Steward v. Bowen

Decision Date02 November 1988
Docket NumberNo. 87-2043,87-2043
Citation858 F.2d 1295
Parties, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 14204A Florence STEWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Edward Lonergan, Doherty, Lonergan & Hovanesian, Cambridge, Mass., for plaintiff-appellant.

Donald T. McDougall, Asst. Regional Counsel for Dept. of Health and Human Services, Anton Valukas, U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Before FLAUM, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Florence Steward appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("Secretary"). Steward filed an application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income pursuant to Secs. 216(i), 223(d), and 1614 of the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. Secs. 416(i), 423(d), and 1382c. In granting the Secretary's motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the Secretary's determination that Steward is not disabled was supported by substantial evidence.

Steward raises three issues on appeal. First, she contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") who conducted her administrative hearing erred in concluding that her severe impairments, when considered in combination, do not equal a listed impairment. Second, Steward argues that the ALJ erroneously concluded that she is capable of performing her past relevant work. Finally, Steward contests the ALJ's rejection of her claim that the pain resulting from her impairments prohibits her from performing her past relevant work. Because we conclude that the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm. 1

I.

On September 7, 1983, Steward filed an application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Steward alleged that she was disabled after August 4, 1983, as a result of numerous impairments, including severe arthritis, asthma, obesity, and hearing problems. See 42 U.S.C. Secs. 416(i), 423(d), and 1382c. At the state agency level, Steward's application was initially denied and was denied again on reconsideration. As a result, Steward sought an administrative hearing on her claims. The hearing was held on December 13, 1984, before an ALJ. On January 24, 1985, the ALJ filed his decision; he concluded that Steward is not disabled within the meaning of the Act because she is capable of doing her "past relevant work." 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(e). He further concluded that Steward's impairments, although severe, do not meet or equal a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(d). Steward requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ's decision. The Council denied her request, and the ALJ's decision thereby became the final decision of the Secretary.

On July 29, 1985, Steward filed a complaint in federal district court seeking judicial review of the Secretary's decision. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the case was referred to a magistrate. The magistrate concluded that the Secretary's decision on Steward's disability claim was supported by substantial evidence. As a result, the magistrate recommended that the district judge deny Steward's motion for summary judgment, and grant the Secretary's motion. On May 28, 1987, the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment. Steward filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if he or she "is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairmant which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months...." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382c(a)(3)(A). To determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act, a five-step inquiry is employed.

The following steps are addressed in order. (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Is the claimant's impairment "severe"? (3) Does the impairment meet or exceed one of a list of specific impairments? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation? (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work within the economy? An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or on steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops [the] inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520 (1983).

Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 607 n. 2 (7th Cir.1984). 2

In the present case, the ALJ concluded that Steward was not gainfully employed. 3 He further determined that Steward's impairments, including osteoarthritis in her right knee, bronchial asthma, chronic bronchitis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and obesity, were "severe" when considered together. The ALJ concluded that, although severe, Steward's impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of the Secretary's regulations. The ALJ also found that Steward was capable of doing her past relevant work. He therefore held that Steward is not disabled. As a result, the ALJ did not determine whether, considering Steward's age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity, she is capable of performing any other work within the national economy.

On appeal, our standard of review is essentially the same as the district court's; we must determine whether the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Garfield, 732 F.2d at 607. Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). If the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we must affirm, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), unless the Secretary made an error of law. Garfield, 732 F.2d at 607 (citing Schmoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir.1980)).

III.

Steward's first argument on appeal is that the ALJ's conclusion that her severe impairments do not equal a listed impairment is not supported by substantial evidence. 4 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(d). Specifically, Steward contends that the ALJ failed to consider the combined impact of her impairments in making his equivalency determination. She argues that if all of her impairments are considered in combination they meet the listed impairment in Sec. 1.03(c). Steward acknowledges that she did not have the specific surgery called for in Sec. 1.03(c). She asserts, however, that she had a similar surgical procedure and that, contrary to the ALJ's conclusion, she has never returned to full weight-bearing status.

Once the Secretary finds that a combination of impairments is severe, these impairments must be considered in combination throughout the five-step disability determination process. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(2)(C). In the present case, it is clear from the ALJ's opinion that he did in fact consider the combined impact of all of Steward's impairments in determining that they neither meet nor equal a listed impairment. The ALJ specifically found that the medical evidence did not establish "that any of claimant's impairments, either alone or in combination, are severe enough to either meet or equal the requirements of any impairments listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations." ALJ's Opinion at 7 (emphasis added). In regard to Steward's specific contention that her impairments equal the listing at Sec. 1.03(c), the ALJ found that the medical evidence did not "establish that the claimant has had reconstructive surgery or a surgical arthrodesis of the right knee joint or has failed to return to full weight-bearing status after such surgical procedure." Id. He therefore concluded that Steward's combined impairments did not meet or equal any listed impairment.

Steward's claim that she has never returned to full weight-bearing status was contradicted both by her own testimony, as well as by the reports of several physicians who examined her. Steward testified that she can walk 3-4 blocks without a cane, and can stand for approximately 30 minutes before the pain in her knee forces her to sit down. Dr. Brasch, a consulting physician who examined the claimant, indicated that Steward could walk 15 feet without a cane. Dr. Van Nguyen, another consulting/examining physician, stated that Steward was able to walk slowly around the examining room without any assistance. Although the evidence demonstrates that Steward's ability to walk, climb, stoop, and bend are limited by her arthritis, this evidence does not undermine the Secretary's conclusion that Steward failed to show that she has not returned to full weight-bearing status. She also does not dispute that the surgery she underwent is not the procedure required under Sec. 1.03(c).

Moreover, the record is devoid of an opinion by any treating, consulting/examining, or non-examining physician that Steward's impairments, either alone or in combination, meet or equal any listed impairment. In contrast, the record does contain two opinions by consulting physicians that Steward's impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment. Both Drs. Bergman and Kwedar reviewed Steward's records 5 and concluded that her impairments are not the medical equivalent of a listed impairment. A doctor's signature on the specific form that both Dr. Kwedar and Dr. Bergman completed and signed "is proof that a physician designated by the Secretary has considered the question of whether the claimant's...

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