. § 6–18–1905(a) (2013). By August 1 of the school year in which the student sought enrollment in a nonresident district, the superintendent of the nonresident district had to notify the parent and the resident district in writing as to whether the student's application had been accepted or rejected. Id. § 6–18–1905(b)(1). If the nonresident district accepted the application, then the notification letter had to include the deadline by which the student had to enroll in the nonresident district, after which the acceptance was , and instructions for the renewal procedure that the nonresident district established. Id. § 6–18–1905(b)(3). If the nonresident district rejected the application, then the notification letter had to state the reason for the rejection. Id. § 6–18–1905(b)(2).
Students whose applications for transfer were rejected by the nonresident district could request a hearing before the Arkansas State Board of Education (“Board of Education”) to reconsider the transfer.Id. § 6–18–1907(b)(1). The 2013 Act required that a student request in writing an appeal hearing within ten days after the student or student's parent received the notification letter. Id. § 6–18–1907(b)(2)(A). “As part of the review process, the parent may submit supporting documentation that the transfer would be in the best educational, social, or psychological interest of the student.” Id. § 6–18–1907(b)(2)(B). The Board of Education could overturn the nonresident district's decision on appeal; if it did so, then it had to notify “the parent, the nonresident district, and the resident district of the basis for the state board's decision.” Id. § 6–18–1907(b)(3).
As of April 29, 2013, appellants Heath and Lori Adkisson, Ryan and Melissa Braswell, Oliver and Tracy Coppedge, George and Stephanie Hale, and Jeff and Missy Langston were residents of and had children who resided in the District. Between April 19, 2013, and April 26, 2013, each appellant submitted an application on behalf of one of their children for transfer from the District to a nonresident district under the 2013 Act for the school year beginning in fall of 2013. Each child for whom a transfer...
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