Stevenson v. Stein

• Decision Date: 09 October 1963
• Citation: 412 Pa. 478,195 A.2d 268
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Harold A. STEVENSON, Appellant, v. Elias H. STEIN, Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., Leonard A. Gottlieb, Ruth Marmon and the Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia.

Page 268

195 A.2d 268

412 Pa. 478

Harold A. STEVENSON, Appellant, v. Elias H. STEIN, Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., Leonard A. Gottlieb, Ruth Marmon and the

Redevelopment Authority of the City of

Philadelphia.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Oct. 9, 1963.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1963.

Lawrence J. Richette, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Irving Segal, Philadelphia, for appellee Ruth Marmon.

Sidney B. Gottlieb, Philadelphia, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, of counsel, for appellee Leonard A. Gottlieb.

Jerome J. Shestack, George P. Williams, III, Philadelphia, for appellee Elias H. Stein.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

EAGEN, Justice.

On November 30, 1958, sixty-four acres of land located in the Eastwick section of Philadelphia, were condemned by the Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia (Authority). The record title owner as of the date of the condemnation was the defendant-appellee, Elias H. Stein.

On June 4, 1959, the plaintiff-appellant, Harold Stevenson, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that he was the legal owner of the land at the date of condemnation by virtue of his having held continuous adverse possession thereof for a period of more than twenty-one years. He also asked that certain unsatisfied mortgages be declared discharged. ¹

By agreement, the issue was tried before a judge without a jury. The trial consumed twenty-four trial days and the testimony covers more than 4500 pages of the record.

The trial judge found that Stevenson had not exercised open, notorious, hostile, exclusive and continuous possession of the land, or any portion thereof, for a twenty-one year period, and entered an appropriate order in favor of the defendants. Exceptions to the findings, conclusions and decree were dismissed by the court en banc. This appeal followed.

The first question for decision is the availability of the action of declaratory judgment in a case of this nature. Even though the granting of such a petition is a matter that lies within the judicial discretion of the court, and even though both parties join in asking such a judgment, the availability question must be determined on appeal. Stofflet and Tillotson v. Chester H. A., 346 Pa. 574, 31 A.2d 274 (1943); McWilliams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644, 179 A.2d 222 (1962). Ordinarily declaratory judgment does not lie where there is a dispute as to the facts, or such controversy may arise. So too, such a judgment should not be granted where a more appropriate remedy is available. McWilliams v. McCabe, supra; Ridley Park Shopping Center, Inc., v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 407 Pa. 230, 180 A.2d 1 (1962); and, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Seward, 407 Pa. 628, 182 A.2d 715 (1962).

While the issue herein is purely factual as our subsequent discussion will establish it is clear that this is an unusual and not the 'ordinary' case. Moreover, no other 'appropriate' remedy is available.

When this action was commenced, a perfect fee simple title to the land involved was already vested in the Authority as a result of the condemnation. The litigation can in no way effect that title, nor is there any suggestion that any of the parties have any rights in the land superior to those of the Authority. Hence, no title to real estate is involved nor is the validity of the mortgages as encumbrances on the title in issue. The only controversy to be determined is who is entitled to the condemnation award which the Authority must pay. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that an action to quiet title is not 'an appropriate remedy.' Nor does any other conventional remedy present a vehicle for resolving the dispute.

We, therefore, conclude that under the circumstances presented, declaratory judgment is proper and the court below did not abuse its discretion in entertaining the action.

The plaintiff contended that he, or his privies, (members of his immediate family) were in exclusive and continuous possession of the tract from the Fall of 1928 until 1960, and that no one questioned their right to possession until after the condemnation. Of course, the burden of proving this adverse possession was upon the plaintiff by credible, clear and definitive proof. Hood v. Hood, 25 Pa. 417 (1855); Johns v. Johns, 244 Pa. 48, 90 A. 535 (1914); Robin v. Brown, 308 Pa. 123, 162 A. 161 (1932); and, Conneaut Lake Park, Inc. v. Klingensmith, 362 Pa. 592, 66 A.2d 828 (1949).

The plaintiff testified that he moved on the land in 1928 and took up residence in an old dilapidated building which he repaired; that he continued to reside thereon until 1960, during which time he farmed the land in large part; that he moved old wrecked automobiles to the site, dissected them and sold the used parts; that other members of his immediate family resided on the tract for substantial periods of time during these years and also farmed a portion thereof. Several witnesses corroborated this testimony in essential part.

On the other hand, the defendants offered many witnesses in contradiction. Some testified that the plaintiff did not personally reside on the land or use any portion thereof until the year 1952; some stated that the plaintiff resided at another distinct address between 1939 and 1946; others testified that no member of the plaintiff's family resided on or used the land prior to 1952, except a daughter and her husband, who lived thereon from about 1938 to 1946, and cultivated a small portion thereof. Voting, probation and hospital records were offered in evidence to establish that the plaintiff resided elsewhere than claimed during several years of the...