Steward v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., Case No. 18-CV-1124-SMY
| Decision Date | 29 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-CV-1124-SMY |
| Citation | 469 F.Supp.3d 872 |
| Parties | Roger STEWARD, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Catherine Hilton, Ron A. Austin, Ron Austin Law, Gretna, LA, Celeste Brustowicz, Stephen Wussow, Stuart H. Smith, Victor T. Cobb, Cooper Law Firm, New Orleans, LA, David R. Barney, Jr., Kevin Wayne Thompson, Thompson Barney, Charleston, WV, Katrina Carroll, Carlson Lynch LLP, Chicago, IL, Paul F. Henry, Paul Henry Law, Richard K. Kruger, Kruger, Henry & Hunter, Metropolis, IL, James F. Clayborne, Jr., Clayborne, Sabo and Wagner LLP, Belleville, IL, for Plaintiff Roger Steward.
Catherine Hilton, Ron A. Austin, Ron Austin Law, Gretna, LA, Celeste Brustowicz, Stephen Wussow, Stuart H. Smith, Victor T. Cobb, Cooper Law Firm, New Orleans, LA, David R. Barney, Jr., Thompson Barney, Charleston, WV, Katrina Carroll, Carlson Lynch LLP, Chicago, IL, Paul F. Henry, Paul Henry Law, Richard K. Kruger, Kruger, Henry & Hunter, Metropolis, IL, James F. Clayborne, Jr., Clayborne, Sabo and Wagner LLP, Belleville, IL, for Plaintiff Saundra Steward.
James F. Clayborne, Jr., Clayborne, Sabo and Wagner LLP, Belleville, IL, Katrina Carroll, Carlson Lynch LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs Clyde Schmidt, Joan Schmidt, Tim Beck, Charlotte Beck, Randy Langford, Brenda Langford, Todd Faulkner, Kim Faulkner.
Kenneth L. Chernof, Ethan G. Shenkman, Michael David Daneker, Stephanie B. Weirick, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, DC, Bart C. Sullivan, Fox Smith, LLC, John E. Galvin, Suzanne P. Galvin, Thompson Coburn LLP, St. Louis, MO, Catherine B. Schumacher, Arnold Porter Kay Scholer LLP, New York, NY, Eliseo R. Puig, Timothy R. MacDonald, Arnold & Porter, LLP, Denver, CO, John F. Hagan, Jr., Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
In this putative class action, Plaintiffs allege that from 1963 to 2017, a plant making uranium hexafluoride ("UF6") operated on the outskirts of Metropolis, Illinois and emitted air contaminated with radioactive and other toxic materials. They further allege that throughout the years, this material settled into the soil and buildings around Metropolis, causing property loss and damages. Plaintiffs seek compensation for property damage, personal injuries, and remediation from Defendant Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell"), which now owns the plant.
In the Amended Complaint (Doc. 89), Plaintiffs assert state law claims of negligence, trespass, nuisance, property damage, failure to warn, ultra-hazardous activity, gross negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Counts I – VIII) as well as federal claims pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq. (Count IX), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq. (Count X), and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq. (Count XI).
Now pending before the Court are Honeywell's Second Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 95), Motion for Order to Stipulate Regarding Claims Related to Personal Injury and Emotional Distress (Doc. 119), and Motion for Oral Argument or Referral to Magistrate Judge (Doc. 139). For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part , the Motion for Order to Stipulate is DENIED , and the Motion for Oral Argument or Referral to Magistrate Judge is DENIED .
Defendant seeks entry of a "stipulated order" regarding a "Joint Stipulation to Limit Claims Related to Personal Injury and Emotional Distress." It is unclear why such an order is required, and Defendant has not provided the stipulation for the Court's review. Accordingly, this Motion is DENIED . Because the Court is able to resolve Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on the written submissions, oral argument and/or referral to the Magistrate Judge are unnecessary. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion (Doc. 139) is also DENIED.
The federal system of notice pleading requires only that a plaintiff provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, the allegations must be "more than labels and conclusions." Pugh v. Tribune Co. , 521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2008). This requirement is satisfied if the Complaint (1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all allegations in the Complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant does not have a license to dispose of plutonium1 and is not a party to any indemnification agreement under the PAA (Doc. 89, ¶¶ 9, 35). They cite Strong v. Republic Services, Inc. , 283 F.Supp.3d 759 (E.D. Mo. 2017) and Banks v. Cotter Corp. , 2019 WL 1426259 (E.D. Mo. 2019), for the proposition that the PAA does not apply if there is no license. In Strong , the court held that "there cannot be federal jurisdiction under the PAA without a license or an indemnity agreement." Id. 283 F.Supp.3d at 766, 773. In Banks, the court found that there was an insufficient showing that the license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") to the defendant covered the activity complained of by plaintiff. Id. 2019 WL 1426259 at * 9. But those cases speak to federal court jurisdiction and there is no dispute as to this Court's jurisdiction; the question is whether Plaintiff's state law claims are preempted by the Price-Anderson Nuclear Liability Act of 1957 ("PAA"). 42 U.S.C. § 2210 ().
The PAA was enacted in furtherance of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011, et seq. , to encourage private investment in nuclear energy by ensuring that public funds are available to compensate affected parties in the event of a nuclear incident and to limit liability for such nuclear incidents. 42 U.S.C. § 2012 ; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. , 438 U.S. 59, 64-65, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). At the time of its enactment, the Atomic Energy Act provided for the licensing of privately constructed and operated nuclear power plants that would be supervised by the Atomic Energy Commission (now the NRC). Id. at 63, 98 S.Ct. 2620. The PAA subsequently required such licensed facilities to purchase private liability insurance in exchange for indemnification by the federal government for damages in excess of the amount covered by private insurance. Id. 64-5, 98 S.Ct. 2620 ; 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (a - c). Through various amendments, the funds used to compensate victims were broadened to include indemnification from a fund subsidized by nuclear reactor owners. Id.
In the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 ("Amendments Act"), Congress gave federal courts original jurisdiction over "any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident." 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2). "The Amendments Act creates a federal cause of action which did not exist prior to the Act, establishes federal jurisdiction for that cause of action, and channels all legal liability to the federal courts through that cause of action." In re TMI Litigation Cases Consol. II , 940 F.2d 832, 856-857 (3rd Cir. 1991). Consequently, if Plaintiffs’ state law claims constitute a "public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident," such claims must be brought pursuant to the PAA.2 "[A] state cause of action is not merely transferred to federal court; instead a new federal cause of action supplants the prior state cause of action" because the Amendments Act created an "overlay of federal law upon the rights and remedies previously available under state law." O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co. , 13 F.3d 1090, 1099-1100, 1101 (7th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiffs first maintain that the contamination of their property with radioactive material is not governed by the PAA because it is not a nuclear incident (which they define as a discrete and catastrophic event, like a nuclear plant meltdown and resulting fallout, originating in a licensed facility). Defendant urges a more expansive reading, arguing that the PAA applies to any claim for property damage resulting from exposure to nuclear radiation, regardless of the licensing status of the facility from which the nuclear material was released. The PAA defines a "public liability action" as "any suit asserting ..." "any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident ...." (with various exceptions not relevant here). 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) and (w). Relatedly, a "nuclear incident" is defined as "any occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within the United States causing, within or outside the United States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of...
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