Stevenson v. Linens of the Week

Decision Date13 August 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-1894,81-1894
PartiesWillie STEVENSON, Petitioner, v. LINENS OF THE WEEK, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, Respondents. *
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board.

Michael V. Kowalski, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Donald P. Maiberger, with whom Bruce F. Robertson, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for respondents.

Before MIKVA, Circuit Judge, McGOWAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRYANT, ** Senior District Judge for the District of Columbia.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior District Judge BRYANT.

BRYANT, Senior District Judge:

We are asked to review the decision of the Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirming the denial of petitioner Willie Stevenson's claim for temporary total benefits under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). 1 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Stevenson's claim, finding that the employer had neither written notice of Stevenson's injury, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §§ 912(a) and (b), nor actual knowledge, pursuant to § 912(d)(1). The Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ's finding that the employer had no actual knowledge of Stevenson's purported injury, with one member dissenting.

We reverse the decision of the Benefits Review Board affirming the ALJ's determination. Given Stevenson's specific allegations concerning notice to his employer, the ALJ's finding that Stevenson's employer did not know about Stevenson's injury was not supported by evidence sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption of notice. Moreover, the employer's receipt of doctors' reports concerning Stevenson's medical condition should have alerted the employer to investigate its possible liability.

I. The Facts

Willie Stevenson worked as a laundry worker at Linens of the Week (Linens). Joint Appendix (JA) 81. His duties included unloading trucks and moving heavy objects. Id. On September 18, 1978, Stevenson injured his back in a work-related accident. JA 68. Stevenson stopped working for a few weeks, and was compensated by Linens. JA 69.

On November 24, 1978, Stevenson again injured his back. JA 84. As a result, he stopped work at Linens on December 14, 1978. JA 98-99. Stevenson sought temporary total disability benefits for the period December 15, 1978 to May 26, 1979 on account of his November 24 injury. JA 4. At the hearing before the ALJ, Stevenson and Linens disagreed whether Stevenson's November injury occurred at work and whether Linens had notice of the injury prior to receipt of a May 1979 letter from Stevenson's attorney.

Stevenson testified at the hearing that when he returned to work following his September injury, he told a supervisor, Mr. Russell, that he still had back pain. JA 83. As a result, Stevenson was given light work to do. JA 92. Stevenson stated that on November 24, he slipped on Linens' washroom floor. JA 84. Stevenson asserted that Leroy Lane, the man to whom Stevenson said he had been instructed to report that day, saw the accident, recommended that Stevenson see a doctor, and told Stevenson that "everything would be taken care of." Id. Stevenson stated that he left in the middle of his workday to see a doctor. Id.

Stevenson further testified that on November 24 or 25 he spoke with Linens' manager, Leo Coulter, to tell Coulter about the injury and ask whether Lane had reported it. JA 84-85. Coulter told Stevenson that everything was being taken care of. JA 85. Although Stevenson returned to work on November 25, he stated that he frequently complained of back pains to his area supervisor, Russell, and Russell advised him to "take it easy." JA 98. On December 14, 1978 Stevenson consulted a new doctor, who instructed Stevenson not to return to work. Id. Stevenson testified that upon return from the doctor's office, he told Ida Eckstein, the Linens secretary responsible for handling accident claims, that doctor's orders required that he quit work. JA 99.

Linens denies that Stevenson's November 24 injury occurred at work; and claims that even if it occurred at work, Linens had no notice of the injury. James Luckett, Linens' Vice President and Director of In-Plant Operations, was Linens' only witness at the hearing before the ALJ. Luckett testified that on the day Stevenson alleged he sustained his back injury, he in fact worked a full day at Linens. JA 138. 2 Luckett stated that Leroy Lane was a washroom helper, not a supervisor, and that Lane had no authority to direct injured employees to seek medical attention. JA 127. Luckett said that Stevenson had instructions to report accidents to his immediate supervisor, James Belton. JA 129.

Luckett denied that he, Coulter, Eckstein, Belton or any other Linens manager had timely notice of Stevenson's claimed November 24 work-related injury. 3 Luckett's denial was based mainly on Stevenson's compensation folder and absentee record, or time card. According to Luckett, if an employee or his supervisor advised Eckstein of an injury, she would immediately fill out an accident report, send the report to Linens' insurer, and file a copy of the report in the employee's compensation folder. JA 130. Likewise, if an employee stopped work at Linens because of an injury, that fact would be reflected in the employee's file. JA 129. Stevenson's file did not contain reports of the November 24 injury. Id.

However, Stevenson's absentee record did show a series of "A's," standing for "accident at plant," for the days Stevenson was out in September and October and also for December 18-22 and December 25-29. JA 204. Luckett said that on December 18, Stevenson came to pick up his check and told Coulter that "he wasn't coming back to work until his back was better." JA 134. Stevenson's absentee record was subsequently marked with the "A's," which, Luckett contended, would have been interpreted by most Linens personnel as a reference to the September accident. JA 133.

Luckett acknowledged that in late 1978, Linens received a "Supplemental Report" dated November 27, 1978 from the Union Market Clinic saying that Stevenson fell on November 24 and re-injured his back. JA 135. But that report, and a report dated December 18, 1978, listed the date of original injury as September 18, 1978. JA 195.

Following the hearing on Stevenson's claim, the ALJ denied Stevenson temporary total disability benefits. The ALJ found that Stevenson had not given Linens or the deputy commissioner written notice of his injury, as required by 33 U.S.C. §§ 912(a) and (b). JA 55. The ALJ also determined that § 912(d) did not apply to Stevenson because Linens had no knowledge of a November 24 work-related injury, and was prejudiced by its lack of knowledge. JA 55-56. The ALJ determined that since Lane was a laundry room helper, not a supervisor, notice to Lane was ineffective. JA 55. The ALJ did not accept Stevenson's testimony that he told Coulter and Eckstein about the injury; instead the ALJ found that had the injury been reported, a business record of the accident would have been made. JA 56. Finally, the ALJ held that the November 27 Union Market Clinic Supplemental Report did not constitute notice because the report did not indicate that Stevenson's accident occurred at work and caused incapacitating injury. JA 55-56. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ's decision, with Judge Miller dissenting. 4

II. Burden of Proof

Under the Act, the Benefits Review Board was bound to regard the ALJ's findings of fact as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3). This court must correct the BRB's errors of law and determine if the BRB has adhered to its proper scope of review. We must also conduct an independent review of the record to determine if the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Vinson, 623 F.2d 1117, 1119 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980). See Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 606 F.2d 1324, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1979), rev'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 268, 101 S.Ct. 509, 66 L.Ed.2d 446 (1980).

Sections 912(a) and (b) require that the injured employee notify the employer in writing within thirty days of injury. Section 912(d), however, provides that: "Failure to give such notice shall not bar any claim under this chapter (1) if the employer (or his agent in charge of the business in the place where the injury occurred) or the carrier had knowledge of the injury or death and the deputy commissioner determines that the employer or carrier has not been prejudiced by failure to give such notice...." Section 920 says: "In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary-... (b) That sufficient notice of such claim has been given...."

Linens contends that the § 920(b) presumption applies only to §§ 912(b) and (c), and not to § 912(d). 5 Linens asserts that § 920(b)'s reference to "sufficient notice" has meaning only with respect to those sections which set forth the technical requirements for notice, i.e., §§ 912(b) and (c). Since § 912(d) speaks only of "failure to give such notice" and "knowledge" of injury in the absence of notice, a presumption regarding "sufficient notice" cannot apply to that section. See Peterson v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 13 BRBS 891, BRB No. 78-610 (June 11, 1981) (Smith, J., concurring) (§ 920(b) presumption does not apply to § 913).

Linens' narrow parsing of the statute would drastically reduce the benefit of the § 920(b) presumption. Section 912(d)'s "actual knowledge" provision is designed to protect claimants who have failed to comply with the technical requirements of §§ 912(b) and (c). If...

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