Stevenson v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 October 2017
• Docket Number: No. 10-16-00244-CV,10-16-00244-CV
• Parties: LAURENCE STEVENSON, EFFIE STEVENSON, IDA SIMON AND KERRY D. SIMON, Appellants v. FORT WORTH & WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY AND TARANTULA CORPORATION, Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

LAURENCE STEVENSON, EFFIE STEVENSON,IDA SIMON AND KERRY D. SIMON, Appellants v. FORT WORTH & WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANYAND TARANTULA CORPORATION, Appellees

No. 10-16-00244-CV

STATE OF TEXAS IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

October 4, 2017

From the 249th District Court Johnson County, Texas

Trial Court No. DC-C201500684

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In five issues, appellants, Laurence Stevenson, Effie Stevenson, Ida Simon, and Kerry D. Simon, complain about a summary judgment and a sanctions order granted in favor of appellees, Fort Worth & Western Railroad Company ("FWWR") and Tarantula Corporation. Because we overrule all of appellants' issues, we affirm the judgment and sanctions order of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a damages suit for personal injury and property damage arising out of a collision between an automobile and a train. In its original petition, FWWR alleged the following facts:

5. On or about February 11, 2015, Stephenson [sic] caused a collision with FWWR's train. Stephenson [sic] failed to yield the right of way at an intersection of train tracks and a highway and caused a collision with FWWR's train. The crossing where the incident occurred is located at or near the intersection of Highway 171 and County Road 1000 (the "crossing"), just south of Cresson in Johnson County, Texas.

6. At the time of the incident, Stephenson [sic] was properly warned of the crossing by the presence of a crossbuck (the familiar black and white sign in the shape of an "X" that says "railroad crossing"). Stephenson [sic] disregarded this warning and stopped his vehicle in a manner that caused it to block the tracks.

7. As a result of Stephenson's [sic] acts and omissions, FWWR has suffered damages within the jurisdictional limits of the Court.

FWWR asserted negligence and negligence per se causes of action against Laurence and sought to recover its damages from the resulting collision.

Laurence filed an answer generally denying all of the allegations contained in FWWR's original petition and asserting numerous affirmative defenses. Later, Laurence filed counterclaims, arguing that FWWR proximately caused disabling personal injuries to him under "Respondeat superior for [FWWR's] negligence, negligence per se and/or gross negligence for all of his actual damages and for his exemplary damages . . . ." Thereafter, Effie Stevenson, Ida Simon, and Kerry D. Simon filed suit against FWWR andTarantula, asserting respondeat superior, negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence, and strict-products-liability claims.¹

Subsequently, several of the parties filed amended petitions, which included an amendment filed by Effie Stevenson, Ida Simon, Kerry D. Simon to add Laurence as a co-plaintiff against both FWWR and Tarantula. Additionally, FWWR filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because "Stevenson stopped the vehicle he was driving in such a manner as to park the attached trailer upon the tracks and as a matter of law he failed to yield the right-of-way to the train and thus proximately causing [sic] the collision." Laurence filed a response to FWWR's summary-judgment motion, without attaching any evidence. However, several days later and independent of his response, Laurence filed his affidavit and statement, as well as an actuarial report prepared by Andrew C. Blum.

Later in the case, FWWR filed a motion for sanctions against Laurence's attorneys for, among other things, repeatedly filing irrelevant attorney-client communications—an invoice between FWWR and its attorneys that was inadvertently produced—despite being ordered by the trial court to return the communications to FWWR. The trial court ultimately sanctioned appellants' counsel for the disclosure of the irrelevant invoice andordered counsel to return the invoice and all copies made, as well as refrain from including the invoice in subsequent filings in the trial court.

Several months later, the trial court entered its final order and judgment, wherein the trial court granted FWWR's summary-judgment motion against Laurence and awarded FWWR $8,753.14 in damages, along with post-judgment interest. Additionally, the trial court ordered that appellants take nothing for their counterclaims against FWWR and Tarantula.² Appellants filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c). This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court's grant of a traditional motion for summary judgment de novo. See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). When reviewing a traditional motion for summary judgment, we must determine whether the movant met its burden to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and thatthe movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002). The movant bears the burden of proof in a traditional motion for summary judgment, and all doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of material fact are resolved against the movant. See Grant, 73 S.W.3d at 215. We take as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the non-movant's favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).

III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION

In their first issue, appellants complain that the 2007 Congressional Amendments to the Federal Railroad Safety Act superseded FWWR's federal-preemption defense.

Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal law may supersede or "preempt" state law in the following ways: (1) Congress may preempt all state law in a particular field by express preemptive language; (2) Congress may inferentially preempt all state law in a particular field, in the absence of express preemptive language, when the scheme of the federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to reasonably infer Congress has "left no room" for supplementary state regulation; or (3) even where Congress has not displaced state regulation in a particular field, federal law will nullify state law to the extent that they actually conflict. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Auto. Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S. Ct. 2371, 85 L. Ed. 714 (1985); Trice v. State, 712 S.W.2d 842, 848 (Tex. App.—Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 ("FRSA") "to promote safety in all areas of railroad operations and to reduce railroad-related accidents and injuries to persons." Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Limmer, 299 S.W.3d 78, 82 (Tex. 2009) (citing Pub. L. No. 91-458 § 101, 84 Stat. 971). The FRSA states that "[l]aws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety [should] be nationally uniform to the extent practicable." Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(1)). To further that goal, the FRSA authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to "prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety" and provides in section 20106 that a "State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety . . . until the Secretary of Transportation . . . prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement . . . ." Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2)). Furthermore, in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood and Norfolk Southern Railway v. Shanklin, the United States Supreme Court held "that under section 20106, federal regulations 'covering the subject matter' of a railroad safety requirement of state law preempt state law, including common law tort liability." Id. (citing Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 357-58, 120 S. Ct. 1467, 146 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2000); CSX Transp., Inc., v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 670-71, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1993)).

As shown below, appellants' claims related to the crossing in this case were preempted because federal funds were used in the installation of retro-reflective tape during a federal safety improvement program. The Highway Safety Act of 1973 ("HSA")granted federal funding to states to "eliminate[e] . . . hazards of railroad-highway crossings." Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 93-87, §§ 201, 203, 87 Stat. 282, 282-83; Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 348; Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 662-63). Both the FRSA and the HSA instituted numerous regulations to address the installation of warning devices at railroad crossings. Id. In particular, 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) and (4) control the design of grade-crossing improvements for railroad-highway projects that receive federal funding. Id.

Subsection (b)(3) requires adequate warning devices that include automatic gates with flashing light signals if any of six enumerated conditions is present. Where none is present, subsection (b)(4) states that the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of the FHWA." According to the Supreme Court, when subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4) apply, the Secretary has determined the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection. These regulations therefore cover the subject matter of state law which, like the tort law . . . seeks to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings, and thus preempt common law tort liability for a claim that a warning device installed at a railroad crossing was inadequate.

Id. at 82-83 (internal citations & quotations omitted); see Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 357-58 ("Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) 'cover the subject matter' of the adequacy of warning devices installed with the participation of federal funds. As a result, the FRSA pre-empts [a] state tort claim that the advance warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks installed at [a] crossing were inadequate."). As a result, the Texas...