Stevenson v. Ellis

• Docket Number: CIVIL 1:23-cv-00573-JPW
• Decision Date: 22 December 2023
• Parties: TERRENCE STEVENSON, Plaintiff, v. DAVID ELLIS, in his official capacity and individually, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

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TERRENCE STEVENSON, Plaintiff, v. DAVID ELLIS, in his official capacity and individually, Defendant.

CIVIL No. 1:23-cv-00573-JPW

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

December 22, 2023

MEMORANDUM

JENNIFER P. WILSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the court is a motion, filed by DefendantDavid Ellis(“Ellis”) to dismiss the complaint of PlaintiffJames Stevenson(“Stevenson”).(Doc. 3.)Ellis's motion will be granted, and Stevenson's complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, because he is unable to plead facts that assert a cognizable § 1983 action or related state law claims.(Doc. 1-2.)For these reasons, this Court will grant in the motion to dismiss.(Doc. 3.)

Factual Background and Procedural History^[1]

Stevenson initiated this action by filing a complaint on February 22 2023 in Franklin County, Pennsylvania.(Doc. 1-2.)Stevenson alleges that Defendant, Trooper David Ellis, individually and in his official capacity as Field Training Officer at the Pennsylvania State Police(“PSP”) Chambersburg Barracks, has violated his constitutional rights pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with other state law claims.(Seeid.)Stevenson brings three counts against Ellis under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981and1983 for discrimination, hostile work environment, and conspiracy (Count I); retaliation (Count II); intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law (Count III); and one claim under Pennsylvania law for invasion of privacy (Count IV).(Seeid.)

These claims primarily arise out of Stevenson's experience during his first week at PSP Chambersburg Barracks while under the supervision of Ellis.(Id.¶ 6.)During this training period, Stevenson alleges that Ellis repeatedly referred to him as his “black pupil,” commented that he hated all “nigg*rs,” mentioned that “minorities and women do not deserve to be troopers,” and pressured Stevenson to file two false DUI reports against suspects, which Stevenson refused to do out of ethical concerns.(Id.¶¶ 6-11.)

Later Stevenson began working under a different trooper, who did not “make any derogatory and racist comments similar to Defendant Ellis.”(Id.¶ 12.)^[2]Stevenson would eventually report Ellis's conduct to supervisors when they inquired about the outstanding DUI reports.(Doc. 1-2, ¶ 12.)Although fearing retaliation if he reported Ellis's “multiple EEO violations,” on the morning of October 19, 2021, Stevenson spoke to other supervising troopers regarding the conduct of his former supervisor.(Id.¶ 15.)Mere moments after speaking with the interviewer, Ellis “approached Mr. Stevenson” and “attempted to solicit information . . . regarding the active investigation into [Ellis]'s conduct.”(Id.¶ 16.)Stevenson declined to respond, and asserts that he felt “intimidated” by the confrontation.(Id.)

The complaint also details the actions of various other PSP troopers, who are not named as defendants, and who continued to inquire about the outstanding DUI reports that Stevenson failed to complete due to his ethical concerns.(Id.¶¶ 1726.)Apparently, the named troopers who apparently harassed and pressured Stevenson to file false police reports, or otherwise failed to take Stevenson's concerns seriously, bore no relation to Ellis besides their common employment.Stevenson details numerous instances in which troopers other than Ellis engaged in allegedly discriminatory, hostile, and retaliatory conduct in the wake of Stevenson's EEO complaint.(Id.¶¶ 19-32.)Stevenson alleges that the PSP never took corrective action against Ellis based on his complaint.(Doc1-2, ¶ 38.)^[3]

Stevenson filed a lawsuit in this district on March 24, 2022 for employment discrimination against the PSP itself, a number of PSP troopers, and Ellis.(Id.¶ 34.)Ellis would later be dismissed as a defendant in that action pursuant to an order issued on April 24, 2023, due to Stevenson's failure to serve notice.SeeStevenson v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. 1:22-CV-0445, Docs. 23, 24 (M.D. Pa. April 24, 2023)(“PSP Action”).^[4]

On February 22, 2022, Stevenson filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which named Ellis as the sole Defendant.(Doc. 1-2.)Ellis subsequently removed the case to this court on April 4, 2022.(Doc. 1.)On April 11, 2023, Ellis filed a motion to dismiss followed by a brief in support.(Docs. 2, 3.)Stevenson opposed the motion on June 15, 2023, and Ellis filed a reply brief on June 29, 2023.(Docs. 6, 9.)Thus, this motion is ripe for review.

Jurisdiction

This court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,1343(a)(3),1343(a)(4), and1367(a).Venue in the middle district is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, insofar as the alleged conduct asserted in the complaint arose within the jurisdictional limits of this district.

Standard of Review

In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009)(quotingBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007)).A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”Id.(quotingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 556).“Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient” to survive a motion to dismiss.Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92(3d Cir.2019)(quotingIqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79).To determine whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief,” disregards the allegations “that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and determines whether the remaining factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365(3d Cir.2012).

Discussion

A.The Doctrine of Lis Pendens Does Not Bar the Present Action.

At the outset, Ellis argues that the present action must be dismissed under the doctrine of lis pendens, because the current action and the PSP Action, have the same claims, the same facts, the same relief sought, and the same defendant.^[5](Doc. 3, p. 12.)Stevenson responds by arguing that because the prior action dismissed Ellis as a defendant, he no longer has a valid lis pendens claim.(Doc. 6, p. 3.); (PSP Action, Doc. 24.)In fact, Ellis did have two pending cases against him from the time period when the instant case was filed until his dismissal from the PSP Action.^[6] Therefore, the issue raised here is whether lis pendens applies to a defendant who had a prior action dismissed, but nevertheless made a timely argument while the prior action was pending.

Before a district court may dismiss a case under a lis pendens theory, the defendant must show that the newer suit involves “the same parties, the same relief requested, the same causes of action, and the same rights asserted.”Barren v. Commonwealth,74 A.3d 250, 253(Pa. Super.2013);see alsoCrutchfield v. Eaton Corp.,806 A.2d 1259, 1262(Pa. Super.2002).The purpose of lis pendens is to “protect a party from being forced to litigate the same issues in several suits at the same time.”Barren,74 A.3d at 253.(citingPenox Techs., Inc. v. Foster Med. Corp., 546 A.2d 114, 115(Pa. Super.1988)).The doctrine also “prevents the appearance of the inequitable administration of law that would occur if two cases litigating the same issues in different counties reached different results,” and “serves the purpose of saving judicial resources.”Id.(citingNorristown Auto. Co. v. Hand, 562 A.2d 902, 904(Pa. Super.1989)).

Here, Ellis clearly had a potentially meritorious lis pendens argument from the time Stevenson filed the instant complaint naming Ellis as a defendant, until such time that Ellis was dismissed as a defendant in the PSP Action.(PSP Action, Doc. 24.)Thus, Ellis had a 19-day window within which to assert lis pendens as a basis for dismissal in this action.However, this window closed on the date when he was dismissed from the PSP Action.Because Ellis no longer has a pending case against him, the defense of lis pendens is no longer available.Ellis provides no authority suggesting that the plain language of the doctrine would lead to any other result.And the purpose of the doctrine is no longer implicated because Ellis is no longer prejudiced by needing to defend himself in two pending actions, and the judiciary no longer risks reaching conflicting judgments on the same controversy.Thus, the court concludes that the present action is not barred by the doctrine of lis pendens because there is no longer a unity of parties present in this case and the PSP Action.

B.Count I - Discrimination, Hostile Work Environment and Conspiracy

1.Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim of Discrimination.

Stevenson asserts a violation of equal protection against Ellis pursuant to § 1983 by alleging that Ellis denied his rights to the “same terms, conditions, privileges and benefits of . . . employment with the Pennsylvania State Police.”(Doc. 1-2, ¶¶ 48-51.)Moreover, Stevenson alleges that Ellis, as supervisor, targeted him because of race; instructed him to fill out false and discriminatory reports; used racial epithets; and intimidated and confronted him when Ellis learned that he reported this discriminatory conduct.(Id.¶¶ 50-51.)In response, Ellis argues that Stevenson failed to adequately plead his equal protection claim because the allegations are conclusory and are based on the conduct of other PSP troopers, not Ellis.(Doc. 3, pp. 14-15.)

To state a claim for racial discrimination...