Stewart v. Coder

• Citation: 11 Pa. 90
• Parties: JAMES STEWART <I>v.</I> DENNIS CODER.
• Decision Date: 30 May 1849
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

11 Pa. 90

JAMES STEWART v. DENNIS CODER.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 30, 1849.

May 30.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Huntingdon.

J. G. Miles, for the plaintiff in error.

M'Allister and Benedict, contrà.—If the receipt of the 1st February, 1843, was fraudulent, everything done in pursuance of

it was so, and Coder and Oyer would still stand as vendee and vendor under the agreement of 1837. The judgments anterior to the receipt, if it were fraudulent, would still bind the legal title, and no fraud of Coder and Oyer could destroy the lien or change or diminish the fund. Upon levy and sale the sheriff's vendee would become the owner of that legal title, and all its rights and remedies would vest in him as fully as they were originally in Oyer: Roberts Fraud. Con. 21; Stouffer v. Coleman, 1 Y. 393; Thompson v. Dougherty, 12 S. & R. 455-459; Fasholt v. Reed, 16 S. & R. 266: Chahoon v. Hollenbach, 16 S. & R. 425; M'Mullen v. Werner, 16 S. & R. 18; M'Kee v. Gilchrist, 3 Watts, 230; Richter v. Selin, 8 S. & R. 440; Anwerter v. Mathiot, 9 S. & R. 397.

Creditor has no other way of testing validity of such a transaction than by sale on execution: such a sale by creditor is the only way a purchaser can become invested with their rights under the stat. 13 Eliz.: Rob. Fraud. Con. 423; 12 S. & R. 458; Foster v. Walton, 5 Watts, 379. The respective rights of the original vendor and vendee must be preserved, or specific performance could never be decreed, nor could their agreement be perfected. By levy and sale of Oyer's title the purchaser could compel payment of the balance of the purchase-money. He could make a deed, and in no other way could the title be perfected, or the rights of the original vendee be preserved: 3 Watts, 232.

The rights of creditors are one, they cannot separate. One set cannot defeat the prior vested rights of others. The first judgments were liens upon Oyer's legal title, if his conveyance to Coder was fraudulent, and the holders of them had a right to proceed to levy and sale, and to have the proceeds distributed among them according to priority. These were vested rights which subsequent judgment-creditors of Oyer could not take from them. By the sheriff's sale on one of those first judgments passed the right to receive the unpaid purchase-money. And this having been done for the benefit of creditors, part of those creditors cannot attach that unpaid purchase-money, and take from the sheriff's vendee what became his by a sale for their benefit. We deny the right of creditors to separate their interests, and then to pursue different and conflicting remedies, each to secure the same fund, and both to be successful: Broom's Maxims, 322; 2 Doug. 472; Ib. 697; Cowper, 200; Ib. 792.

The opinion of this court was delivered by ROGERS, J.

The defendant takes defence on two grounds. 1st. He denies the fraud charged by the plaintiff, and insists that the transaction between him and Oyer was bonâ fide, and for a valuable consideration; and, secondly, admitting that it was fraudulent as being intended to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors, the plaintiff has no remedy in this action. The defendant contends that the lien creditors of Oyer, prior to the 28th October, 1843, when the bond from Coder to Oyer was attached, were entitled to the money, if any was due; that they proceeded to levy and sale of the land of the vendor, and that the proceeds of sale were appropriated to their use. The court, after stating the facts, presented the case to the jury in a double aspect; on the first plea referring the point of fraud to the jury; and next charging them in express terms, that granting it was fraudulent, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, because the judicial sale of the vendor's interest exhausted the rights of Oyer's creditors, and left nothing for the attaching creditor. As on the last point there was not a single disputed fact, the charge of the court was in effect, that the jury should find a verdict in favour of the defendant. If the court was right in this position, it is a flat bar to the plaintiff's action, and consequently supersedes the necessity of inquiring into the first point, to which all the errors in the rejection and...