Stewart v. Dameron, Civ. A. No. 70-131.
Citation | 321 F. Supp. 886 |
Decision Date | 29 January 1971 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 70-131. |
Parties | Frank STEWART v. Charles H. DAMERON, District Attorney ad hoc, East Baton Rouge Parish, Sargent Pitcher, District Attorney, East Baton Rouge Parish, Honorable John Covington, Judge, 19th Judicial District Court, Captain Leroy Watson, Sheriff's Department, East Baton Rouge Parish, and James Lee Moore (alias Tiny Tim). |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Benjamin E. Smith, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.
Emile C. Rolfs, III, Baton Rouge, La., for Charles H. Dameron.
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr., Ralph L. Roy, Baton Rouge, La., William M. Shaw, Homer, La., for Sargent Pitcher, Jr.
Carlos G. Spaht, Baton Rouge, La., for Sargent Pitcher, Jr. and Judge John S. Covington.
Joseph F. Keogh, Baton Rouge, La., for Captain Leroy Watson and Sargent Pitcher, Jr.
Plaintiff, Frank Stewart, is presently under indictment in the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, charged with violation of LSA-R.S. 14:26-14:30, as amended, i. e., conspiracy to commit murder. The indictment returned by the Grand Jury in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, on April 1, 1970, charges that the plaintiff herein, Frank Stewart, and one Alphonse James Snedecor did, on or about March 15, 1970, "willfully and unlawfully conspire together to murder one Woodrow W. Dumas." Mr. Dumas is the Mayor President of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana. After plaintiff was so charged, the State Court set his bail at $100,000 and refused, upon plaintiff's request, to reduce it. Plaintiff then applied to this Court for a reduction in bail, and after hearing arguments, this Court, considering the bail to be excessive under the circumstances, ordered it reduced. Plaintiff was then released on his own recognizance and thus remains at liberty at the present time. He now applies to this Court for injunctive relief and asks that the State Court be permanently restrained from further prosecuting him under this indictment. He alleges that he seeks this injunction particularly under the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, and generally under the provisions of Amendments I, IV, V and XIV to the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is alleged under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1443 and § 1343.
Plaintiff contends that the proposed prosecution is entirely without substance; is politically motivated; and is intended to suppress plaintiff's First Amendment rights to freely speak within the black community. He further contends that this prosecution began and proceeds without any real intent to punish criminal activities on the part of the plaintiff and has as its real intent the misuse of prosecutorial power of the District Attorney for the purpose of suppressing the efforts of the Negro community of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to exercise their right to "self-government, free speech, free assembly, self-determination, and human dignity". In opposition to the issuance of an injunction, defendants contend first that injunctive relief is specifically barred in this case by the express provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283, and secondly, that if Section 2283 does not expressly, on its face, bar the issuance of an injunction in this case, the interpretation of that statute by the United States Supreme Court, when applied to the facts of this case, preclude the issuance of an injunction herein.
Title 28, U.S.C.A., Section 2283 provides as follows:
"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
The plaintiff relies heavily on the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States ordered the issuance of an injunction prohibiting prosecution by the State of Louisiana in the case of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965). But the circumstances of Dombrowski are far different from those in the present case. Dombrowski was a suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief restraining the State of Louisiana from "prosecuting or threatening to prosecute" for alleged violation of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law. LSA-R.S. 14:358-14:373. That case involved a situation where the homes and the offices of the plaintiffs had been raided by State authorities and certain literature seized. As a result of the raid and the seizure, the plaintiffs were threatened with prosecution for allegedly violating the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Laws. Such a prosecution had, as its object, the prosecution of the plaintiffs for distributing or attempting to distribute certain literature and also to prevent the further distribution of certain literature by the plaintiffs. Obviously, there was, on the face of those proceedings, immediately raised the question of whether or not the prosecution or threatened prosecution by the State of Louisiana was for the purpose of preventing criminal activity or was instead for the purpose of depriving the plaintiffs of their First Amendment rights to freedom of expression. The Supreme Court of the United States concluded that even the pendency of such proposed litigation would have a "chilling effect" on the plaintiffs' exercise of their First Amendment rights and thus ordered that an injunction be granted. In the course of its opinion the Court, in Dombrowski v. Pfister, supra, 380 U.S., at 485-490, 85 S.Ct., at 1120-1122, said:
But since Sheridan, the United States Supreme Court has further clarified the scope of Section 2283. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1743, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970), the Court held:
Thus, it is now clear that contrary to what was said by the Court of Appeals in Sheridan v. Garrison, supra, Section 2283 is not merely "an enactment of the principle of comity," nor can its prohibitions be overcome in any other way than by a factual finding that injunctive relief is justified by one or more of the express exceptions contained therein.
There is, of course, no contention here that injunctive relief would be necessary in aid of this Court's...
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...States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The District Court declined to restrain the State Court (Stewart v. Dameron, E.D.La., 1971, 321 F. Supp. 886), but this Court vacated that order and remanded the case for a new evidentiary hearing, since "Stewart had not been allo......
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Stewart v. Dameron, 71-1483 Summary Calendar.
...murder. The district court, after holding a hearing on the merits, denied the injunctive relief sought and dismissed plaintiff's suit, 321 F.Supp. 886. At this hearing the district court placed the burden of proof on the State to prove the good faith of its prosecution, and plaintiff Stewar......
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Stewart v. Dameron, Civ. A. No. 70-131.
...November 9, 1970, and after hearing extensive testimony, for written reasons filed in the record hereof, injunctive relief was denied, 321 F.Supp. 886. Some eleven months thereafter, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 448 F.2d 396, on the very technical ground that this Court shou......